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Abstract 
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This thesis investigates how successive British governments in the last two decades 
of the Cold War developed and adapted civil defence policies aimed at mitigating 
the effects of a nuclear attack on the population of Britain. It tests the hypothesis 
that civil defence in Britain from 1972 until 1986 was shaped by three distinct 
influences; economic, ideological and external. It establishes in which ways and to 
what extent policy was shaped by these factors and which, if any, was the primary 
determinant of the major policy decisions of the time. 
 
It explains how changing economic, ideological and external contexts fused those 
policies with the political framework during those 15 years. It examines the theory 
and reality of civil defence, from its rebirth as a political and practical concern in 
1972 until the end of civil defence as a practical and political response against a 
specific nuclear threat in 1986. It does so within the framework of a wider Cold 
War defence policy and explains how policy assumptions were constituted and 
perpetuated. By extrapolating and further analysing the idea of policy development 
as a direct result of certain key factors, this thesis charts the conceptualisation and 
evolution of civil defence through its fluctuating humanitarian, political, insurance 
and deterrent functions by which such policy may be explained and understood. 
 
The thesis concludes that determining one dominant influence from within the 
intensely symbiotic relationship of ideology, economics and external affairs is 
problematic. Rather it can be seen that the initiation of civil defence policy was the 
aspect of the policy cycle most closely influenced by ideology. The later 
formulation and implementation of that policy was primarily determined by the 
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economic resources available. The ultimate existence of civil defence in its 
manifestation as protection against nuclear attack was wholly a reaction to the 
shifting developments of international affairs.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
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A Definition of Civil Defence 
For the purpose of this thesis, ‘civil defence’ will be used as defined in the 1948 
Civil Defence Act  (the prevailing legislation from 1972 to 1986), to mean: 
 
 ...any measures not amounting to actual combat for affording 
defence against any form of hostile attack by a foreign power or for 
depriving any form of attack by a foreign power of the whole or part 
of its effect, whether the measures are taken before, at or after the 
time of the attack.1  
 
 
This differs from ‘home defence’ which is a broader term used more widely during 
World War Two as it explicitly embraces circumstances where the use of coercive 
measures or military force are also related to matters of internal hostile threat or 
attack; for example, the use of the Home Guard2. However these terms are often 
used in policy discussion without very much distinction. The interchangeability in 
official documentation is illustrated by the then Co-ordinator of Voluntary Effort in 
Civil Defence, Sir Leslie Mavor, in an article in an internally circulated journal in 
1982: 
 
Don't be thrown by my recurrent references to 'civil' defence. For all 
practical purposes, 'home' and 'civil' defence mean the same, but I 
use the latter form in deference to the Home Secretary's wishes.3 
 
 
Despite Sir Leslie's assertions, the distinction between the two will be observed 
within this thesis for the purpose of clarity. 
                                               
1  Civil Defence Act 1948 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/12-13-14/5/contents (accessed 29 
November 2007) 
2  MacKenzie, S.P. (1995) p.17 
3  Mavor, L. (1982) p.31 
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Methodology 
This thesis adopts a qualitative case study methodology with a linear research 
design, focussing on one primary area of data collection, document and archival 
analysis, and one secondary area, expert interviews. The emphasis on qualitative 
methodology lies with the securing of content and process in context, archival 
research lent itself very well to the narrow, in depth focus of the study. 
 
The research process is based on a broadly linear model, divided into five main 
stages: theory specification, data specification and methodology construction, data 
collection (archival), data collection (interviews) and data analysis.  The 
methodology based on the analysis of documentary and archival sources with 
selected interviews was adopted as it offered the best opportunity for the 
development of new studies and modern interpretations of existing events.  
 
Rodney Lowe notes three advantages of using public records for research.4 Firstly, 
such records contain the broadest range of information upon which civil defence 
policy was made. Secondly, the genesis of policy and its eventual execution can be 
traced through the large amounts of documentation produced by the ‘lower levels’ 
of government and therefore is able to trace the decision making process and the 
eventual implementation of policy through the various stages of acknowledgement, 
discussion and refinement. Thirdly, it is possible to find previously unavailable 
views of ministers and other government officials by means of sifting through the 
                                               
4  Lowe (1997)  pp.241-2 
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large volumes of departmental records. So in conclusion, as Burnham et al. states,5 
there is a great deal of evidence that the use of public records in national and 
regional archives can make a substantial contribution towards the understanding of 
the complicated policy making process of modern government.  
 
The research is predominantly archival but utilises interviews with experts in 
aspects of civil defence policy in order to provide complementary data to 
strengthen and round findings and ensure that analysis can be cross checked against 
sources and methodology. This is, as Bryman notes, consistent with the standard of 
triangulation which entails using more than one method or source of data.6 A 
loosely-structured interview technique was used, combining a number of open-
ended standardised questions followed by a period of free discussion, leaving open 
the possibility of an exploratory conversation around the themes rather than 
demanding answers which fit a particular format or structure. As Rubin and Rubin 
(1995) note, “Qualitative interviewing requires listening carefully enough to hear 
the meanings, interpretations and understandings that give shape to the worlds of 
the interviewees”7. Used in conjunction with the analysis of records in the public 
domain in order to fill in the gaps and reveal what may not have been noted in 
official documents, the data collected from one to one interviewing offers the 
potential for  personal interpretations of events and insight into thought processes 
and the thinking behind particular conclusions. 
 
                                               
5  Burnham et al. (2004)  p.177 
6  Bryman (2001) p.274 
7  Rubin & Rubin (1995) p.7 
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The interviewees were chosen for their ability to represent the widest possible 
range of civil defence knowledge. Bruce Kent is a political activist and the former 
Chair of War on Want and the International Peace Bureau. From 1980 to 1990 he 
served as the General Secretary and later Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND). He remains Vice-President of CND and an active campaigner 
on peace issues. John Preston is Professor of Education at the University of East 
London. His research explores the relationship between security and ‘disaster 
education’ and how disasters can be seen to be pedagogical events which involve 
learning and evolve through public reaction and participation. He is the author of 
Disaster Education (2010) and Protect and Survive: ‘whiteness’ and the 
middle‐class family in civil defence pedagogies in the Journal of Education Policy 
(vol. 23, issue 5, 2008). Dr Robin Woolven served as an Intelligence Ofﬁcer with 
the Security Service 1980–97. His 2002 Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College 
London was titled Civil defence in London 1935-1945: the formation and 
implementation of the policy for, and the performance of, the A.R.P. (later C.D.) 
services in London and he researches on aspects of home defence and security. 
 
Two separate methods of data gathering is important not only for this reason. The 
15-year span of the scope of the research also engenders certain challenges which 
are detailed below. Firstly, the historical focus of the research introduces a certain 
challenge in the thirty year (and in the case of certain documents judged to be of 
particular sensitivity, up to one hundred year) closure rule imposed on most public 
records by the Public Records Act of 1967. The Freedom of Information Act of 
2001 (which came fully into effect from the 1st of January 2005) created a statutory 
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right to access internal documents held by public authorities; the 30 year standard 
closure period no longer determines access to records. Instead, information is 
assumed to be ‘open’ immediately unless one of the exemptions set out in the Act 
applies. Although ultimately, power still rests with the government who have the 
final say in the form of a ministerial veto. While this gave the author unprecedented 
access to primary material not available in previous research, there was certainly a 
notable proportion of documents related to the last decade of the Cold War that 
while pertinent to the research, remain inaccessible for the foreseeable future. 
However, the advantages for unique primary data gathering in this method 
outweigh the disadvantages of omission.  
 
Secondly, this historical focus precluded the interview of government individuals 
central to the government decision making process during the period in question; 
where civil servants and former politicians involved with civil defence are still 
alive, they have retired from the public sphere and are unable or unwilling to be 
interviewed.  It is for this reasons that the interviews were conducted with 
individuals with secondary expertise in civil defence and the policy making 
process; academics, former military personnel and defence and senior members of 
anti-nuclear peace groups. 
 
The document research took place mainly in the National Archives, as the largest 
holder of government records in the UK. As Lowe states, there is no more 
important single source of information in the UK for those interested in policy 
13 
 
making.8 Accounts of the detailed workings of successive British governments and 
the key players within those administrations found within these archives are a vital 
primary resource for this research. In order to prevent an unrepresentative reliance 
on a single document source other repositories such as the British Library, 
Bishopsgate Institute, London School of Economics archives and the Liddell Hart 
Centre for Military Archives were utilised in order to strengthen and round findings 
and ensure that the analysis can be cross checked against sources. 
 
For the purpose of the research, a distinction between primary, secondary and 
tertiary sources is made in the following way. Primary materials are so classified if 
they were produced at the time as a direct result of the event in question or policy 
making process. In order to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the research, 
primary documents were used wherever possible. Secondary and tertiary material 
was consulted where appropriate and where issues of authenticity and credibility 
could be resolved and where material could be corroborated by evidence from 
primary sources.  
 
Research Questions 
Two clearly defined periods in civil defence policy can be identified from the end 
of World War Two until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. The first period is 
illustrated by the unsophisticated atomic war planning based on the strategic 
defence principles of World War Two which lasted from the Berlin blockade in 
1948 through to the Cuban crisis of 1962 and the eventual winding down of civil 
                                               
8  Lowe (1997) p.240 
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defence provision in 1968. The second was the period of escalating world tensions 
and conflicted ideology that characterised civil defence policy from the reactivation 
of civil defence as a policy concern in 1972, exacerbated under the Thatcher 
governments from 1979 until 1986, when thawing of East-West relations saw civil 
defence change to encompass a broader civil emergencies remit. This thesis 
explores the political response to the threat of nuclear attack from the perspective 
of policy decisions made in the post-1972 years and seeks to explain the 
development of civil defence from its reactivation in 1972 until 1986. As such, the 
primary questions which comprise its intellectual framework are: 
1. How did British civil defence policy develop between 1972 and 1986 
2. In what ways have the influences of economics, ideology and external 
actors and events shaped civil defence policy? 
3. Which of these three factors, if any, could be said to be the determining 
influence on the development of civil defence? 
 
While no body of work offers a comprehensive examination of multiple policy 
influences, it is questions of economics, ideological considerations and events on 
the world stage that can most often be found in both the primary documents of the 
time and the literature. The economic factors underpinning policy determination 
have been the most openly discussed amongst both successive governments and 
subsequent researchers.  As N.J. McCamley summarises in his book Cold War 
Nuclear Bunkers: 
 
The progress and development of civil defence…in the United 
Kingdom was fashioned by three forces: the fluctuating tensions of 
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east-west diplomacy; the often parlous state of the British Economy 
and the ideologies of the political party in power.9 
 
This is also an approach identified by Grant (2006) who stated of civil defence in 
the early decades of the Cold War: 
 
…it is important to understand the factors which determined how it 
[civil defence policy] developed in cold war Britain. There were four 
big, and interconnecting, themes; these were, firstly, the changing 
nature of nuclear attack; secondly, the events and changing nature of 
the cold war; thirdly, the precarious state of the British economy; and 
finally the need to present an image of a `survivable' nuclear war.10 
 
 
The changing nature of nuclear attack was of greater significance in the post-World 
War Two period, as planning assumptions shifted from contemplation of the 
relatively small scale destruction possible from the first atomic bombs to 
considerations of the much greater devastation made possible by the advent of the 
hydrogen bomb. By 1972, the stockpiles of nuclear weapons by both East and West 
rendered further technological developments redundant as far as destructive 
capabilities – and therefore civil defence measures – were concerned. However, 
Grant’s other factors – the changing nature of Cold War events, the need by 
successive governments to manage the public face of nuclear war and civil defence 
for political and ideological reasons, and the precarious state of the British 
economy continued to demonstrate their influence until the end of the Cold War.  
 
                                               
9  McCamley, N.J. (2002) p.147 
10  Grant, M. (2006) p.12 
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Because of their significance, it is these broad determinants that have been chosen 
as the framework with which to analyse policy decision making.  This analytical 
framework is significant in its ability to offer a unified and original approach to the 
analysis of civil defence policy. By analysing policy making through the filter of 
these intertwined influences, this thesis explains the reasoning behind the genesis, 
development and termination of civil defence policies in the post-1972 period and 
how those policies were adopted and adapted through the changing historical 
contexts of the later Cold War.  
 
Britain's fluctuating and often precarious economic situation; the ideological 
principles and convictions of the political party in power and the ebb and flow of 
tensions played out on the Cold War world stage are examined to see if they 
determined why civil defence policies of the period were developed as they were. 
By analysing the history of policy making in this thematically structured way, the 
evolution of civil defence from humanitarian utility to weapon of deterrence can be 
traced and explained.  
 
The thesis recognises the conceptual models of policy analysis found in the major 
literature as a necessary and useful guide to understanding policy decisions but 
does not adopt one particular model or theory as a primary method by which to 
analyse civil defence policy.  As Hill states: 
 
Attempts to analyse the policy process are inescapably based upon 
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explicit or implicit models of the policy system. In some cases the 
model is seen as being 'driven' by environmental forces, in others by 
internal objectives and goals, in yet others by the internal perceptions 
of the external environment. 11 
 
 
As Dye notes,12 however, most public policies lend themselves not to explanation 
through a single model but through several different, often contradictory, models. 
Each model offers an individual way of thinking about civil defence policy and as 
such, this thesis seeks to understand both policy determination and the construction 
and operation of policy processes using several conceptual models.  
 
There are a number of issues relating to the exploration of these questions that this 
thesis does not cover. Firstly, it does not attempt to catalogue or discuss in depth 
the actual provisions for public protection during the Cold War as these have been 
comprehensively detailed elsewhere13. Instead the focus is on the rationales for 
civil defence and analyses of the political, governmental and legislative discussions 
that led to the creation and implementation of British civil defence policy from 
1972 onwards. As such it does not attempt to re-evaluate existing accounts of 
systems and structures, but rather seeks to sit alongside them as a complementary 
work. Neither does this thesis seek to evaluate the technical effectiveness of civil 
defence; many previous works describe the effects of nuclear weapons and the 
perceived ability or otherwise of civil defence to mitigate these.14 It is not the aim 
                                               
11  Hill, M. (1993) p.6 
12  Dye, T. (2008) p.12 
13  See footnote 17 
14  Openshaw, S. et al. (1983) Doomsday: Britain after Nuclear Attack, Goodwin, P. (1981) Nuclear 
War: The Facts on Our Survival, Greene, O. et al. (1982) London After the Bomb,  Tyrrell, I. (1982) The 
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of this thesis to determine the utility of civil defence and when such questions are 
raised it is in order to explore how such limits are responded to in policy making.  
 
Secondly, the thesis concentrates on the civil defence policy making which is 
directly concerned with protecting the public from nuclear attack. It does not 
consider the issue of policy creation in light of attack by conventional, chemical or 
biological weapons and neither does it investigate the issues of civil defence in 
mitigating the effects of natural or industrial disasters. Although these aspects of 
civil defence were often of parallel concern to policymakers and considered by 
certain parliamentarians as a complementary reason to support robust nuclear civil 
defence provision,15 the policy considerations that shaped civil defence against 
nuclear attack represent some of the most complex and challenging during the later 
Cold War and as such it is on that aspect of policy development that this thesis 
concentrates.  
 
Lastly, it is recognised that in narrowing the focus of research to investigate just 
three potential policy determinants, consideration of other policy influences must 
be sacrificed in order to provide sufficient depth of analysis. In particular, policy 
evaluation in response to the technical advancement of nuclear weapons, 
recognised by some16 to be important catalysts in the advancement of civil defence 
                                                                                                                                        
Survival Option,  Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (1982) Nuclear Attack: Civil 
Defence,  Radical Statistics (1982) The Nuclear Numbers Game, Tucker, A. and Gleisner, J. (1982) 
Crucible of Despair: the effects of nuclear war. 
15  Gray, J. & Rea, J.  HL Deb 01 November 1983, vol. 444, cc.523-49  
16  Grant, M. (2006), Smith, M. (2009) 
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in the pre-1968 period, is not analysed to a comparable depth. The pre-1968 period 
is not the primary focus of this research and as such, while it is acknowledged that 
the rapid development of atomic weapons in the post-war period had significant 
and lasting influence on post-1972 policy making, issues of weapons development 
and scientific advancement are not discussed within this policy-orientated work.  
 
It is also worth noting that the nature of civil defence policy-making is often 
complex, ill-defined and impossible to neatly categorise and as such, there are 
many places in this thesis where the triumvirate of economics, ideology and 
external factors cannot be clearly separated. This is most obvious in Chapter 5 in 
the discussion of external factors, where the actions of local governments were in 
themselves heavily influenced by ideological factors. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the definition of 'external factors ' therefore means both world events and those 
actors or agencies working outside the central government policy sphere, even if 
politically connected.  
 
Originality 
The original contribution to knowledge of this thesis is that it is the first doctoral 
study of British civil defence policy of the post-1972 period that is entirely policy 
focused and the first Ph.D to benefit from the access to original government 
documentation resulting from the recent relaxation in the 30 year disclosure rules. 
Although there exists a small but useful collection of literature that 
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comprehensively details civil defence systems, organisations and structures17, such 
work is primarily concerned with how civil defence developed and only in a 
subsidiary manner, if at all, with why. If any analysis of policy has been made in 
these, it has been done so as a secondary concern, to illustrate the primary focus 
which lies elsewhere.  
 
Previous academic work on the subject of civil defence policy has either taken an 
earlier era of civil defence (usually pre-1968) as its focus; has researched civil 
defence policy as just one fact in an overarching Cold War or British security 
concern the primary focus of which lies elsewhere, or has chosen to concentrate on 
another aspect of policy concern (such as the role of the scientific advisors).18 
Where existing accounts touch briefly upon issues of economic or socio-political 
influence, this thesis is the first to attempt an identification and evaluation of the 
significant influences on the development of civil defence policy in the last two 
decades of the Cold War, something not previously seen in any of the secondary 
literature or existing academic theses.  
 
That there has been no attempt to present a unified analysis of civil defence policy 
in the existing literature is an illustration of the paucity of current civil defence 
theory not only for the post-1972 period but since the beginnings of modern civil 
                                               
17  Campbell, D. (1982) War Plan UK: the Truth about Civil Defence in Britain, Catford, N. (2010) Cold 
War Bunkers, Clarke, B. (2009) The Illustrated Guide to Armageddon: Britain's Cold War,  Cocroft, W. 
et al. (2003) Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946-89, Dalton, M. (2011) The Royal 
Observer Corps Underground Monitoring Posts and McCamley, N. (2007) Cold War Secret Nuclear 
Bunkers: The Passive Defence of the Western World During the Cold War. 
18 Grant, M. (2006), Hennessy, P. (2002) and Smith, M. (2009)  
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defence during World War One. 
 
Literature Review 
Policy Literature 
There is a breadth of literature available on the policy making process. For the 
purpose of this thesis, this literature review primarily concentrates on those sources 
which seek to explore the means by which decisions are made in British politics, 
through theories, concepts, and models of public policy making. The review is 
structured by school of thought and is broadly divided into the theoretical or 
model-based literature which advocates either a stagist or linear framework for 
policy analysis, and that literature which offers criticism of, or an alternative to, the 
stagist model. 
 
Policy Analysis for the Real World (1985) by Brian Hogwood and Lewis Gunn 
offers a mixed framework for policy analysis, one that can be used for both 
“...description and prescription”.19 Description is concerned with how policies are 
made and prescription with how policies ought to be made, but the primary focus 
of Hogwood and Gunn is on the prescriptive improvement of policy processes and 
this influences the policy approach adopted throughout the book. Hogwood and 
Gunn are broadly in favour of the stagist approach and develop a top-down notion 
based on a rational system model of implementation as a useful way of presenting 
the analysis for any issue.  
                                               
19  Hogwood, B. and Gunn, L. (1985) p.4 
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Hogwood and Gunn’s nine step method of their own devising that values the 
political aspects of the policy process, can be used for both the descriptive and 
prescriptive aspect of the policy process, and is the first way in which their 
framework can be said to be 'mixed'. The second part of their mixed approach is 
evident in the iteration that the nature of the policy process should inform the 
choice of model or models by which it is analysed. Thomas Dye's 2007 book, 
Understanding Public Policy, also chooses a practical, mixed approach to policy 
analysis, from the perspective of not only what specific policies governments 
choose to pursue but also why they pursue those policies and what the 
consequences of those policies might be. Dye's focus is similarly comparative and 
analytical; he asserts that the tools offered by the different models of policy 
analysis can elucidate and inform our understanding of different areas of public 
policy.  
 
While the overall emphasis of Hogwood and Gunn’s work lies with the rational 
model, they also assert the benefits of utilising different models and state that their 
framework does not neatly fit within either the incremental or strictly rational 
approach but stresses a “...contingent approach”20 in which aspects of more than 
one model should be used according to context and issue. Likewise, Dye chooses to 
employ models of analysis and the stagist policy cycle approach to describe and 
explain public policy, encouraging the reader to utilise these models, both singly 
                                               
20  Hogwood, B. and Gunn, L. (1985) p.5 
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and combined, to explain the “...cause and consequences”21 of public policies. Both 
Dye and Hogwood and Gunn act as a linear introduction to the models of policy 
analysis and are less conceptual or theoretical than some of the academic works on 
British public policy, most notably Parsons (1995) and Cairney (2002). 
 
Peter Dorey's book Policy Making in Britain (2005) is in some ways a natural 
successor to A.G. Jordan and J.J. Richardson's British Politics and the Policy 
Process (1987). Jordan and Richardson considered that Parliament itself was 
considerably limited in political decision making, and that political activity was 
“...largely conducted in policy communities of interested groups and government 
departments and agencies.”22 In these groups, party politics had limited effect with 
real power lying within the private worlds of individuals and groups with special 
interests. Dorey's approach, while not identical, shows echoes of Jordan and 
Richardson in its focus on the increasing influences seen outside central 
government in think tanks and policy transfer which lessen the role of Cabinet, 
ministers and civil servants.  
 
Paul Cairney's Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues (2002) takes a 
similar approach to understanding public policy processes, balancing theory with 
comparative application of theoretical models. Like Dorey, Cairney chooses to 
highlight in particular the important roles of structure and agency in policy change 
and the relations between citizens and the political elite that produce action and 
subsequent policy.  His approach is much more theoretical, however, and his focus 
                                               
21  Dye, T. (2007) p.xi 
22  Jordan, A.G. and  Richardson, J.J. (1987) p.viii 
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remains on the use of multiple theories to examine the policy process from multiple 
perspectives. Each chapter is concerned with a specific public policy concern and 
the questions that the application of theory seeks to answer; an approach which 
leaves less room for the type of applied case study analysis seen in works by Dye 
(2007), Duncan and Bochel (2007) or  McConnell (2010). 
 
This focus on the role of non-governmental actors is perhaps seen most acutely in 
Charles Lindblom's The Policy-making Process (1980) which offers an 
examination of the policy making process which focusses on the role and 
distribution of power in that process. The book is divided into two broad concerns; 
in the first, Lindblom discusses the limits and most effective use of policy analysis 
and in the second, examines the role and function of the parties who hold power in 
the policy making process, examining the relationship between citizens and 
government and the role of interest groups in policy formation.  
 
Cairney’s multi-disciplinary approach is also seen in Wayne Parsons’ Public Policy 
(1995) which approaches policy studies with a more problem-focussed, multi-
method framework. Noting that policy analysis is “...an approach to public policy 
that aims to integrate and contextualise models and research from those disciplines 
which have a problem and policy orientation,”23 Parsons’ book mixes analysis of 
the policy process with the use of analytical techniques in policy making. This 
results in a less stagist format with reduced emphasis placed on the importance of 
the policy cycle than seen from authors such as Dye (2007), urging that students of 
                                               
23  Parsons, W. (1995) p.xv 
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the policy process take an iterative, rather than linear, approach to analysis.  
Parsons' book is divided into four main tenets. Meta-analysis, or the analysis of the 
activity of analysis itself. 'Meso analysis', the analysis of problem definition, setting 
of agendas and the way in which policy is formed. 'Decision analysis', the study of 
the decision making process. And lastly 'delivery analysis', the analysis of 
evaluation, implementation and change and advocates a non-linear method for 
application of these analytical tools.   
 
A less theoretical set of tools is offered in Hugh Bochel & Susan Duncan's 2007 
Making Policy in Theory and Practice which proposes a unique approach to the 
study of contemporary policy making, offering nine chapters on the core 
competencies of the modern policy process as defined by the Cabinet Office 
Strategic Policy Making Team's 1999 report, Professional policy making for the 
twenty-first century. Each chapter, co-authored by an academic and a policy maker 
or practitioner, is accompanied by extensive case studies and the intent of the book 
is to review policy making within the context of the public sector. As such it differs 
from the more theoretical texts, focussing instead on the reality of the policy 
process under real world conditions and setting it in a wider British context. Like 
Parsons (1995), Bochel and Duncan view the public policy process as more of a 
continual, iterative process than sequential or stagist and reject the use of rationalist 
models of analysis as failing to reflect the situations that policy makers actually 
face. They argue that the alternative model of 'incrementalism', as developed in 
Lindblom's 1959 article The science of 'muddling through'24 and later in The 
                                               
24  Lindblom, C. (1959) The science of 'muddling through' in Public Administration Review vol.19, no. 2  
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Policy-making Process (1980) offers a more realistic picture of the policy 
environment and therefore a more useful tool which takes into consideration the 
many and diverse influences that can impact upon the policy process.  
 
Michael Hill's The Public Policy Process (2012) is a book similarly less concerned 
with the policy cycle as with unravelling and analysing the complex, multi-layered 
process by which public policy is made. Hill's view is that before alternatives or 
successions to existing policies can be conceived, it is essential to first understand 
the political processes and actors responsible for shaping those policies, however 
irrational or beyond rational control they seem to be.  Hill compares this to 
effective engineering, which first must display a good grounding in physics.25 In 
doing so, Hill makes the distinction between analysis of policy (that is, expanding 
the understanding of policy) and analysis for policy (improving the quality of 
policy) and this distinction informs his approach throughout the book. Lindblom 
also argues that there are “...sharp constraints”26 on how far rational methods can 
go in providing insight into policy making, due to the inevitable influence of 
human subjectivity and partisan political processes, and makes a comparison 
between the effectiveness of analysis and the play of power in making public 
policy. 
 
Like Parsons (1995), Dorey (2005) offers criticism of the stagist approach as a 
useful tool for understanding the policy process, questioning its ability to provide a 
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consistently realistic account of policy making but ultimately defending its 
usefulness as a heuristic tool. As such it is the stagist model that Dorey employs in 
his exploration of the policy process, while maintaining primary focus on the role 
of core executive actors and how they are key in actively influencing and shaping 
the policy agenda rather than just responding to it as the sequential model implies.27 
Similarly, despite Parsons' assertion that the traditional analytical approach of 
phases and stages excludes “...considerations of the fact that there is a multiplicity 
of ways of looking at policy making and policy analysis,”28 it is possible to use the 
latter three analytical options outlined in the book as a stages model of the 
analytical process in themselves.   
 
Hill (2012) also cautions the reader not to assume that policy follows the stages of 
any particular policy model exactly, but that it is less concrete, with inconsistent 
definitions that vary between actors. As such, he offers no prescription for policy 
making and notes the difficulty in maintaining distinctions between description and 
prescription as suggested by Hogwood and Gunn (1985), preferring to remain with 
discussions of the relevance of various theories of power in examining the policy 
process. Lindblom (1980) recognises the importance of the power balance between 
actors, emphasising the impossibility of neutrality in the policy making process and 
asserting that the power and influence naturally favour the political elite and not the 
voting public. He argues therefore that the policy making process can only be truly 
understood when examined through the twin lenses of an analytical (as seen in the 
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traditional models) and a political approach (as represented by the play of power). 
This is unusual in the literature. While other academics note the value of combining 
theoretical models – including group theory – in understanding the process, 
Lindblom's focus on a solution that overcomes the inequality inherent in these 
models is unique. Where Hill’s approach differs to that of the others however is that 
it is descriptive in exploring the nature of the policy process29 and as such the book 
focusses on the processes of implementation and their relevance to public policy. It 
chooses instead to explore theories and conceptual frameworks over case studies of 
particular policy areas by seeking to understand the process of implementation and 
how these processes might be affected or controlled.  
 
Civil Defence Literature 
Just as any attempt to evaluate the importance of civil defence policy would be 
incomplete without reference to its place within the wider context of British policy 
making, any account concerning military and nuclear strategies of that era which 
did not seek to examine the significant impact of civil defence policy on such 
strategies would be missing a crucial element of Cold War history. Civil defence 
represented more than simply a set of plans for public protection or an additional 
string to a government's defence bow; it was a mirror held up to the threats posed 
by the Cold War in which the prevailing ideologies of government, economic 
circumstances, domestic security concerns and effects of international tensions 
were illustrated and reflected back as policy.  
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As Matthew Grant notes30 the importance of the Cold War on British national 
political and cultural history has yet to be comprehensively examined. Throughout 
the Cold War, a significant body of work representing the interaction between the 
public, civil defence and the nuclear state was published in the United States,31 but 
the same cultural representation and critical investigation into civil defence has not 
been seen to the same extent in Britain, either during or after the Cold War. 
Although a significant amount of work on the importance of the defence and 
military aspect of the conflict has been written in the three decades following the 
end of the Cold War,32 there remains little of note on British Cold War history from 
perspectives other than military defence studies detailed above. This absence of 
investigative analysis on matters relating to civil defence is especially keenly felt.  
 
Writing in 1985 on the state of civil defence literature, Lawrence Vale argues that 
“...little has been written to fill the huge gap between in-house official self-
congratulation and more critical tracts by advocates of disarmament.”33 The end of 
the Cold War and the slow declassification of official documentation allowed 
scholars of the post-war period to critically re-evaluate Cold War nuclear histories 
and the government’s plans for public protection. However, the continued absence 
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of substantial analysis on civil defence policy in the last two decades of the Cold 
War is represented by a notable gap in the literature and Vale’s analysis of the state 
of the scholarly debate on the subject remains largely true nearly thirty years later. 
 
Secrecy was a major weapon in the Cold War. As McCamley notes, the mystery of 
the enemy’s political prowess formed the crux of political tensions34 and the results 
of this remains evident in the restricted nature of the material available to 
researchers even thirty years after the Cold War's end. Historian Peter Hennessy 
states that official documents relating to public protection were “...the Crown 
Jewels of genuine official secrecy...because you didn't want the other side to get 
your war plans.”35  While the significant changes made to the availability of official 
documentation by the Freedom of Information Act (2000) and the government’s 
move towards a 20 year closure rule are allowing scholars unprecedented access to 
primary materials. 
 
The nature of civil defence means it touches on several academic fields and this is 
reflected in the literature which can cover a wide thematic range within a single 
work. For the purposes of this review, existing civil defence literature will be 
presented in two broad categories, each of which contains significantly different 
types of literature often with notably disparate purpose, and within this 
categorisation individual themes are explored. 
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The literature grouped within the first of these categories is the investigatory 
accounts of the machinery and preparations for protection during war time, 
primarily written during the times in which civil defence provisions in question 
were most active36. This body of literature is primarily, though not exclusively, 
partisan or political in nature and ranges from the subtly critical of government 
policy to the outright condemnatory. The literature in this category, either as a 
primary or secondary concern, addresses the presentation of civil defence to the 
public or places the question of public civil defence advice at the forefront. It often 
displays a partisan bias as it seeks to expose and convince the reader of the 
infeasibility or questionable wisdom of civil defence or the survivability of nuclear 
war. This category includes theses and papers by research students examining the 
contemporaneous political climate of defence, books and articles by journalists and 
reports by independent investigative committees. 
 
Possibly the most well-known piece of literature in this category, and the one that 
shaped thinking on civil defence most significantly at the time, is the investigative 
journalist Duncan Campbell's 1982 book War Plan UK,37 a work that could be 
described as a natural successor to Peter Laurie's 1970 book Beneath The City 
Streets.38 Laurie's work was ground breaking and made use of sensitive material at 
the time in its frank and open discussion of the existence and necessity of 
previously hidden sites throughout London such as underground bunkers, food 
storage depots and government communication posts. Laurie's book was 
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campaigning against government secrecy and the undemocratic nature of those in 
power withholding information from the public on nuclear war.  He recognised 
that: 
 
...civil defence, in its higher manifestations, deals with the brute 
realities of government. In its concrete citadels, hardened cables and 
curt emergency powers and secrecy it encases the central essence of 
political power.39 
 
 
Laurie's work offers a remarkably detailed account of the government's plans for 
public survival considering that the majority of those plans were highly classified at 
the time of writing, and this foundation of exposing secret government preparations 
for war would later be built upon and expanded by Duncan Campbell. It 
represented not only a break in the secrecy surrounding civil defence planning but 
the most significant work in a corpus of literature that was united in its open and 
cynical condemnation of government policies, beginning what one academic 
review stated at the time to be a 'new trend'40 in historical study. 
 
In piecing together a contemporaneous account of government civil defence 
planning from the sources available to him, Campbell's stated aim was to “examine 
the subject through the eyes of central government and its planners.”41 It becomes 
evident that his research was driven by the desire to unmask government secrets 
that he viewed as detrimental to the processes of democracy but more than that, by 
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what he viewed as the essential dishonesty of civil defence. Campbell believed that 
post-1968 civil defence was a widespread sham, a superficial policy designed not 
to protect but to keep the population under control and to suppress dissent42 and he 
is quick to dismiss civil defence advice as little more than propaganda. This was a 
popular theme that would continue to be seen in the literature until the end of the 
Cold War and one echoed by Suzanne Wood, writing in 1983, whose primary 
argument was that the greatest concern of civil defence policy was the control of 
the survivors.43  
 
Campbell attempts to expose this supposed deceit by detailing the plans and 
structures of civil defence and critiquing their obvious inadequacies in the face of 
scientific reports of the expected devastation Britain would face in the event of a 
nuclear exchange, stating in the introduction to his work that his aim was to 
“examine the subject through the eyes of central government and its planners”.44 
However the limitations of his access to official government documentation is 
evident in the gaps in his analysis and his reliance on certain key sources such as 
1974’s Police Manual of Home Defence.45 Given Campbell’s lack of access to 
primary sources his analyses remains impressive, but less a scholarly account of 
civil defence and more an attempt to ‘expose’ the inadequacy of policy. It is also 
clear that his support lies with the peace movements and non-cooperative nuclear 
free local authorities in their primarily ideological opposition to the civil defence 
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planning of the 1970-1974 Conservative government and the promotion of 
alternative, non-nuclear means of defence.  
 
As such, Laurie and Campbell's work must be questioned as accurate historical 
sources concerning policy creation or the validity and ultimate usefulness of civil 
defence. They should be read in light of these partisan allegiances, limited access to 
information and subsequent lack of analysis regarding the policy making decisions 
which are so crucial to the more nuanced understanding of civil defence policy. 
There has been no serious academic attempt to build upon these journalistic 
accounts or offer the kind of policymaking analysis seen in the work of Hennessy 
or Grant for the post-1972 period.  
 
Several volumes were also written in the 1980s which analyse the effects of a large 
scale nuclear attack on Britain in the post-1972 period. These offer some 
conclusions on the perceived inadequacies of policy and, by extension, some 
speculative comment on the reasons behind this. These are London Under Attack46, 
the report of the GLC's Greater London Area War Risk Study; Nuclear Attack: 
Civil Defence47 compiled by the Royal United Service Institute for Defence 
Studies; and Stan Openshaw, Philip Steadman and Owen Greene's 1983 book 
Doomsday.48 These volumes stop considerably shy of offering a comprehensive 
contribution to policy analysis, although London Under Attack, written by the 
Greater London Council (at the time one of the 'nuclear-free' local authorities that 
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refused to comply with central government civil defence training plans) offers 
some critical analysis of central government civil defence plans but strictly within a 
limited, unilateralist ideological framework. 
 
The second category contains primarily academic works defined by a more 
balanced style of analysis, drawn chiefly from primary archival sources and with a 
greater focus on policy examination and determination. This category is 
predominantly comprised of the highly-focussed books and papers of research 
students, contemporary historians and political scientists as well as a small but 
significant body of work which is broader in scope, but still useful for the civil 
defence researcher, on particular satellite issues such as weapons policy and 
architecture and these have been discussed thematically where appropriate.  
 
Scholarly work concerning the post-1968 period has rarely been produced since the 
contemporaneous research of the early to mid-1980s, when British participation in 
a globally developing culture of nuclear brinkmanship produced a spate of theses 
and dissertations concerned with the immediate and seemingly urgent concerns of 
nuclear war and civil defence. The first and most important of these pieces of 
doctoral research is that produced by George Crossley in 198549. Crossley's thesis 
covers a very wide range of Cold War history, from 1957 until 1983 and the 
analysis of policy determinants reflects the limited availability of official 
information at the time.  However, it remains an invaluable piece of work for its 
focus on multidimensional influences on civil defence genesis and development. 
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Crossley's major research concern is the detailing of civil defence structures, plans 
and preparations and is not without personal ideological and political influences 
and this places his work wholly within the first category of literature on the subject. 
Like Duncan Campbell's work of 1983, Crossley comes to the debate openly 
critical of the civil defence policies of the governments in question, often 
referencing Campbell at length50 and devotes large sections of his work to the 
successes of the peace movements (especially the Nuclear Free Zones) of the time 
in forcing the government to alter or abandon civil defence exercises. Though 
Crossley's work displays these imbalances, his research into the political 
development of policy through three decades is extremely thorough and the 
analysis he offers as to the cause and effect of policy succession in particular is 
comprehensive.  
 
Another important thesis in this category is Lawrence Vale's comparative study of 
civil defence across four countries, produced in 198551. Vale's work is long and the 
research is densely packed with information garnered from government papers and 
publications. Although just one chapter is given to the development of civil defence 
policy in Britain, Vale comparatively studies not only policy development between 
Britain and other countries, but also the causes of policy genesis and influence 
between pre- and post-1968 Britain which gives considerable insight into the way 
domestic policy developed in the later stages of the Cold War. In comparison with 
more recent studies of civil defence in the second category of literature, Vale's work 
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lacks the analysis made possible by later released sources, as does other similar 
research compiled during this time.52 However Vale's conclusion, highlighting the 
duality of civil defence concerns and the dichotomy and conflict at the heart of its 
humanitarian and insurance rationales, based on limited availability of relevant 
primary sources, is insightful and offers a limited but valuable contribution towards 
the body of British civil defence literature. 
 
M.J. Flannery's doctoral thesis53, written just two years after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, offers a theoretical approach to the analysis of British civil defence 
policy not seen in other bodies of work in this first category which lack a 
theoretical basis. His thesis spans the best part of a century and focuses not just on 
protection against nuclear attack but on industrial uses of civil protection. It uses 
the analytical model of policy change and succession developed by Hogwood and 
Peters54 in an attempt to understand the wide sweeping changes to civil defence 
seen in the 90 years since its inception and analyses policy development within this 
theoretical framework. The wide-ranging scope of this study means that this 
research is rather more overarching than detailed; examples for deeper analysis are 
provided where they can be demonstrably shown to fit the model used; otherwise 
the work gallops through large swathes of history without pause for reflection. 
Where they relate to policies for nuclear public protection however, parts chosen 
for deeper evaluation are significant and from these a greater theoretical 
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understanding of policy development can be obtained which is especially valuable 
in light of the majority of work on civil defence which is without a theoretical 
framework.  
 
The next major body of work on civil defence policy, which falls within the second 
category, was not to begin until more than a decade after the end of the Cold War. 
Twenty one years after War Plan UK, Peter Hennessy's 2003 book The Secret 
State55 is the first major work by an historian on the subject of civil defence. It 
investigates government plans in the event of nuclear war by bringing together a 
wide range of archival sources and interviews with key political players to provide 
an outline of the development of Britain's civil defence plans from the start of the 
Cold War to the 1960s. Hennessy offers a balanced, academically-orientated review 
of civil defence planning as it rose to prominence in the first half of the Cold War, 
concentrating on the planning assumptions and government debates connected with 
policy creation which results in a unique behind the scenes look at policy creation. 
As a result, this approach is highly revealing in its exploration of the minutiae of 
certain decisions made by the intelligence community – and in particular the Joint 
Intelligence Committee – that informed policy itself and subsequently provides 
much insight into the possible influences upon policy decision. This is at the 
expense of much exploration of the wider context in which policy decisions were 
taken but it is the first serious attempt at tackling the issue of civil defence and an 
important starting point for anyone attempting to understand the conflicting 
pressures shaping policy making at the time.  
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Matthew Grant, a former student of Hennessy's, goes further into the influences of 
domestic politics and the British economic landscape on civil defence policy 
making and builds on Hennessy's work in his monograph After the Bomb: Civil 
Defence and Nuclear War in Britain, 1945-68.56 While still examining, as Hennessy 
does, the pre-1968 period, Grant also makes much of newly accessible archival 
sources and offers a much more detailed policy study of successive British 
governments’ civil defence plans, arguing, as Hennessy does, that civil defence 
must be considered a fundamental part of post-World War Two British history. 
Grant's book evaluates not only the policies that were adopted to meet the threat of 
nuclear war but the political and economic contexts in which those policies and 
priorities were decided. He identifies three primary policy phases from the end of 
World War Two until 1968:  the "atomic age," from 1945 to 1954; the 
"thermonuclear age," from 1954 to 1960; and lastly the "deterrent age," from 1960 
to 1968, and evaluates policy making through the distinct and different government 
attitudes towards civil defence during these phases.  
 
It is unique amongst studies of civil defence covering the early Cold War period as 
an investigation into the external factors shaping decision making, framing civil 
defence as a set of policies that can only be understood as reactions to constantly 
shifting developments in international tensions, domestic political concerns and 
often fraught economic circumstances. It offers a systematic analysis of the 
political debates surrounding policy at the time, detailing how these debates led to 
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shifts in policy concerns and the framework within which he sets this analysis 
succeeds in unravelling a complex policy environment. Grant's work is a key text in 
understanding how the civil defence debate of the post-war period influences later 
policy development, however, it is not concerned with the change and development 
of civil defence after it was reactivated in 1972 and as such is different from this 
thesis in that it addresses a different historical period.  
 
Rose Farrell notes57that at the beginning of the new millennium many previously 
classified Cold War structures such as bunkers, communication posts and regional 
government headquarters were made known and, in some cases, opened for public 
viewing or even sold. As a consequence much of the literature on civil defence at 
this time is grounded in the architecture and other physical manifestations of the 
Cold War, taking these mysterious and compelling buildings as their framework. 
The two most significant publications within this theme are Bob Clarke's Four 
Minute Warning58 and N.J. McCamley's Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers59. 
 
Both these works describe the development of the physical infrastructure and 
institutional structures of Britain's nuclear security during the Cold War and 
together they build a detailed picture of the machinery of government after 1968. 
Both Clarke and McCamley are sceptical about the level of protection that civil 
defence policies afforded the public, while Campbell attributes this to successive 
governments' desire to manage dissent. These later critiques, which fall squarely 
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into the second category of civil defence literature, primarily attribute the perceived 
lack of humanitarian focus in late Cold War civil defence to a shift in policy 
function towards an adjunctive role in supporting a nuclear defence and deterrence, 
rather than one of public control.60  
 
Both authors draw conclusions about policy motivations from the structures that 
were commissioned as a result of those policies and do not seek to explore any 
further influences in policy making. Consequently these conclusions are naturally 
limited because, as Farrell observes, the outcome of a policy can only go so far in 
displaying the full intent behind that outcome.61 Where such influences are 
acknowledged they are done so in passing, discussed fleetingly and without any 
significant insight. In-depth policy analysis is missing and that absence is felt as a 
clear indication of the need to close that gap in civil defence policy literature.  
 
In addition to published secondary sources, there are also several other important 
works concerning the developmental influences of late Cold War civil defence in 
the form of unpublished theses, essays and undergraduate dissertations. As with 
their published counterparts, literature in the academic sphere has been primarily 
concerned with civil defence policy as seen before the 1968 stand down.  
 
The 2009 doctoral thesis of Melissa Smith62 is the most recent academic work on 
the subject of civil defence in the pre-1968 period, offering both a policy driven, 
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post-Cold War analysis of civil defence focussing on the role of government 
scientific advisors and the public response to civil defence during the pre-1968 
period. While Smith's scope of focus is outside that of this thesis, she provides 
enlightening historical and theoretical context based on previously unavailable 
sources. This literature is key to understanding historical trends in the development 
of policies in the post-1968 period. Additionally, three articles written since 2000, 
with the benefit of more readily accessible archival sources, shed light on three of 
the most important and influential events on civil defence policy change and 
progression in the later Cold War. Grant, writing on the Sandys White Paper63; 
Smith, on propaganda and public information64 and Jeff Hughes on the Strath 
Report65.  
 
Grant explores the impact of the Sandys Defence White Paper, a key document in 
Britain's Cold War history. Grant's detailed article argues that in failing to make an 
adequate case for civil defence while stressing the need for a credible deterrent 
strategy, the Paper highlighted what critics of government nuclear policy saw as an 
inability to protect the population from nuclear attack. This was a criticism that was 
to have policy influence right up until the end of the Cold War. In a short but 
precise article, Smith tackles the issue of government-produced education and 
information materials, assessing their foundations, agendas and influences in 
themes that are built upon in her doctoral thesis. She argues that the dissonance 
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between the information given to the public on the issue of self-protection and the 
reality of civil defence spending and provision led to the undermining of civil 
protection policy for years to come. She argues that the disparity was responsible 
for the damage to the credibility of civil defence by the later Protect & Survive 
campaign and peace groups who used it as a campaigning tool. 
 
Finally, Hughes offers a historically based analysis of the previously classified 
Strath Report, its genesis, compilation and ramifications. The Report had 
profoundly pessimistic conclusions on civil defence policy in its portrayal of the 
widespread destruction that would devastate Britain in the event of a nuclear 
exchange. Hughes extrapolates the far-reaching changes that resulted from the 
Report, not only in successive governments' preparations for war but in attempts to 
suppress public discussion on the true risk and possible consequences of nuclear 
strategy that would continue for the following three decades. 
 
The bulk of the literature on civil defence is concerned with civil defence in either 
its pre-1968 stand down phase or after its reactivation as a policy concern in 1972. 
There is a notable exception, however, in the unpublished BA dissertation by Rose 
Farrell.66 It concerns that most neglected period in civil defence history, where the 
literature is at its thinnest, the period between the standing down of civil defence in 
1968 and the warming of the Cold War in the early 1980s. Farrell offers a modern, 
historically-minded analysis of the period using recently released archival sources 
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and raises questions as to what degree policy making was determined by political 
agendas. Additionally, there is some exploration of the dichotomy between the 
political rhetoric of civil defence and what was actually provided to the public for 
means of protection.   
 
Mention should also be made of the series of UK Nuclear History Working Papers 
produced by Robin Woolven for the British Nuclear History groups of the 
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton. In 
particular, the third paper of this series67 concerned with the interplay of the British 
nuclear weapons programme and civil defence policies covering the period of civil 
defence hiatus from 1968 to 1972 is useful in understanding the often complex 
relationships between defence, deterrent and public protection that informed 
nuclear policy development during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
A theme explored in the literature in the 1980s is the interaction of policy and local 
government; local councils during this time were often ideological battlegrounds in 
which many skirmishes with central government were played out, and civil defence 
was no exception to this.68 Lexa Hillard's 1986 article Local Government, Civil 
Defence and Emergency Planning: Heading for Disaster?69 written as civil defence 
began the end of its slow segue towards emergency planning, critically investigates 
the legislative and operational framework of local authority civil defence plans and 
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offers an enlightening insight into the ways in which central government used the 
law to quash local government dissent over participation in civil defence activities. 
The interaction between central and local governments on the issue of civil defence 
is also seen in the thesis of George Crossley, who demonstrates in detail the direct 
effect that ideologically and financially motivated councils had on policy 
development in their refusal to comply with planning.70  
 
The various peace movements of the 1970s and 1980s cannot be said to have 
spoken with one voice or to have responded in the same way to the threat of 
nuclear weapons and the development and promotion of civil defence. There are 
few bodies of work which offer a thorough contextualisation to the debate on which 
peace and protest groups used civil defence as a motivating tool and can be said to 
have had influence in the policy making sphere. Richard Taylor’s Against The 
Bomb: the British Peace Movement 1958-1965 and Mark Phythian’s CND's Cold 
War are both notable examples of the literature of peace groups which offer an 
overview of their activities and origins. But like much of the literature on peace 
groups – and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in particular – they 
focus on the personal histories and the internal politics and ideologies of these 
groups and fail to relate the groups' activities to the wider political and policy 
making context. 
 
However, to study the work of CND in response to civil defence policy is to 
understand one of the ways in which that policy impacted upon the public and how 
                                               
70  Crossley, G. (1983) pp.90-110 
46 
 
that reaction subsequently influenced policy. Several pieces of literature help to 
contextualise the analysis of civil defence advice as a tool of propaganda or 
persuasion. As Melissa Smith notes, considering the reactions of particular sections 
of the population can provide a useful insight into the reception of some of the 
publicity issued by the government.71 To peace groups such as CND, civil defence 
was also a tool to further the cause of disarmament.  
 
Chapter Discussion 
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides historical contextualisation in analysing how 
World War Two strategies influenced the concept and planning of home defence. It 
examines the Strath Report of 195572 and evaluates the historical basis for change 
in policy concerns away from World War Two models and analyses the lasting 
results of the Padmore Working Party's 1954 investigation into the national 
economy in war. The redistribution of power in the 1950s and the increased role of 
local authorities in the political hierarchy will be detailed as a precursor to later 
discussion on local authority rebellion. The chapter ends with analysis of the 1965 
review of home defence73 and the factors that led to the winding down of civil 
defence provision in 1968 under Labour.  
 
Chapter 3 is the first of three chapters concerned with the three main areas of 
potential policy influence, focussing on economic influences. It starts with an 
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identification of the factors that served to establish a new policy climate in 1972 
and develops with an analysis of the relative decline in civil defence spending in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. It concludes with an evaluation on whether the state of 
the economy can be said to be directly linked to the policy of 'no evacuation, no 
shelter' of the time.  
 
Chapter 4 explores ideological factors, beginning with the new strategies for civil 
defence seen in the 1970s and 1980s and the emergence of policy based on the 
concepts of deterrence and strong national defence. This development of policy is 
illustrated by the rapid changes in civil defence provision under the Thatcher 
governments and a comparison and analysis of cause will be made between 
aggressive Conservative defence policies and their weak civil defence position. The 
critical response to civil defence will be discussed and analysis made of Labour and 
Liberal policies in opposition (both nationally and locally). 
 
Chapter 5 discusses influences external to central government. It starts by mapping 
international developments/tensions against UK policy and measures the influence 
of United States and European administrations and civil defence models on the 
development of policies, with a focus on the nuclear brinkmanship of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. It will finish by looking briefly at the role of the Scientific 
Advisory Branch and, more significantly, peace movements (with particular focus 
on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) to determine what influence these 
organisations may have had on policy development. 
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The conclusion draws together the main findings from the previous chapters and 
analyses the effects of each influence of the genesis and development of civil 
defence policy.  
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Chapter 2 
The Historical Context 
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This chapter explores the genesis of modern civil defence policy in Britain and the 
emergence of civil defence as protection against nuclear attack in the post -World 
War Two period up until civil defence's stand-down in 1968. It provides historical 
context for the main argument of this thesis and explores to what extent economic, 
ideological and external factors were evident as precedents for civil defence policy 
from 1972.  
 
The chapter is primarily concerned with the origin and post-War development of 
Cold War civil defence as defined by the influential humanitarian World War Two 
strategies. It explores technological catalysts such as the explosion of the first 
atomic bomb and how these were influential in creating the policy climate in which 
the 1948 Civil Defence Act was passed and how policy strategies resulting from the 
Act became subject to increasing economic and ideological pressures. The second 
part of the chapter, The Strath Report, evaluates the historical basis for change in 
policy concerns which formed the basis of civil defence planning throughout the 
late 1950s and 1960s, analysing the influence of the Report on subsequent models 
of civil defence. 
 
This is followed by The Sandys Defence White Paper which analyses its lasting 
results and how these findings echoed through policy making in later decades. The 
cementing of civil defence as a subsidiary of the deterrence posture is explored and 
the final shift away from community-based policy making examined. In Local 
Authority Dissent and the Anti-Nuclear Movement, the effects of central 
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government policy on local authorities are analysed. The ideological considerations 
that led to the rebellion of certain local authorities, as well as the role of civil 
defence policy in creating and shaping the anti-nuclear movement, is evaluated. 
Civil defence policy as a catalyst for the newly-emerging nuclear disarmament 
movement is explored and the influence of this on policy making is detailed. 
 
In the last part of the chapter, Home Defence Reviews of the 1960s, the move from 
the traditional ideas of civil defence as public protection is examined through the 
1960 and 1965 Reviews. The civil defence response to the Cuban Missile Crisis is 
highlighted as an example of the shift in policy priorities and a comparison made 
against the official information on civil defence for public consumption. In The 
Labour Party and Civil Defence 1945-1972, the party's attitude towards the nuclear 
deterrent and civil defence is traced from its roots in 1947 until the end of the 
1960s and the influence of ideological differences in policy consultation explored. 
It analyses the economic factors behind the civil defence policy decision making of 
the 1964-1970 Labour administration and the effect this had on public provision. 
Lastly The 1968 Stand Down investigates the economic and external factors that 
led to the winding down of civil defence provision in 1968 under the Labour 
government of Harold Wilson, exploring the ideological criticism that met this 
decision. 
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The Genesis of Modern Civil Defence Policy 
With the advent of World War Two and the increasing sophistication of warfare 
technology, the necessity for a policy of civil defence for the British population on 
home soil was impressed upon the government as the domestic threat from war 
became more real. Britain’s experience of the 1917-8 air raids had resulted in 
approximately 1,500 killed in just over 100 raids. In the early 1930s government 
estimates calculated that 600,000 would be killed and 1.2 million injured in air 
raids in a future war.74 In the inter-war years, a report set out by the Air Raid 
Precautions committee recommended that future planning for public protection be 
comprised of three strands: warning, protection and rescue.75 
 
Despite the government's estimation that Britain could face a greater number of 
bombs per day than it saw in the entire four years of the previous war76, attempting 
to construct measures to enshrine these recommendations for public protection in 
law was not without difficulties. The government faced threats for which it had 
little previous experience, a challenge that would haunt civil defence planning until 
the end of the Cold War. In a 1937 House of Commons debate concerning public 
protection against the increased threat from the skies, the Home Secretary, Sir 
Samuel Hoare, confessed: 
 
...in my own experience I have never found a more baffling problem 
of defence than the problem of air raid precautions. There is the 
question on what sort of scale should you make your plans. What 
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should be the exact relations between the central government and the 
local authorities? What are the risks against which we are trying to 
protect the country? All these questions are new and very 
complicated. 77 
 
 
Hoare's planning culminated in the Air Raid Precautions Act 1937, which required 
local authorities to make schemes for neutralizing, reducing or repairing the effects 
of enemy action against the civilian population. This was brought into practice over 
the following two years. The model of civil defence during this time, while also 
designed to protect industry and infrastructure, was essentially based around the 
humanitarian policies of shelter, evacuation and the wardens and warning system of 
the Air Raid Precautions78.  The modern age of civil defence had begun, and it 
heralded a “...close interlocking of military and civil defence, if the two can ever be 
anything but indivisible.”79 
 
With the use of atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki towards the end of 
World War Two, it would become clear that a new model of public protection to 
face a new and poorly understood threat would become necessary.  Newly elected 
Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee, speaking to the Atomic Energy Committee 
in 1945, realised the extent of Britain's leap into the unknown when he said: 
 
It is difficult for people to adjust their minds to an entirely new 
situation... it is infinitely harder for people to realise that even the 
modern conception of war to which in my lifetime we have become 
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accustomed is now completely out of date.80 
 
 
The explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949, only four years after 
the end of World War Two, also forced the British government to consider how the 
potential effects on Britain of this new and catastrophic weapon could be 
moderated and how the British people could be protected from the consequences of 
its use. Just months after the first Soviet test, the civil defence question was brought 
back into focus. In a House of Commons debate on defence expenditure in 
November 1949, Labour MP Emrys Hughes questioned what the Soviet 
development of the atomic bomb would mean for the defence of the British 
population: 
 
The other night, when we were debating the Civil Defence 
Regulations, I quoted some figures from a Government committee. 
This Government committee, which had investigated what happened 
in the bombing of the Japanese towns, estimated that we could 
expect from the dropping of one atom bomb at least 50,000 dead; the 
destruction of property would be immense, and the estimate was that 
400,000 houses would be destroyed by one atom bomb of the type 
that was dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then the 
President of the United States has told us that they have atom bombs 
immensely more powerful. How has that affected our Defence 
Estimates? Can the Secretary of State for War tell us how much of 
the £800 million is actually to be devoted to the protection of the 
civilian population in this country? 81 
 
 
The Under Secretary of State for War, Michael Stewart, gave an oblique circular 
response that would become familiar over the subsequent decades. He stated that 
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no answer could be given as policy which reduced the chances of nuclear weapons 
being used was a policy in and of itself a policy of civilian protection.82  
 
These questions would remain contentious subjects in the political arena for the 
next forty years. Britain's geographical location close to the Soviet Union and 
ideological similarities with the United States led to it being used as a storage and 
launch base for American nuclear weapons.83 It was clear from early in the Cold 
War that Britain was very much a potential target for the Soviet Union and 
vulnerable to attack. When Britain started to develop its own nuclear capabilities at 
the end of the 1950s, it became a target in its own right.  
 
The destruction that would be wrought in the event of a nuclear exchange involving 
a small, densely populated country such as Britain would have been widespread.84 
The upshot being that questions of protection and regeneration would be asked 
anew by each successive government until the end of the Cold War.  
 
Post-World War Two Civil Defence Policy 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, although a skeleton staff remained, the 
majority of civil defence provisions in Britain were stood down. When Labour won 
the general election in 1945 the Chiefs of Staff agreed with the government that no 
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major war was likely in Europe for at least a decade.85 Less than a year later 
however, Churchill, now leader of the opposition, was declaring that an iron curtain 
had descended across the Continent and increasing diplomatic tensions between the 
United States and the Soviet Union meant that the Chiefs of Staff assumption was 
looking less than assured.  In The Bomb: A Life, Gerard De Groot states: 
 
In the nuclear arena, Great Britain has always behaved like the boy 
who shows up at a party in flared trousers, only to discover that 
everyone else has returned to straight legs. This tendency to miss the 
beat was especially apparent in the approach to civil defence. 86       
 
This is a view that was shared by opponents of the government's plans for civil 
protection in light of the new nuclear threat. In 1948, The Joint Intelligence 
Committee suggested that the USSR might produce their first atomic weapon as 
early as 1951.87 However a 1948 Civil Defence Committee paper supposed that the 
USSR would not be in possession of atomic weapons until around 1957 and then 
only in limited numbers, envisioning a future war in which nuclear weapons would 
play only a minor role alongside the conventional explosive weapons seen in World 
War Two.88 Be that as it may, the eventual explosion of the first Soviet atom bomb 
in 1949 - as well as later successful detonations of UK and US thermonuclear 
devices in 1952 - provided much of the impetus for the expansion of a new civil 
defence programme. The sheer destructive force of these new weapons attracted 
attention from the public and questions for the government. Planning proceeded 
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along the lines seen during World War Two with its reliance on shelter and 
evacuation.  
 
Conservative critics of this approach accused the government of failing to 
adequately respond to the potential threat posed by atomic weapons and urged 
politicians of all parties to back motions that increased spending, recruitment and 
resources towards civil defence as a fourth arm of a broader defence strategy.89 
Others decried what they viewed as a steadily growing acceptance of nuclear 
weapons, urging the government to “...end the agreement by which American 
bomber bases are stationed in Britain, and to initiate and support disarmament 
proposals which will make substantial expenditure on inadequate civil defence 
measures unnecessary.”90 
 
After the Berlin Crisis of 1948, the Ministry of Defence commissioned the newly-
revived Royal Observer Corps to make an assessment of new civil defence 
requirements in the event of war. As a result of this consultation and against a 
background of international uncertainty, the 1948 Civil Defence Act was passed, 
which remains to this day the principal statute concerning civil defence measures. 
The Act defined civil defence as: 
 
...including any measure not amounting to actual combat for 
affording defence against any form of hostile attack by a foreign 
power or for depriving any form of attack by a foreign power of the 
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whole or part of its effect, whether the measures are taken before, at 
or after the time of the attack91 
 
and requested that the designated Minister be responsible for the following: 
 
(a) the organisation, formation, maintenance, equipment and training 
of civil defence forces and services; 
(b) the organisation, equipment and training for civil defence 
purposes of police forces, fire brigades and employees of local or 
police authorities employed primarily for purposes other than civil 
defence purposes; 
(c) the instruction of members of the public in civil defence and their 
equipment for the purposes of civil defence; 
(d) the provision, storage and maintenance of commodities and 
things required for civil defence; and 
(e) the provision, construction, maintenance or alteration of 
premises, structures or excavations required for civil defence and the 
doing of any other work required for civil defence.92 
 
The humanitarian principles of rescue and recovery seen in the World War Two 
model are very much evident in the wording of the Act, with its emphasis on the 
creation and organisation of civil defence services that played such a crucial role in 
civilian protection during World War Two and the recognition of the usefulness of 
public information and training that was seen in detailed and widespread wartime 
information campaigns. Nevertheless, portents of how civil defence would later 
come to be regarded could be heard from the Conservative backbenches in the 
same year, with Henry Legge-Bourke MP inquiring: 
 
Would the Under-Secretary say that the Government accept the 
principle that if Civil Defence is in a proper state of preparedness it 
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can, in fact, act as a deterrent to war, and have an effect before war 
begins?93 
 
 
The Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, Kenneth Younger, agreed, stating that 
preparations “…must of necessity apply to a period before war has broken out”94 
although he chose not to say how far in advance of any conflict this might be.  
 
Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, civil defence planning was 
accelerated and, as Grant shows, the Official Committee on Civil Defence of May 
1950 recommended that £137 million be spent over four years, principally on 
communications, warning systems, the training of volunteers and the stockpiling of 
food and equipment.95 This was considered unsatisfactory by the Home Office who 
considered that the budget should be increased to allow for shelter building. This 
was countered by the Chiefs of Staff, who argued that expenditure should be 
concentrated on those measures which would most contribute towards the 
'preparedness of the armed forces'.96 Just two years later the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Estimates noted that: “...such plans as they had were 
destroyed by successive budgetary restrictions and policy decisions regarding 
expenditure on equipment and capital works.”97 Such economic concerns and 
persisting, often ideologically-driven conflicts between spending on active versus 
passive modes of defence were to dog civil defence policy until the end of the Cold 
War. As Smith notes, the conflict between spending on military forms of defence 
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(including deterrence) and pubic defence is key to understanding much of the 
development of civil defence policy98 and highlights the core nature of civil 
defence as not just one set of unified plans but as a series of interconnected, multi-
perspective policies. 
 
In addition to the moral and political questions raised by the ownership of such 
weapons, the Conservative government of 1951-55 faced major new home defence 
policy issues. Policy of the time was based almost entirely on specifications and 
practice developed and maintained during World War Two and was designed to 
provide Britain with the ability to endure a nuclear war lasting months, with an 
emphasis on maintaining the UK as a forward air base for as long as possible.99 As 
Duncan Campbell states:  
 
British defence planners soon came to accept that future war would 
be prolonged and involve extensive use of nuclear weapons. It is 
often forgotten in the present age that the idea of a limited nuclear 
war, involving only a few hours of exchanging nuclear salvos, is a 
wholly modern concept. The planners of 1950 and 1960 had a 
perception of war which was partly based on the long campaigns of 
previous wars. 100 
 
Provisions at this time centred on the evacuation and dispersal of over ten million 
people in priority classes, including pregnant women and children under sixteen. 
Advertisements were placed in national newspapers and leaflets produced for 
distribution amongst the population, stressing the revived slogan that 'Civil 
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Defence is Common Sense',101 to educate the public at large about their new role in 
peacetime civil defence preparedness and to encourage people to sign up for civil 
defence training. These plans were severely criticised in a 1953 report from the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Estimates, which condemned the 
organisation of civil defence as “...extravagant and inefficient, with uncertain 
training standards, poor leadership and a proliferating and top-heavy Home Office 
bureaucracy.”102 In the same year, a parliamentary committee was convened to 
consider the national economy in war. Led by Treasury official Thomas Padmore, 
the committee sought to investigate the continuation and machinery of government 
during any future war.103 
 
With the Soviet development and testing of the hydrogen bomb and the results of 
US testing, the increased capabilities of these new weapons made it clear that the 
pattern of civil defence based on the Second World War model had to be 
reconstructed. The threat of radioactive fallout raised questions about the viability 
of Britain's existing defence plans as the government acknowledged the hydrogen 
bomb's superior capacity for destruction over the (relatively) limited destructive 
power of the atomic bomb and the need for civil defence to reflect this. As the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, James Stuart, acknowledged in a Commons debate 
in April 1954, “...instructions to Civil Defence authorities are being reviewed in the 
light of the development of atomic weapons of all types.”104 By the mid-1950s, the 
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extent of the destructive capability of the hydrogen bomb was fully realised and 
civil defence went through a degree of technologically-driven change, the emphasis 
of nuclear policy moving from a rationale of protection to one of deterrence. Sir 
Norman Brook, Cabinet Secretary stated in 1954 that; 
 
The development of this bomb had now reached a stage which 
required us to re-assess first, our foreign policy and general strategy 
and, thereafter, the 'size and shape' of the Armed Forces, our civil 
defence policy and our atomic weapons programme.105  
 
 
The view of Sir Norman concerning the need for a re-evaluation of Britain's 
thinking on defence was in accordance with conclusions drawn by the 
government's 1954 White Paper on Defence which highlighted the new duality of 
civilian defence. The need for a revaluation of policy appeared evident. Civil 
defence was no longer only a humanitarian concern, but one also closely linked to 
the concept of deterrence and, as such, open to the influence of the ideology of the 
political party in power. As the Paper stated: “...the emergence of the thermonuclear 
bomb has overshadowed all else. Nevertheless our problem is still fundamentally a 
dual one. We have to prepare for the risk of war and so prevent it.”106 
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The Strath Report 
The Attlee Labour government had won a landslide in 1945 on the promise of an 
extensive welfare system, but the financial commitment required to fulfil this 
promise plus spiralling defence costs meant the government began to look to 
atomic weapons as offering a cheaper alternative to traditional methods of 
defence.107 The United States' Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) 
determined how the superpower would control and manage the nuclear technology 
it had jointly developed with its wartime allies, Britain and Canada. Implementing 
the McMahon Act, which excluded the United States' allies from receiving any 
information or data, created a substantial rift between the United States and 
Britain108 and the United Kingdom faced the decision to create a separate atomic 
programme from the United States, an early influence of external actors on the 
development of British policy.  
 
Britain's nuclear programme started in 1946 with the creation of the Atomic Energy 
Research Establishment at Harwell, although it was not until January 1947 that a 
formal decision to create the bomb was made.109  Some in government were 
opposed to the huge financial commitment the hydrogen bomb represented, 
warning of ‘an extremely serious economic and financial situation in two to three 
years’ time.”110 This was highlighted by Hennessy, who noted that in the meeting of 
the Cabinet Committee on Atomic Energy on the 25th October 1946, ministers 
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Hugh Dalton from the Treasury and Stafford Cripps from the Board of Trade were 
“…well on the way to talking out the bomb project” 111 on economic grounds. 
Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary in Clement Attlee's post-war government, 
recognised however that power lay with the possession of this new nuclear 
weapons technology which would ensure Britain's continued role on the world 
stage.  Referring to the condescending attitude of the nuclear-armed Americans, 
Bevin famously stated: 
 
I don't want any other foreign secretary of this country to be talked to 
or at by a secretary of state in the United States as I have just had in 
my discussions with Mr Byrnes. We've got to have this thing over 
here whatever it costs. We've got to have the bloody Union Jack on 
top of it.112    
 
In the official minutes of this crucial meeting the opposing forces at work, 
represented by the Treasury and Bevin, in reaching that monumental decision were 
recorded as follows: 
 
In discussion it was urged that we must consider seriously whether 
we could afford to divert from civilian consumption and the 
restoration of our balance of payments, the economic resources 
required for a project on this scale. Unless present trends were 
reversed we might find ourselves faced with an extremely serious 
economic and financial situation in two or three years’ time.  
On the other hand it was argued that we could not afford to be left 
behind in a field which was of such revolutionary importance from 
an industrial, no less than from a military point of view. Our prestige 
in the world, as well as our chances of securing American co-
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operation would both suffer if we did not exploit to the full a 
discovery in which we had played a leading part at the outset.113 
 
Six years later in 1952 the Conservative Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, 
announced that the first atomic test would occur before the end of the year and on 
3rd October 1952 the first British atomic device was tested.  As Goldberg argues, 
the test resulted from “...a conjunction of military, technological, political, 
economic and psychological currents in 1952 that persuaded the Churchill 
Government, newly returned to power, to adopt the nuclear deterrent strategy and 
accept the consequences.”114 These currents can often be seen converging and 
diverging throughout Britain's subsequent integrated defence strategy – and in turn, 
decisions on civil defence - until the end of the Cold War. 
 
Six months after the successful test, Lord Cherwell, scientific advisor to Churchill, 
reported “…we think we know how to make an H-bomb”115 The initiative to force 
a decision on the hydrogen bomb however came from Cabinet secretary Sir 
Norman Brook, chair of the Home Defence Committee. Realising that the 
hydrogen bomb made existing defence planning obsolete, a series of meetings with 
the Chiefs of Staff was convened, the outcome of which was the report of the 
Working Party on the Operational Use of Atomic Weapons entitled Hydrogen bomb 
research and production in the United Kingdom.116 The report was submitted to the 
Defence Policy Committee in June 1954, which recommended that a programme 
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be initiated to develop a hydrogen bomb.117 
 
It was not just existing military defence planning that the advent of the hydrogen 
bomb threatened to render obsolete. McIntyre argues that Britain’s defence policy 
at the time of atomic weapons development was “…strongly influenced by 
economic considerations, as well as by military planning and the strong political 
desire to maintain a strong international profile.”118 These factors can also be seen 
in the government’s strategic reaction to civil defence planning.  In December 
1954, a committee of civil servants was convened led by the head of the Cabinet 
Office Central War Plans Secretariat, William Strath.119 The purpose of this 
committee was to explore the implications of the hydrogen bomb for Britain and to 
determine to what extent the country could survive a thermonuclear attack. 
Comprised of scientists, military personnel and economists the committee sat for 
three months drawing up a detailed picture of how British life would be after war 
involving the effects of ten H-bombs of ten megatons each dropped on British 
centres of population.120  
 
The report placed particular emphasis on planning for protection of the public from 
the newly-realised threat of fallout, and “...paid special attention to shelter and 
evacuation policy, since planning cannot proceed in many other fields until 
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decisions have been reached on these two inter-related subjects.”121 As historian Jeff 
Hughes argues, “...the threat of fallout necessitated a re-conceptualisation of the 
British state: now for war planning purposes it had to be imagined as a series of zones 
of contaminated risk mapped by imagined fall-out plumes in a “...hyper-real post-
attack topography.”122 Policy makers were now obliged to deal not only with the 
threat of a weapon with the destructive potential far in advance of anything that 
could have been imagined during the last mass organisation of civil defence of 
World War Two, but with creating a strategy to deal with danger that could often 
neither be seen or heard. 
 
The resulting report issued to ministers in March 1955123 was a pivotal event in 
British civil defence planning. It reviewed a wide range of issues from civil defence 
to the means of ensuring the continuation of the machinery of government and its 
findings were bleak.124 A far-reaching review of civil defence was recommended, 
and Strath noted that the risk to centres of high population could be reduced by a 
combination of shelter, evacuation and dispersal.125 The report lists 62 points of 
recommendation, including the necessity of evacuation plans for high-risk 
individuals such as women, children, the elderly and infirm as well as key 
individuals necessary to continue the functions of government and essential 
services. Home shelters were recommended for those areas that fell outside 
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expected zones of complete devastation. The provision of shelters within these 
zones was considered too technically difficult and financially 'prohibitive', an 
important example of influence of the economic sphere. Materials should be 
stockpiled in central reserves for this purpose and central stores of food, fuel and 
medical supplies created.126  
 
Another key theme in the report was the idea of public awareness and the ability of 
the individual and family group to prepare. Strath recognised: 
 
...the difficult problem of educating public opinion in the 
implications of 'fall-out' without undermining public confidence...it 
will not be possible to postpone for long some announcement of our 
policy for dealing with this menace.127  
 
Public reaction to the prospect of thermonuclear conflict was often referred to 
during official assessments of various courses of action and this was mirrored by 
debates inside the government, which often found itself in a dilemma when 
considering the potential for the negative political impact of public opinion 
resulting from any official information that might be released. Strath, however, was 
clear: 
 
Life in all contaminated areas would demand a high degree of self-
discipline on the part of every individual in the observance of 
elementary procedures to reduce risks from exposure...such 
discipline could not be secured unless the need for it were widely 
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known and the basic precautions thoroughly understood by everyone 
in advance.128  
 
Despite this conviction that a successful civil defence policy was based on the 
widespread dissemination of knowledge and public preparedness, governmental 
control of information in the public domain became increasingly important 
throughout the 1950s, and, as Hughes states, “...shaped both the reception of the 
Strath Report and the subsequent development of government planning for nuclear 
defence.”129 This was exploited by Labour in opposition who, in 1955, published 
their own report into civil defence, which concluded with the following call to 
action: 
 
We feel that this report should be published and given as wide a 
circulation as possible. We say this because we are convinced that 
the time has come when the truth about the danger in which we stand 
should be told to the public. The Government appears to be 
deliberately withholding similar information from the British 
public.130 
 
 
While the majority of the parliamentary Labour Party were supporters of the 
decision to develop a British hydrogen bomb,131 the Leader of the Opposition, 
Hugh Gaitskell, agreed with Sandys on the importance of reducing dependence on 
the American deterrent.132 Sandys showed the growing unease amongst the 
opposition towards nuclear weapons and arms control which would go on to split 
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the party along ideological lines in later years of the Cold War. 
 
In the years following the publication of the Strath Report, few of its 
recommendations were acted upon. Over the summer of 1955 the government 
rejected the advice contained within the Strath report on economic grounds, and 
from 1955 civil defence spending fell year on year until by 1957 spending stood at 
half its 1952 levels.133 It could be argued that the findings of the Strath r eport lay 
behind the pessimistic view of the 1955 Statement on Defence that said of the 
consequences of a nuclear attack on Britain that: “...central and local government 
would be put out of action partially or wholly. There would be grave problems of 
public control, feeding and shelter. Public morale would be most severely tested. It 
would be a struggle for survival of the grimmest kind.”134 The unpalatable 
conclusion of the Statement on Defence is one that would come to haunt the 
government in the following years, as Labour opponents of government policy 
criticised the nature of existing planning.135 
 
In the months following the Report, the development of civil defence policy was 
subject to a number of conflicting economic, political and ideological pressures. 
The Strath report had concluded that the success of civil defence lay in widespread 
civil preparedness. The Home Secretary, Gwilym Lloyd-George, was an advocate 
for the recommendations laid out in the report, arguing in October 1955 for shelters 
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to be constructed on the grounds of public morale.136 However critics of the plans 
cited the prohibitive expenditure required of over £1000 million against the 
numbers that could realistically be saved and others still questioned the expense on 
civil defence which would ultimately have to compete against the budget for the 
British nuclear deterrent and other military forces.137  Competing claims on a 
limited budget could be seen as a reason that none of the report's recommendations 
were made policy. Its publication coincided with a time of economic difficulty in 
Britain and in 1955 the Chancellor, Harold Macmillan, advocated slashing “... a 
substantial block from the load now pressing on our resources.”138 Hennessy notes 
that civil defence would have been one of the primary targets of those cuts: 
 
The Minister of Defence who has circulated the Strath Report to his 
colleagues and presided over the cabinet Committee on its 
implications now proposed to hack £17m out of the £55m planned 
for Home Defence in 1956-57 by not buying food, medical supplies 
and oil for the post-attack stockpile and by stopping the building of 
protective headquarters and control rooms.139 
 
 
By 1956 it was clear that the report's recommendations would not be acted on and 
the idea of a widespread public shelter policy in particular was effectively dead.140 
The figure eventually authorised by Macmillan for 1957/58 was £22 million.141 
This drastic cut in expenditure on civil defence was the first of many that would 
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have a profound influence on the nature of civil defence policy until the end of the 
Cold War. 
 
The Cabinet Office led Home Defence Review of 1955, an exercise in evaluating 
home defence expenditure that was to be repeated later, debated various items of 
proposed civil defence measures against the projected costs in 1960 and again in 
1965:  
 
To sum up, while the Strath recommendations, as accepted by the 
Defence Committee, ranged over the whole field of civil 
preparations for home defence, Government policy has been in 
practice to exclude expenditure on the comparatively costly 'survival' 
measures, while concentrating the limited amount of money 
available on the maintenance of the civil defence services.”142 
 
As Robin Woolven points out, it was generally the cheapest option that was agreed 
upon.143 
 
In the following year, a civil defence circular announced that: 
 
...the megaton weapon has produced a situation so different in degree 
as to amount to a difference in kind. This required a ... complete 
overhaul of our home defence plans, the number of casualties, extent 
of damage by blast and fire, and restrictions on movement imposed 
by fall-out will necessitate a much closer co-ordination of effort, 
over far wider areas than has previously been required.144  
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However it was the prevailing economic climate that was to dominate civil defence 
policy decisions. After Harold Macmillian became Prime Minister in 1957 he 
sought to reduce government expenditure; and the administration's belief in the 
nuclear deterrent allowed large cuts to be made in civil defence provision. In 
response to the request from Macmillian, the then Minister of Defence, Walter 
Monckton, produced a report on home defence measures that recommended wide-
ranging cuts in civil defence. He recommended that the only provisions that should 
be continued were those that “...the absence of which would be liable to undermine 
the deterrent”145, including measures for control of the public at large and the 
continuation of government. As Grant asserts146, the maintenance of the deterrent 
and the good public perception of such was crucial to the successful revision of 
civil defence set out in the Monckton review and “...that within these limits, our 
home defence preparations will be realistic and not a façade”.147 
 
The issue of whether it was preferable to funnel defence spending into building up 
a strong military deterrent was to be an ideologically-driven one that would recur 
throughout the Cold War, the genesis of which had a particularly defining influence 
on civil defence under the later Thatcher governments. Gathered at a meeting to 
discuss the Report three years previously, members of the Home Defence 
Committee noted that “... the desirability of giving a higher proportion of available 
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resources to home defence measures would have to be weighed carefully against 
the risk that this would be at the expense of the primary deterrent.”148  
 
With the need to convince the British public that both the nuclear deterrent and 
civil defence were viable in mind, in 1956 HMSO produced the first publicly 
available information on the hydrogen bomb - a manual called Nuclear Weapons - 
in which some details concerning the immediate effects of these weapons was 
given.149  This was followed a year later by a booklet called The Hydrogen Bomb, 
still offering  advice used in World War Two such as keeping a bucket of water or 
sand handy to put out fires caused by a thermonuclear detonation.150 As will be 
seen, the Sandys Defence White Paper in 1957 was more realistic about the 
chances of survival for the population under nuclear attack.151 
 
The Sandys Defence White Paper 
The defence review of 1957, led by the Minister for Defence Duncan Sandys, was 
to set forth the future of British defence and was in some aspects a response to the 
Suez disaster of the previous year which had revealed a crisis in the battle readiness 
of the British military. Although primarily concerned with foreign and defence 
policies, the paper also had implications for Britain's nuclear deterrent and home 
defence, tying the two aspects of defence together more closely than ever before 
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and embracing deterrence as the main tenet of Britain's defence posture. As 
historian Sir Michael Howard, speaking on Sandys in 2007, reflected the paper 
“...did make us dependent upon deterrence… I wonder whether the realisation in 
the back of people's minds that we have got the deterrent, we are absolutely 
dependent upon it for our general defence policy, made very much difference to the 
way in which they handled these matters.”152 
 
When the paper was published in April 1957, echoes of many of Monckton's 
suggestions could be found within its pages. Chief amongst these was the new 
position that civil defence was to hold as a subsidiary of the deterrent posture: 
“...the central aim must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it. In present 
circumstances the only way to deter nuclear aggression is to possess the means of 
retaliating in time.”153 While the paper stressed the worth of civil defence and the 
need for plans that would allow for 'organised society' to survive and made 
assurances that current passive defence organisations would be allowed to continue, 
there was a conspicuous lack of provision for actual practical measures to ensure 
the continuation of life.  
In the most famous passage from the paper, Sandys states: 
 
It must be frankly recognised that there is at present no means of 
providing adequate protection for the people of this country against 
the consequences of attack with nuclear weapons. This makes it 
more clear than ever that the overriding consideration in all military 
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planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it. 154 
 
The government spent much time attempting to mitigate the effect of this 
statement, with mixed results. Ministers argued in the following months with 
limited success that to interpret this as implying civil defence to be useless was to 
misunderstand the intent of the statement, which was to frame civil defence not 
only as a continuing insurance but as a necessary part of deterrence.155 The 
technological advances that brought forth the huge destructive capability of the 
hydrogen bomb meant that government defence strategy was no longer geared 
towards 'winning' a war but towards preventing one and civil defence played a 
crucial part towards convincing an aggressor that Britain was willing to use its 
nuclear capability.  
 
It was clear from the very first years of the Cold War that the Conservative party 
viewed civil defence as having a function beyond its fundamentally humanitarian 
one, and this can be seen in the response to the conclusions of the Strath report. 
Advocating an increased level of public preparedness, Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of 
Defence argued that “... the primary objective is to prevent war, and a sum … spent 
on medium bombers would be much more likely to influence the decision of an 
aggressor than the same sum spent on shelter.”156 It was Sandys however that first 
formally tied the two aspects of defence together and embraced civil defence as a 
fully-fledged arm of Britain's nuclear defence posture.  
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Earlier in 1957 the Conservative government commissioned a report into the future 
of home defence that recommended that the only civil defence measures that 
should be continued were those that “... the absence of which would be liable to 
undermine the deterrent,”157 suggesting that the question of the upkeep of the 
nuclear deterrent was crucial to the successful revision of civil defence. In turn, this 
report was to influence the conclusions of the Sandys report, with its 
recommendations that “... the central aim must be to prevent war rather than to 
prepare for it. In present circumstances the only way to deter nuclear aggression is 
to possess the means of retaliating in time.”158 The report's frank admission that “... 
there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this 
country”159 undermined the government's policy on both civil defence and the 
nuclear deterrent. It drew both public and opposition criticism; if civil defence was 
still needed then what was the case for the deterrent, and if the deterrent could fail, 
what use was a civil defence that failed to adequately protect? Nevertheless, the 
Conservative administration continued to frame civil defence not only as a 
continuing insurance but as a necessary part of deterrence.160   
 
The Conservative party considered that the advent of the increased destructive 
capability of the hydrogen bomb meant a necessary shift in the focus of civil 
defence. The model seen in World War Two with its emphasis on community-
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based, humanitarian functions was slowly being replaced by a home defence policy 
with objectives beyond that of simple public protection. Some in the Conservative 
parliamentary party believed that civil defence could not hope to be effective and as 
such all monies allocated to the development and upkeep of civil defence should 
instead be put towards maintaining the deterrent.161 In the 1960 Home Review, 
however, the political impossibility of abandoning civil defence entirely due to 
continuing international tensions was recognised.162  
 
The 1964-70 Labour government's decision to place civil defence on a care and 
maintenance basis was met with widespread condemnation from the Conservative 
party, who accused Labour of having an ideological agenda, undermining the 
deterrent by means of stealth and reducing its effectiveness by abolishing civil 
defence.163 David Renton MP voiced the widely-held opposition opinion when he 
stated: 
 
It is very strange, because the Government, like their predecessors, 
had assumed that civil defence was a necessary part of the policy of 
the deterrent and lent credibility to the deterrent. We are not only to 
have the credibility of the deterrent removed at a time when we are 
continuing our policy of having atomic weapons, but we are to have 
removed a most valuable service to humanity.... we on this side are 
deeply distressed by what the Government have done this week.164 
 
 
The concept of civil defence as a function of deterrence is one that would shape not 
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only policy itself but the way in which the public thought about it and responded. 
Melissa Smith notes that emphasising the deterrent function of civil defence saw a 
shift in policy focus. It became less important whether civil defence provision 
would work and increasingly important that it appeared to work165, both in terms of 
foreign relations and domestic acceptance. The issue of military deterrence over 
civilian insurance and public control became the primary ideological battlegrounds 
between Left and Right when civil defence once more emerged as a policy concern 
in 1972.  
 
It was clear from the Paper that the move towards home defence as an adjunct of 
this deterrence that started with Strath had been completed. Civil defence policy 
had now all but entirely taken an economically-influenced shift away from the 
expensive, community-based post-war evacuation and shelter policy to a more 
cost-effective one entirely reliant on self-help and personal preparedness.  
 
 
Local Authority Dissent and the Anti-Nuclear Movement 
The ineffectiveness of civil defence at this time was encapsulated by Conservative 
politician C.M. Woodhouse who branded it “...a cold, callous, cruel fraud; a policy 
of mass suicide.”166 The initial reaction to the publication of the Paper in 1959 had 
been relatively subdued, but within days Labour-controlled St. Pancras Borough 
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Council in London recommended that civil defence be stopped because “...in view 
of the Government's admission in the recent White Paper there is no real defence 
against atomic and hydrogen bomb warfare, we are of the opinion that to continue 
with civil defence is a complete waste of money.”167 
 
St. Pancras was not the first local authority to make their disagreement with 
government civil defence policy known. In July 1954, Coventry City Council 
announced that they intended to terminate all their civil defence functions, citing 
them to be a waste of time and money in the face of recent reports about the 
devastating nature of the hydrogen bomb.168 The conflict was resolved by the 
Home Secretary who appointed three commissioners to discharge those functions 
in the name of and at the expense of the council. After just over a year in default, 
Coventry announced in August 1955 that it was prepared to resume all its civil 
defence functions.169 Coventry would be just the first example of the Labour-led, 
local authority defiance of central civil defence policy and anti-nuclear protest that 
was to last until the end of the Cold War. The St Pancras revolt however was an 
altogether more pressing problem for the government, representing the most 
serious dissent against their home defence policies since the development of the 
hydrogen bomb.  
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The 1956 local elections returned a hard-left Labour council to St Pancras, 
including the former Trotskyist John Lawrence who was elected leader of the 
council later the same year. While the proposals set out in the Sandys White Paper 
were backed by the leader of the Conservative opposition in the council, Lawrence 
led the Labour Group into recommending that, as an ideological stand as a Socialist 
council, that “...as from 1 June 1957 all Civil Defence Activities in St Pancras be 
discontinued by the council, the civil defence staff will be absorbed into other 
departments and all properties used for civil defence be used for urgent housing 
purposes.”170 Lawrence had admitted that stopping work on civil defence “...was 
politically motivated and made as a stand in favour of Britain opting out of being a 
nuclear power.”171 The St Pancras revolt continued for 18 months; after a change in 
leadership the council resumed its civil defence duties in January 1959. 
 
The government utilised powers to intervene when a local authority failed to 
perform its statutory duties by Regulation 4 of the Civil Defence (Regulations) 
1949 which stated: 
 
If the designated Minister is satisfied that any local authority has 
failed or refused properly to discharge any of the civil defence 
functions conferred on them as aforesaid he may by order either 
empower himself to discharge those functions in the name and at the 
expense of that authority or authorise or require some other authority 
or person to exercise those functions in the name and at the expense 
of the authority so failing or refusing.172 
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It was under these regulations that St Pancras' non-compliance, as Coventry's 
before, was partially resolved with the appointment of a commissioner in June 
1957,173 sent to undertake the council's civil defence responsibilities at the expense 
of the borough. The commissioner arranged for the construction of a new civil 
defence headquarters and increased the staff employed in civil defence from 5 to 9. 
The borough was charged for all expenditure incurred from these measures without 
the benefit of grant aid.174 However the refusal of the council to participate in Civil 
Defence Activities only came to an end in May 1959, when the electorate returned 
a pro-civil defence, Conservative majority. Although St Pancras' call for other local 
authorities to follow its lead was not successful, the revolt was an embarrassment 
for the government and a clear warning that the language of the Sandys White 
Paper, which strove to minimise the effect of its conclusion that there was “no 
means of providing adequate protection”175, had not been sufficient to avoid alarm. 
 
As well as inspiring dissent in St. Pancras, the Sandys White Paper was a catalyst 
for the nuclear disarmament movement which up to this point had been little more 
than a handful of minority protest groups. The Hydrogen Bomb National Campaign 
sought an end to the development and testing of nuclear weapons176 and the Peace 
Pledge Union campaigned for an end to Britain's nuclear programme177, but neither 
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organisation was actively campaigning on issues of public protection. Nevertheless, 
the embryonic peace movement gained considerable momentum from the Sandys 
White Paper statement of 'no adequate protection'. As civil defence began to 
become more widely reported peace groups became increasingly influential as their 
numbers grew.  
 
In 1958 the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was formed and would 
become a vocal critic of not only successive governments' nuclear weapons 
programmes, but of their civil defence measures too.178 Anti-nuclear campaigners 
doubted that civil defence could have any value on its own, but the real objection 
came in the form of civil defence as an adjunct to an overall defence policy based 
on the use of nuclear weapons. Civil defence therefore became a legitimate target 
for peace groups as well as further underlining the link between civilian protection 
and deterrence, based, as it was viewed, “...upon an attempt to create an 
atmosphere of security where there is none, and is thereby concerned with 
conditioning the mind of the public to the idea of nuclear war.”179 
 
Faced with this backlash from peace groups and the opposition benches, the 
government began to stress the 'insurance' aspect of its policy, emphasising the 
humanitarian function of civil defence: 
 
..although it is our primary aim to prevent such a disastrous war from 
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ever breaking out, it is impossible for any Government to rule out of 
consideration entirely the sort of dangers about which we have been 
talking tonight, although we hope that they will never come about. 
Civil defence is an insurance policy against them, and to say that 
such an insurance policy tends to promote the very dangers against 
which it is directed is similar to saying that a ship is more likely to be 
steered on to the rocks because it is carrying lifeboats. No 
responsible Government could accept such nonsense.180 
 
The 1959 Defence Paper, however, seemed to contradict the government's 
conciliatory tone when it stated that “No major change is contemplated in the 
structure or role of civil defence.”181 
 
Home Defence Reviews of the 1960s 
Post-Strath, civil defence planning started to move away from traditional ideas of 
public protection, concentrating instead on plans for the survival and continuation 
of government and community order.  The 1960 Home Defence Review182 built 
upon the conclusions of the 1955 Review and comprised a more thorough 
examination of the range of civil defence provisions and the rationale for such, and 
presented a detailed account of the value of civil defence expenditure. As in earlier 
reports, while certain home defence measures were considered to have worth, 
financial considerations were once again at the forefront of its recommendations 
and the importance of civil defence as deterrence emphasised: 
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… that some home defence preparations are an integral part of the 
deterrent policy, primarily because of their potential value in 
steadying public opinion in support of this policy in a period of 
tension. Some of the Committee also think that the Government also 
has a duty to take measures to mitigate the consequences to the civil 
population in global war, and that home defence preparations are 
justified in order to increase the chances of survival if war were to 
come. In practice, measures which would be justified on this latter 
ground are largely the same as those which would be of value on the 
former ground, namely to steady public opinion in a period of 
tension.183 
 
 
The Paper noted that even the 'minority view' represented on the Committee who 
believed that no effective public defence was possible and all funds currently 
allocated for civil defence should instead be put towards maintaining the deterrent, 
“...nevertheless recognise that it would be politically impracticable to abandon 
home defence entirely at the present time.”184  The Joint Under-Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, later answering questions in the House of Lords on the 
Paper, stated: 
 
The construction of public shelters for the protection of the 
population cannot be contemplated and provision on a country-wide 
scale of less elaborate but specially constructed underground shelters 
against fall-out would also impose an impossible burden on our 
resources.185 
 
 
 
By inextricably linking the survival of the government machine with the continuity 
of the state and emphasising that “…provision should be made for carrying on the 
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government of this country in nuclear war”186 and stressing the need for control in 
wartime, 'survival' was increasingly understood to mean the survival of the state 
rather than the individual. From this Review came the development of sub-regional 
seats of government, local civil-military headquarters around the country which 
would be responsible for the administration and distribution of supplies in their 
region and who would represent central government for an indefinite period post-
attack.187 Responsibility for immediate life-saving measures unofficially fell to the 
volunteer Civil Defence Corps (CDC) and a decision was made to reorganise and 
arrange additional training for its 360,000 members. The government stated that the 
occupants of protected headquarters and regional controls would be “...elected not 
for their intrinsic merit...but for the help they could give to others,”188 but it was 
apparent that state survival was now the primary concern of civil defence as the 
plans for protection of key personnel but not of the public became known.  
 
The decision to build a British independent atomic deterrent had been taken by a 
Labour government in 1947189, and it was known that Attlee supported Churchill's 
defence policy after 1951 and that the Labour Party followed a broadly bi-partisan 
defence policy from then until 1960.190 Since that first Attlee government, the 
Labour Party broadly supported an evolving defence policy based on nuclear 
weapons in the context of the Cold War.191 By the mid-1950s however, Labour 
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politicians were already questioning the Conservative government's nuclear-based 
defence strategy in terms of civil defence.192 At this time, however, Labour's 
position on civil defence was broadly one of support; effective civil defence policy 
was seen as a necessary foil to the questionable wisdom of a British nuclear 
deterrent: 
 
Given the Government's foreign policy and strategy, and as they are 
committing this country to be certainly attacked in the first week of 
the next war, we must consider what methods we have with which to 
defend the population.193 
 
 
A minority within the party were in favour of unilateralism and a conventional, 
rather than nuclear, participation in NATO and it was from this point that ideology 
began to grow as an important influence on Labour's civil defence policies. 
Although an opponent of high expenditure on defence and nuclear power, 
addressing the issue of disarmament at the Labour Party conference in 1957, 
Shadow Foreign Secretary, Aneurin Bevan encapsulated the Labour Party's 
dilemma when he controversially dismissed unilateralism;  
 
It is therefore not a question of who is in favour of the Hydrogen 
bomb, but a question of what is the most effective way of getting the 
damn thing destroyed. It is the most difficult of all problems facing 
mankind. But if you carry this resolution and follow out all its 
implications and do not run away from it you will send a British 
Foreign Secretary, whoever he may be, naked into the conference 
chamber. ... And you call that statesmanship? I call it an emotional 
spasm.194  
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By the time of the 1960 review however, this support for civil defence was 
beginning to change. In 1960 the Labour opposition tabled an ultimately 
unsuccessful but politically revealing amendment to the 1960 Report on Defence 
which stated: “That this House, recognising the need for an adequate policy for 
collective defence and security, has no confidence in the defence policy of Her 
Majesty's Government.”195 Primarily concerned with what it saw as a report which 
involved “... the nation in further substantially increased expenditure whilst 
providing no prospect of effective defence,” 196 Labour's opposition also stemmed 
from what the party considered to be the government's reckless disregard for the 
civilian population in the event of nuclear war: 
 
The Government's deterrent strategy means that they are prepared to 
plunge the population of this country into annihilation at short notice 
or with no notice whatever. They make no attempt at any policy for 
preserving the lives of the people. At the same time, in order to keep 
the people happy about this suicidal nuclear deterrent strategy, the 
Government go in for what the defence correspondent of The Times 
last year called a token civil defence policy. That is to keep the 
people happy with a lot of fun and games. I think that represents the 
acme of cynical frivolity and irresponsibility. I think it is quite 
wicked.197  
 
While the Review did not seek to restore confidence in the government's plans for 
public protection as might have been expected, the subsequent 1962 Defence 
Statement sought to reaffirm the status of civil defence; “...over the next five to ten 
years it is clear that Civil Defence will play an important part in maintaining the 
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general preparedness of the whole nation for any emergency”198 This was a 
statement that was to be tested just a few months later in October 1962. The Cuban 
Missile crisis is widely regarded199 as the incident that brought the world closest to 
nuclear war.  Robert McNamara, United States Defense Secretary at the time, 
stated: 
 
I want to say, and this is very important: at the end we lucked out. It 
was luck that prevented nuclear war. We came that close to nuclear 
war at the end. Rational individuals: Kennedy was rational; 
Khrushchev was rational; Castro was rational. Rational individuals 
came that close to total destruction of their societies. And that danger 
exists today.200  
 
The closeness of this threat was also felt in Britain. The British V-bomber force was 
put on a 15 minute readiness alert,201 however at no point during the events were 
any civil defence plans put into action, the Civil Defence Corps put on standby or 
the public given any information concerning personal protection against possible 
attack202. In Prime Minister's Questions on the 25th April 1963, Labour MP Konni 
Zilliacus asked of Harold Macmillian, the Prime Minister: 
 
Mr. Zilliacus asked the Prime Minister what were the special 
measures he instructed the competent Ministers to take, for putting 
the Government's civil defence policy in a state of readiness, at the 
height of the Cuban crisis last October.  
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The Prime Minister  None, Sir.  
Mr. Zilliacus Is it not within the recollection of the Prime Minister 
that he took special measures to put rockets and V-bombers in a 
special state of readiness at the time? Does not the Government civil 
defence policy purport to evacuate 12 million people between the 
announcement of a state of crisis and the four-minute warning? Has 
that policy now been quietly dropped as being a complete bluff?203 
 
 
Macmillian simply answered that it had not. Lord (Philip) Allen of Abbeydale, 
Deputy Under Secretary to the Home Office at the time of the crisis is quoted in 
Woolven (2002) as saying: “...my memory may be unreliable but I have no 
recollection of the Home Office taking any action in response to the rising 
international crisis in October 1962.”204 The government had evidently not felt it 
necessary or advisable to activate civil defence plans in reaction to the threat and 
the implication appears to be that the government was hoping the problem would 
go away.  
 
It is possible that civil defence measures were not activated in an attempt to prevent 
further exacerbation of a delicate situation. However criticisms of this apparent 
failure in the government's duty of care came readily from the opposition benches, 
with Michael Foot encapsulating the argument when he posited that “...during Cuba 
week no measures were taken to put civil defence into operation, presumably 
because there was no civil defence? Is that the official secret which the Prime 
Minister is trying to keep?”205 Plans had always centred around the assumptions 
that there would be a 'precautionary period' of several days before the initiation of a 
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nuclear exchange206, but the Cuban crisis came out of nowhere. When Labour MP, 
Laurie Pavitt, asked Rab Butler, the Home Secretary, “... why British civil defence 
plans are based on the premise that several days' warring of a nuclear attack will be 
available in view of the fact that United States plans are based on much shorter 
warning”207, Rab Butler's response was: 
 
It is important to distinguish between warning of an actual attack and 
a period of alert at a time of increasing tension which would enable 
emergency preparations to be made. Information about home defence 
plans is exchanged with our American Allies, and I have no reason to 
suppose that there is any fundamental difference between us on this 
matter.208 
 
This raised the question; if civil defence plans could not be put into action for fear 
of exacerbating a situation of international crisis, could they be said to hold any 
humanitarian function at all? As Labour MP Reginald Paget, speaking in the 
Commons said: 
 
I suppose that the Cuba week-end was, in nuclear terms, a test crisis 
period. I do not know, and I do not know of anyone who does know, 
what was the warning that should have been given... This sort of 
preparation ... indicates the measure not only of our defensive 
imbalance but our deterrent threat.209  
 
As George Crossley notes,210 this also suggests a preoccupation not with gestures 
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of strength but with domestic compliance.  
 
In the last two years of the Conservative government that followed the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, civil defence expenditure was increased slightly211 in order to speed 
up the provision of buildings and communications for emergency controls. The 
1963 Statement on Defence also asserted that “...the Government have always 
recognised the importance of informing the public of the effects of nuclear 
weapons and the steps that could be taken to mitigate these effects”212, the result of 
which was the public release of Advising the Householder on Protection Against 
Nuclear Attack.213 Originally released to the civil defence, fire and police services, 
this was now made available for the public to buy and contained information that 
would also have been issued on television and through newspapers if it was ever 
deemed necessary. The fact that it was offered for sale and not distributed free 
summed up the government's dilemma with regard to public education on civil 
defence matters. On the one hand the usefulness of public awareness was 
recognised but fears about public panic kept the information from reaching as many 
as it might. As the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, C.M. 
Woodhouse informed the Commons: 
 
Some people have suggested, like my hon. Friend, that it ought not to 
be put on sale: but that it ought to be distributed free to the public.... 
For a number of reasons, not from fear of scaring the public, we 
decided that it would not be right to distribute it now in a way which 
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would appear to suggest that we were positively suggesting to the 
public that they ought to take the measures indicated in this booklet 
now, because we are not doing so, and that for more than one 
reason.214 
 
The booklet offered advice on subjects such as putting out small fires and 
constructing a fallout room within a house and, like advice given in the 1950s, still 
maintained that it would be possible for search and rescue teams to come to the aid 
of the trapped or injured.215 This advice was criticised in the eleventh report by the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Estimates, which commented: 
 
The average householder who reads what to do in the event of an 
imminent nuclear attack will not form the impression that the civil 
defence measures taken by the government are of any value 
whatsoever.216 
 
Despite the government's programme of public information stressing the 
humanitarian function of civil defence, the Municipal Yearbook in 1963 reiterated 
to civil defence officials that the care of the population at large was no longer their 
primary concern: 
 
Modern Civil Defence goes far beyond the popular conceptions of 
the rescue, treatment and removal of casualties and the care and 
feeding of the homeless. At a time when normal channels of 
communication would be non-existent or seriously disrupted, the 
Civil Defence organisation would be needed not only to provide 
essential supplies and services, but for the restoration of good order 
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and local government. 217 
 
 
In stark contrast to the soothing advice given in Advising the Householder on 
Protection Against Nuclear Attack, a Home Office Circular218 issued in July 1963 
outlined the three phases of Home Defence plans. The first was the operational or 
“...life-saving phase, where civil defence teams under local authority control rescue 
and evacuate as many people as possible; the second was the survival phase, where 
the remaining resources are assessed and plans laid for converting their 
organisation into a survivable social system and the third was the recovery phase, 
directed from Regional Government headquarters with the aim of the gradual over 
a period of many years restoration of some society and industry.”219 This 
unequivocally redefined one of the primary tenets of civil defence as the 
continuation of government in war. 
When the Labour Party came to power under Harold Wilson in 1964, it had done so 
on the back of a campaign against the British nuclear deterrent, Attlee himself now 
appearing in a party election broadcast in which he stated “... the idea of an 
independent deterrent is a nonsense. They cannot tell me of any possible occasion 
on which we ourselves independently should want to use a weapon. Or how you 
can use it as a threat.”220 Wilson had previously condemned the purchase of 
American-made weapons systems as “the so-called British, so-called independent, 
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so-called deterrent.”221 Yet when Wilson became Prime Minister, Labour broadly 
continued existing deterrent policy in light of the 1965 Home Defence Review 
which concluded that a policy of deterrence – and in turn, civil defence -  was still 
justified as it offered British defence capability “... stability since an aggressor who 
struck first would...suffer unacceptable damage in return.”222  
 
The election of the Wilson government marked the beginning of a cross-party 
consensus on the nuclear weapons programme and a change in the Labour party's 
opposition towards the concept of deterrence previously seen in the parliamentary 
party since the early 1950s.223 Although support for unilateralism continued to be a 
defining feature of Labour's Cold War defence ideology, it never again posed any 
significant threat to the British nuclear deterrent224. Attitudes towards civil defence 
policy were also changing. Where previously Labour policy in opposition had been 
to lend support to any civil defence provision on a humanitarian basis, opinion 
within the party now began to split, between those who considered public 
protection a reluctant but necessary adjunct to a nuclear-based defence strategy and 
those who branded it as a public amelioration designed to make the prospect of 
nuclear war more palatable. 
 
This Labour administration had a different ideological perspective to the preceding 
Conservative government and this was apparent in policy consultation not only 
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with regard to the nuclear deterrent but also to civil defence. Crucially, it was at this 
stage that civil defence planning started to make the subtle shift in the way it dealt 
with public protection away from 'traditional' concepts of civil defence into the 
arena of emergency planning, with suggestions that the Civil Defence Corps could 
be used to aid the victims of industrial accidents and similar domestic crises in the 
future.225 The 1965 Defence White Paper reported that while plans for regional 
controls, law and order and communications had been established, preparations for 
public protection such as medical services, shelter and food remained at the 
planning stage.226  
 
The 1965 Home Defence review expressed the new government's intention of 
giving high priority to public expenditure of social and economic value. As a 
consequence, it was necessary to give lower priority to expenditure, including 
defence expenditure, which did not have social and economic value.227 However 
despite a pre-election understanding that Labour would scrap the deterrent, the 
Review went on to calculate the risk of nuclear attack on the UK, concluding that a 
policy of deterrence was still justified as it offered certain “...stability since an 
aggressor who struck first would...suffer unacceptable damage in return.”228 As a 
result of this, civil defence was considered to still be of worth, and although noting 
that, as had been seen in previous Home Defence Reviews, there was an argument 
that all available resources should be diverted towards the deterrent as what 
provisions could be made would be of 'little value', it was ultimately decided that 
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civil defence could potentially save lives and therefore should be maintained.  
 
Speaking at the announcement of the Review to parliament in February 1966, the 
Home Secretary Roy Jenkins stated “...we have concluded that, despite the 
reduction in the risk of a nuclear conflict, we cannot discontinue civil defence 
preparations....But there is a limit to what we can afford by way of insurance 
against this risk [of nuclear conflict].”229  Preparations were therefore restricted to 
those which were considered most likely to make a 'significant contribution' 
towards national survival and were concentrated around the decentralisation of 
government and emergencies systems of warning and communication. Tying civil 
defence policy even more closely with emergency planning, the creation of a 
'Home Defence Force', with members drawn from the Territorial Army and 
intended to provide police with valuable support in the maintenance of law and 
order in an emergency”230 was announced. When further cuts in the civil defence 
budget were found to be needed the following year, however, this plan was 
scrapped and the Civil Defence Corps were reduced in number by around a third.231  
 
By 1967, the provisions for public protection were being further scaled down. The 
UK Warning and Monitoring Organisation, originally set up in the mid-1950s and 
made up of 1,500 underground observation posts designed for the detection and 
monitoring of bomb bursts and post-strike fallout, continued to be developed, as 
did the Regional Seats of Government. But stockpiles of food and fuel were 
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depleted and it was planned to further reduce the Civil Defence Corps to 75,000 
members, cutting out the aid and rescue teams entirely. 232 
 
The Dissolution of Civil Defence 
The Home Defence Review of 1965 calculated that the risk of nuclear attack on the 
UK had lessened significantly since the review of 1960. It also argued that while 
civil defence was ultimately of reduced value, it was still of worth as an adjunct to 
a continued policy of deterrence.233 As discussed in Chapter 3 however, the 
government was also under considerable financial constraints and after cuts to the 
civil defence budget were found to be not enough, it was decided that in light of the 
receding threat of nuclear conflict to reduce civil defence to a care and maintenance 
basis. 
 
The next Home Secretary James Callaghan also made it clear in a debate on civil 
defence in the House of Commons in February 1968 that, in addition to the need to 
make significant budgetary cuts, civil defence provision was being scaled back as 
the threat it was primarily designed to meet no longer posed any significant danger: 
 
It is the Government's assessment that the risk of nuclear attack on 
these islands is less now than it was a few years ago. This is one of 
the considerations which led me to put forward the proposition that I 
did.  
I think that the horrific consequences of a nuclear war are now so 
well appreciated that it is difficult to believe that any country would 
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willingly provoke such a conflict. Moreover, the recent events in the 
Middle East and in Vietnam have provided real evidence, in the view 
of the Government, that the Soviet Union and the United States are 
determined to avoid direct contact in a war situation. 
I would be the last to claim that we have sufficient justification for 
believing that the risk of nuclear war has completely gone. That 
would be absurd. There remains the danger, remote as we believe it 
to be, of accident or miscalculation. But the danger has lessened 
significantly enough in my view and in the view of the Government 
to permit us, at a time of extreme financial stringency, to look more 
closely than ever before at the level of expenditure on civil defence 
preparations—at what I would call the size of our insurance 
premium.234 
 
 
 
By 1968 it was evident that these cuts would not be enough. Taking into 
consideration the earlier conclusions drawn by the 1965 Home Defence Review 
concerning the significantly lessened risk of nuclear conflict, the Home Defence 
Committee was asked to recommend how home defence expenditure could be 
reduced to about a quarter of existing costs. Despite the warning of the Committee 
that if a reduction to the required expenditure levels of between approximately £7 
and £8 million was to be obtained, it would not be possible to:  
 
...maintain in a state of immediate operational readiness even those 
preparations retained on a care and maintenance basis; and it would 
be understood that months of intensive effort would be required to 
restore to the country the same level of capacity to face an immediate 
crisis as it [now] possesses.”235 
 
Despite this, in the first month of 1968 Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced to 
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the House of Commons that: “...we have decided to reduce Home Defence - Civil 
Defence - to a care and maintenance basis, with a saving of about £14 million in 
1968, and £20 million in 1969 and in subsequent years.”236  It is clear that 
economic concerns were of the greatest influence on policy at this time. In response 
to questioning following the announcement, the Under-Secretary of State for the 
Home Department David Ennals stated that financial circumstances and the risk of 
nuclear attack were the reasons for the reduction in civil defence measures.237  
Once again using the official metaphor of insurance in his language, he 
acknowledged the shortcomings of civil defence policy:  “…we have reduced our 
premium, and we recognise that the cover has also been reduced.”238 This was 
privately accepted by Home Secretary James Callaghan who said that as it stood: 
“…the maintenance of civil defence in this country on the existing scale was not a 
significant element in the deterrence of nuclear aggression.”239 
By the end of the decade, the superpowers were enjoying a period of more relaxed 
relations. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons240 which came 
into force on 5 March 1970 and sought to limit the spread of nuclear weapons was 
one of the first building blocks of this period of détente. The incoming 1969 Nixon 
administration in the US also saw talks begin between the West and the Warsaw 
Pact towards limiting the nuclear capabilities of the two superpowers. This 
ultimately led to the signing of Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT1) in 
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1972.241  
 
The government believed that the ratification of SALT1 was an indication that a 
worthwhile reduction in international tension was on the point of being achieved.242 
It was considered that there would be sufficient warning of any Soviet political 
intention to attack the United Kingdom to allow time for civil preparedness to be 
brought to readiness before the end of an assessed period of three or four weeks' 
warning of Soviet preparations commencing.243 Declining to ascribe more weight 
to either reasons of economics or external influences, financial limitations or 
détente, Callaghan went on to state that while the danger from accident or 
miscalculation could never be completely removed, reducing civil defence 
provisions was a decision inextricably based on a risk of nuclear war that had been 
calculated to be negligible.244 
 
Criticism of this proposal focussed on the apparent contradictions in government 
policy, contrasting this with the results of the 1966 Home Review which concluded 
that: 
 
The risk of a major war arising out of direct conflict between East 
and West can be almost entirely excluded as a result of the present 
state of nuclear deterrence; nevertheless we must maintain our guard 
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as there is always a risk of war arising out of misunderstanding or 
miscalculation.  
We must maintain an effective civil defence policy as a measure of 
insurance against an unlikely event….with proper preparations much 
could be done to save lives, relieve suffering and help millions 
survive.245  
 
 
Critics demanded to know the government's basis for change in policy concern, 
accusing the government of using improving international relations as a cover for 
spending cuts or arguing that policy should not be dictated by the possibility of 
détente alone.246 The year after this significant reduction in provision, the Labour 
government at the time privately acknowledged that civil defence arrangements as 
they now stood were not fit for purpose in the event of a nuclear incident of any 
cause.247 In a memo to the Prime Minister, Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend, 
while reiterating the inadequacies of home defence policy, stated that it could not 
be “...maintained that the risk of an attack on this country is such as to justify, in 
our present economic situation, the premium needed to insure against it on the scale 
which was accepted up to January 1968.”248  
 
In less than a decade civil defence policy had changed from being heralded as a 
vital and integral part of British nuclear deterrent posture that served an important 
if secondary humanitarian function to being a prohibitively expensive political 
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afterthought that could not claim to serve either deterrent or humanitarian purpose. 
Preparedness, and in particular the specifically life-saving aspects of civil defence, 
were wound down. Expenditure was cut from £22.5 million to £7.2 million.249 The 
Civil Defence Corps and other auxiliary services were disbanded the same year, 
local authority bunkers were to be put into care and remaining stockpiles of 
equipment dispersed, and the government, publicly ignoring the advice from the 
Home Defence Committee, stated its policy to keep the civil defence organisation 
in a state from which it could be reactivated if needed.250 Only the United Kingdom 
Warning and Monitoring Organisation (UKWMO) was kept at a state of readiness.  
 
In the months following the official stand-down, concerns were expressed from 
within the government that the decision to discontinue civil defence provisions had 
been ill-informed and left Britain vulnerable not only to foreign attackers but to 
domestic saboteurs.251 While some ministers cautiously welcomed further 
review,252 the Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins stated that he saw 'no real 
evidence' for a change in the basis of policy concerns. The 1969 Statement on 
Defence Estimates set out only the minimum expenditure that would allow civil 
defence to continue at the barest levels that would permit active preparations to 
resume if need be.253 However at the same time, an assessment commissioned by 
the Home Defence Committee who had been reviewing the decision to place civil 
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defence on a care and maintenance basis in 1968, concluded that the threat to law 
and order during a period of tension had been underestimated. In a memo to the 
Prime Minister, Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, summarised the results of this 
assessment as follows: 
 
The results suggest that our home defence arrangements are now 
seriously deficient and that, as things stand, it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to activate an effective home defence organisation 
within the period of warning which we may expect, or even within a 
much longer period.254 
 
The Conservatives at their party conference in 1969 promised a review of civil 
defence when next in power, but when the party under Edward Heath was returned 
to government in 1970 they did not seek a return to civil defence as had occurred 
under their last administration. Cold War relations were enjoying a period of 
détente and this coupled with ongoing financial concerns meant that issues 
appertaining to civil defence issues were not a priority for policymakers. In 1969, 
the official Home Defence Committee finished its first review of home defence 
since it was placed on a care and maintenance basis in 1968. It disclosed that there 
were “serious deficiencies in the current arrangements for home defence, and that 
home defence organisations could not be mobilised to an effective standard within 
the expected warning time of attack”.255  
 
It was against the backdrop of the following decades of economically-constrained 
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administrations that civil defence fought against competing claims on a restricted 
budget.  The dichotomy at the heart of civil defence planning was clear from the 
immediate-post war years as Clement Attlee, addressing the Cabinet Committee on 
Civil Defence in 1948, had spelled out: 
 
[it was] essential to avoid a situation in which the government would 
be driven to devote resources to civil defence on a scale which would 
cripple the national economy, detract from our power of offence and 
alienate our allies in Europe...the government was not prepared to 
devote resources to passive defence at the expense of weakening our 
striking force or impeding our economic recovery.256 
 
The peak era for expenditure on traditional civil defence measures – against a 
foreign, primarily nuclear-armed, aggressor – came in the early 1950s and pre-
dated the arrival of the H-bomb in Britain. In the early 1960s however, the 
Conservative government of Harold Macmillan struggled with the difficulties of 
trying to curtail spiralling inflation without hampering economic growth,257 a 
period that Economist Nicholas Crafts asserts was one of failure of the government 
caused by poor understanding of economic theory, short-termism and a failure to 
confront interest groups.258 A solution could not be found by Labour after they were 
returned to power in 1964 and eventually in 1967 Harold Wilson was forced to 
devalue sterling.  Practical civil defence provisions dwindled rapidly in this decade 
concurrent with a decline in spending until in 1968 civil defence measures were 
placed on a care and maintenance basis.  
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The results of the Home Defence Committee's inquiries, published in 1969 as the 
Review of the Effect of the Care and Maintenance Decision on Arrangements for 
Government in War, concluded that it would not be possible to achieve a 
satisfactory home defence organisation within the current spending limit of £8 
million per year259, a direct correlation between economics and efficacy of policy. 
Sir Burke Trend recommended that for an additional expenditure of between £5 and 
6 million per year, the basic essentials of effective civil defence preparations could 
be achieved.260 Acknowledging the government's inability to abandon home 
defence entirely, the Home Defence Committee stressed that appropriate Ministers 
should consider “...in the context of the current review of public expenditure, 
whether it would be justifiable to spend a little more on making them [home 
defence organisations] minimally effective.”261 This was a view shared by Minister 
of Power, Roy Mason, who in a memo to the Prime Minister wondered whether 
“...despite the general situation on public expenditure, it seems to me that we must 
consider whether we have cut expenditure in these fields too ruthlessly, and 
whether it is practicable to do something to make our arrangements minimally 
effective.”262  
 
The Treasury disagreed with both the Home Defence Committee's conclusions on 
both the threat from inadequate home defence provision and the suggestion of the 
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benefits of an additional £6 million expenditure.263 In a memo to the Prime Minister 
in 1969, the Treasury's position on the findings of the Home Defence Committee 
stated: 
 
I have no reason to think that the £8 million a year which we already 
spend could be more effectively distributed.  
In our present economic circumstances, I would find it extremely 
difficult to agree to any substantial addition to the present 
expenditure on Home Defence.264 
 
Home Secretary James Callaghan was in agreement with Burke Trend in principle, 
however, stating that although he had considered abolishing civil defence 
altogether, for the relatively small 'insurance premium' suggested by Trend, “...we 
can avoid raising unhelpful speculation in this country, and we can pit something of 
an account to our NATO allies”265. The Prime Minister therefore suggested that the 
involved Ministers take stock of the situation to determine whether the additional 
expenditure proposed could reduce risk sufficiently to be warranted. While a fresh 
review of home defence was welcomed by many ministers concerned,266 both the 
Chancellor, Roy Jenkins, and Home Secretary, were not in favour, with Callaghan 
acknowledging the gaps in home defence already noted but questioning the validity 
of such a review if the additional expenditure could not be found: 
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The stringent economies we are having to make in many fields as a 
result of the public expenditure review can have left little scope in 
departments for further cuts in their expenditure forecasts to find 
room for home defence; I for one cannot see where further 
reductions could be made in Home Office expenditure to 
counterbalance the extra sums which the Home Office Civil Defence 
Vote would have to bear.267 
 
 
It would be through the move away from traditional models of home defence and a 
broadening of policy remit to encompass civil preparedness and emergency 
planning that allowed the rebirth of civil defence as an active policy concern in 
1972. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the genesis and development of post-war civil defence 
policy was subject to various determining factors in the years before 1968, some of 
which had far-reaching repercussions that were to influence policymakers and 
shape policy until the end of the Cold War. The influence of economic factors, 
ideology and external actors can clearly be identified in the policy process and thus 
prefigures how these would come to affect later policy development. However it is 
also possible to see the effects of other influences, such as the rapid development of 
weapons technology which, in the form of the hydrogen bomb, was a significant 
policy driver in the rapid shift of civil defence planning away from the model of 
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shelter and evacuation seen in World War Two.  
 
In 1945 the world came to the end of a conflict which had lasted for six years, and 
great hope was held for a new era of peace between the US and the USSR. Yet in 
less than two years the world had been plunged into a new conflict between the 
former Allies that would become a source of continuing confrontation for the next 
four decades. During the Berlin Blockade of 1948, war with the USSR seemed a 
real possibility and from this point forwards, Britain's base for US air forces 
combined with existing Anglo-American alliances and Britain's geographical 
importance meant the country was consequently thrust into the forefront of the 
Cold War. This provoked the most important external influence for the revival of 
civil defence policy which, having been disbanded at the end of World War Two, 
was revived a short three years later in 1948 due to the perceived threat of these 
new world tensions. Continuing the policies of mass evacuation, dispersal and 
shelter that had served the country during World War Two, it retained the 
humanitarian wartime focus of public welfare and rescue and was organised along 
similar recovery and recuperation lines. The purpose, scope and practical 
application of civil defence as defined by the 1948 Civil Defence Act changed so 
significantly in the two decades between its creation and its stand down however as 
to render it almost unrecognisable.  
 
The influence of external actors in the form of scientific and technological 
advances continued to be seen as the World War Two model of civil defence 
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suffered a crucial blow when the full destructive capability of the hydrogen bomb 
became known by the early 1950s and defence policy as well as civil defence 
policy underwent a degree of change to meet the new threat to the public as laid out 
in the Strath Report. With the advent of fall-out, policy was forced for the first time 
to meet a threat not contained within the World War Two model. As the scale of 
potential annihilation and the economic factor of severely limited funds available to 
deal with it was realised, in the years following the publication of the Report much 
of the rhetoric surrounding civil defence became increasingly couched in terms of 
'deterrence' and 'insurance' and less in terms of public protection. Ideological 
concerns as experienced by the effects of the creation and maintenance of the 
nuclear deterrent and financial considerations started to become the defining 
influences on civil defence policy. Though the government was broadly in favour 
of the shelter and evacuation plans recommended in the report, the competition for 
expenditure from the nuclear deterrent and the need to make budgetary cuts meant 
that only those aspects of civil defence policy which complemented and enhanced 
the deterrent were put into practice.  
 
The notion of civil defence serving as an insurance policy was stated frequently 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s as the cementing of civil defence policy as a 
subsidiary to Britain's deterrent posture became more firmly entrenched. The 
Sandys White Paper of 1957 publicly recognised that no adequate protection for the 
public could hope to be provided in the event of a nuclear exchange and so the 
government's focus was now on preventing a war rather than surviving one, and 
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civil defence measures became increasingly concerned with the survival of the 
government machine. 
 
With the increasing public knowledge of the extent of the threat to life from the 
hydrogen bomb and the seemingly inadequate provisions for public protection, the 
government began to come under heavy criticism from both the opposition and 
peace groups which saw their membership dramatically swell in response to the 
perceived nuclear threat. It can also been seen that although policy in the early 
1960s reflected concerns over state survival and crisis management, manifestations 
of civil defence were notably absent during the Cuban Missile Crisis which caused 
much criticism of both civil defence policy and the foundations of deterrence on 
which it rested. Despite active and vocal groups campaigning against government 
policy, external actors' opposition to the deterrent and criticism of protection 
policies had little effect on their development at this time. 
 
By the mid-1960s, civil defence policy was concentrated around those measures 
that were considered to contribute the most significantly towards state survival; 
national warning systems and regional seats of government control. The new 
Labour government had historically looked favourably upon the British nuclear 
deterrent although it was economic rather than ideological concerns that meant that 
civil defence policy under Wilson was considerably limited in what it provided in 
the way of public protection. The traditional civil defence policy model began to 
move increasingly towards one of emergency planning and within a few years, 
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economic forces combined with the external influence of détente and a 
considerably reduced risk of nuclear conflict led to increasing cuts to civil defence 
provision year after year until further development of civil defence policy was 
mothballed in 1968. 
 
At various times during the two post-war decades, the influences of external actors 
and world events can be seen on policy making as can the impact of ideological 
concerns as expressed by civil defence's inexorable link with the development of 
the nuclear deterrent, though not one can be singled out as a primary determinant. It 
is also vital to recognise the influence of rapidly developing technological advances 
in the post-war years as a significant factor in the shift in policy concern, one 
unique to the hurriedly evolving nature of nuclear weapons seen during this period. 
However the overarching motivation of most policy development was rooted in 
economic considerations; financial concerns were found to repeatedly surpass 
recommendations on civil defence provision found in reports such as Strath, and 
ultimately, policy was shaped to fit the expenditure available rather than the other 
way around.  
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Chapter 3  
Economic Influences 
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This chapter is the first of three chapters concerned with the three main areas of 
potential policy influence and will focus on the impact of economic influences on 
civil defence policy making. The first part of the chapter, The revival of Civil 
Defence, analyses the measures by which civil defence re-emerged as a policy 
concern with a broadened remit in 1972. A Review of Civil Preparedness 
concentrates on the policy significant, review of civil defence conducted by the 
incoming Conservative government in 1979. It examines the third party influences 
behind the government's change in policy concerns and the resulting shift from 
community-based policy making to a self-reliant, cost-effective model of civil 
defence. Criticism of government policy is explored, with specific reference to 
practical measures for public protection, the independent nuclear deterrent and 
British defence policy.  
 
This is followed by Civil Protection and Military Spending, which focuses more 
closely on the relationship between civil defence policies. The policy of civil 
defence as an adjunct to overall defence strategy is examined in light of criticism 
levelled at the gulf between expenditure on military defence and civil protection. In 
Local Authority Responsibilities and the 1983 Civil Defence Regulations, the 
devolution of many civil defence responsibilities to local authorities and the 
resulting budgetary difficulty is analysed. The economic constraints facing local 
authorities in discharging these duties are examined and the chapter ends with a 
consideration of the financial influences and implications of the 1986 Civil 
Protection in Peacetime Act. 
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The Revival of Civil Defence 
In 1970 the new Conservative Home Secretary Reginald Maudling recommended 
to the Ministerial Committee on home defence that expenditure on civil defence be 
reviewed once more, expressing his concerns over the viability of home defence 
under its current funding arrangements. Despite stating that “...I do not think that 
additional expenditure on home defence should be a high priority and I certainly do 
not think that there is a case to return to pre-1960 levels of expenditure, or anything 
like it”268 he proposed that a new examination of home defence provision should be 
undertaken: 
 
Prior to January 1968, when the previous administration decided to 
put home defence on a ‘care and maintenance’ basis, expenditure 
was of the order of £24 million a year. Major savings were achieved 
by the disbandment of the Civil Defence Corps (£6 million), TAVR 
[Territorial Army] (£3 million) and Auxiliary Fire Service (£1 
million). The impact of other savings tended to be arbitrary because, 
in general, home defence preparations were not only far from 
complete but at different stages of completion. The £8 million a year 
now devoted to home defence is spent primarily on preserving 
capital assets such as buildings and equipment, and on maintaining a 
minimum amount of knowledge and special skills. It does not allow 
the existing systems to be maintained at a consistent state of 
readiness or to be improved; and there must be doubt about the 
viability of the present arrangements and whether we are getting real 
value for the expenditure involved.269 
 
 
With this analysis, Maudling proposed a review to examine the effectiveness of 
civil defence measures. This time, with the Home Secretary in favour of a review to 
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look again at home defence policy, the proposal was a success. The resulting 1971 
Home Defence Review acknowledged the financial shortcomings of existing civil 
defence policy, stating that: 
 
If the programme remains on the present ‘care and maintenance’ 
basis, the Government could not fulfil the four aims of home 
defence; in particular virtually nothing could be done to mitigate the 
effects of nuclear war on the public or to enhance the basis for 
national recovery.270 
 
 
The review considered the effectiveness of various measures amounting to no more 
than £15 million per year, and recommended the completion of the Sub-Regional 
control network in England and Wales, the maintenance of emergency and wartime 
broadcasting services at current levels of readiness and the upgrade of the UK 
warning and monitoring organisation but crucially, no programme of mass public 
education or shelter building. The Review advised instead that “public protection 
will be based on keeping families together”271 which was to form that basis of the 
'stay-put' policy that lasted until the end of the Cold War. Home Office Permanent 
Secretary, Phillip Allen, stated what could be achieved without additional 
expenditure on civil defence in a meeting with Maudling in July 1971: 
 
It would be misleading to claim that a credible system could be 
created… The current aim was to provide warning of an attack, so 
that people could take what shelter they could, and the survival of 
some form of government after an attack. This was not civil defence 
as it was known in the last war. 272 
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Tellingly, the Review acknowledged openly that the overall aim of civil defence 
was not only to mitigate the effect of an attack on Britain and enhance the basis of 
post-attack recovery but to ensure the continuation of government and protect the 
UK from any internal threat.273 Faced with severe economic constraints, however, 
the the proposals laid out in the Review were rejected and local authorities were 
informed that “...regarding public protection and shelter – we are unable to find 
sufficient savings to finance local authority expenditure in this area.”274 
 
 
Importantly, the review sought to redefine the scope of civil defence in line with 
renewed concerns over domestic security to include for the first time the provision 
to “secure the UK against any internal threat.”275 1970 and 1971 had seen major 
strikes from miners, Post Office workers and various other groups and this 
combined with the deteriorating situation in Northern Ireland meant that internal 
disputes were considered by the Review as an increasing threat to Britain, 
potentially more so than foreign aggressors. It was evident, however, that civil 
defence was intended to meet an external threat that it currently was not capable of 
doing. 
 
In 1972, two years after the Conservative government had come to power, 
Maudling reported that, in light of recent difficulties in industrial relations the 
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government had been 'clearly right'276 to relate home defence measures more 
directly to civil emergencies, advising that “...I should like to make our 
preparations for nuclear war the tail and our preparations for civil emergencies the 
dog; and I should like now to move openly to an orthodox position in which the 
dog would wag the tail.”277 He also noted, however, that current civil defence 
policy did not take the threat from nuclear attack seriously enough: 
 
Although the report represents the best that can be done within the 
limit of the existing ceiling on expenditure related to home defence, 
it is stretching credibility to suppose that the very limited 
preparations which that ceiling permits would be significant in a 
situation of nuclear war. The fact is that, under the compulsion of 
successive reviews on public expenditure, we have allowed civil 
defence measures to be downgraded to a point at which they no 
longer make sense in relation to the particular kind of emergency for 
which they are supposed to cater.278 
 
 
This was not necessarily a view borne out by contemporary threat assessments. In 
1972 there was little change from the 1968 assessments and assumptions regarding 
the nature of Soviet aggression and as such, priorities could only be adjusted to 
within current total expenditure, which amounted to about £10 million, primarily to 
provide planning guidance based on those 1968 assumptions.279 
 
Prime Minister Edward Heath understood that given the economic constraints 
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under which they were operating, civil defence was making best use of the funds 
available. In a 1972 memo to the Home Secretary, Heath acknowledged the results 
of the review, which concluded there should be no increase in civil defence 
expenditure and that existing expenditure ought to be considered for reallocation, 
primarily towards civil emergencies.280 He expressed concern however over the 
limitations on policy decisions that financial constraints were dictating, stating that: 
 
I understand that we have now done all that we can to ensure the best 
possible use of the existing funds; but I am concerned that our 
present civil defence measures hardly make sense in relation to the 
particular kind of emergency which they were originally designed to 
meet.281 
 
 
As a result of this, it was agreed that planning for home defence would be 
reviewed, in order to consider whether any further cost “...would be justified by 
putting us in a stronger position than at present to face emergencies, whether they 
arise in peace or in the shadow of approaching war.”282 Although his was a 
financially troubled government, Heath was evidently still keen to be seen as 
providing civil defence and in 1972 civil defence emerged once more as a policy 
concern with the objectives that were to remain until the end of the Cold War.   
 
The resulting review was carried out under the proviso that any recommended 
expenditure should not be increased above the level required to keep preparations 
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on a 'care and maintenance' basis adopted at the time of the devaluation measures 
in January 1968. Be that as it may, the results of the review concluded that there 
was not much scope for improving civil defence measures under such conditions,283 
and so policy concerns turned to the re-appropriation and redistribution of existing 
funds, with a primary focus on domestic emergencies.  
 
The conclusions of the review led to the setting out of Home Office Circular No. ES 
1/1972. Now referred to as 'home defence', civil defence policy's new objectives as 
evident in the 1971 Home Review were laid out in 1973's Home Defence Planning 
Assumptions: 
 
· to secure the United Kingdom against any internal threat; 
· to mitigate as far as practicable the effects of any direct attack on the 
United Kingdom involving the use of conventional, nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons; 
· to provide alternative machinery of government at all levels to 
increase the prospects of, and to direct, national security; 
· to enhance the basis for national recovery in the post-attack period.284 
 
 
This document went largely unnoticed and created little political debate, but 
continuing the trend for civil defence as an adjunct to an overall British defence 
policy first seen in the 1960s it placed civil defence firmly within the context of 
emergency planning, creating an inexorable link between “...war planning and the 
preparations required for and the organisation appropriate to a major peacetime 
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emergency or natural disaster.”285  
 
The general disinterest in civil defence by all but the most dedicated advocates 
during these years can be seen as a mixture of response to low-risk threat 
assumptions and increasingly severe competition for ever more limited funds. A 
Treasury minute of January 1973 on the public expenditure position relating to civil 
emergencies spending confirmed the precarious financial position faced by civil 
defence policymakers: 
 
The growth rate for public expenditure agreed by the cabinet was 
barely compatible with tax policies; the (increased) Contingency 
reserve is largely mortgaged; there are signs that the pressure on 
resources may begin to appear more quickly than previously 
expected. 
 
The terms in which the Chancellor will report to the cabinet clearly 
make most unwelcome proposals for civil emergencies, involving 
extra expenditure of about £70 million over the next few years. If 
approved, the reduction in programmes to be sought in this year's 
public expenditure would have to be increased by an equal 
amount.286 
 
 
Upon seeing these minutes the Chief Secretary commented to the Treasury that 
there were “...alarming expenditure implications in all this – these items are truly 
'Contingency reserve', if only there were any Contingency reserve left!”287 
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There was a good deal of policy continuity under the Labour government 1974-79. 
Operational matters were conducted in accordance with the previous 
administration's guidelines, civil defence policy developing by what one 
commentator has called “a dual process of the development of ideas and the 
provision of guiding advice.”288  The Under-Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Dr Shirley Summerskill, confirmed the Labour government's 
agreement with previous administrations’ reluctance to plan for shelter provision on 
the grounds of cost, stating in 1976 that “...this country could not afford to provide 
a network of public underground shelters which would give considerable protection 
against the effects of a nuclear explosion.”289 Robin Woolven agrees with this 
summary of the effects of the government’s precarious financial position on civil 
defence at this time, noting how economics eventually triumphed over ideological 
motivations: 
 
Regardless of the ideological motivation of policy advisors and 
policy makers, all parties acknowledged the need to provide some 
level of public protection or perhaps just something to better help 
survivors survive - but all had to realise that if there was not 
sufficient funding to back their ideas, then they were merely shouting 
into the wind.290  
 
 
The Labour government also agreed with its predecessors that public shelters were 
economically untenable in that nothing should be done for civil defence purposes 
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which would add directly or indirectly to the cost of housing in the public or the 
private sector. In the same year the Standing Advisory Committee on Home 
Defence comprised of over 100 scientific advisers was disbanded291. The 
government stated that this was due to economic reasons, but some commentators 
critical of what they considered the government's ineffectual and deceptive civil 
defence policy argued that this was a move designed to remove the well-informed, 
independent advisers who might be critical of government policy.292 
 
Additionally, revised planning assumptions in 1977 took account of the changing 
assessment of possible warning times preceding attack and concluded that while 
the general threat of nuclear confrontation remained, initial hostilities could be 
prolonged and be of a conventional nature.293 This marked the beginning of a shift 
in NATO policy that would trickle down into British policy making, from that of a 
model of 'tripwire' defence to one embracing a more graduated response to the 
increased Soviet military capability.  
 
The government's term of office was marked by severe economic restraints and 
expenditure cuts and while civil defence spending bore its full share of reductions 
in public expenditure, the primary effect of this on home defence provision was in 
terms of stockpiles of equipment and manpower.294 The reduction in overall civil 
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defence expenditure was severe, from £27.2 million in 1974-75 to 14.6 million in 
1978-79.295 In the five years up to 1978–79, Government spending on civil defence 
halved in real terms. This was the culmination of a period in which the subject had 
been almost entirely ignored, and in the eight years to 1976, only one debate took 
place on the subject in the House of Commons.296 
 
The 1979 Review of Civil Preparedness  
In the Conservative Election Manifesto for 1979 ‘significant increases’ in defence 
spending were promised, emphasising the importance of ensuring the continuing 
effectiveness of Britain’s nuclear deterrent.297 In May 1979, NATO ministers also 
stressed that civil defence was an essential part of deterrence, defence and détente 
and that weaknesses in civil protection could have damaging effects on the defence 
of the Alliance military posture.298  
 
When the Conservatives were returned to power in 1979, they announced a review 
of civil defence.  A briefing paper for the Home Secretary dated July 1980 
concerning the proposed financial implications of the review indicates the 
government's focus on the importance of spending on civil defence as an adjunct to 
a strong military posture and not necessarily directly on the means of public 
protection: 
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The total package, costing at 1979 prices about £108m over the five 
years 1981 to 1986, is vital to the enhancement of our civil 
preparedness and to the general credibility of the approximately 
£8,000m annually to which we are now committed for military 
defence. The proposed measures must be viewed as a whole, 
including those which may not, at first glance, appear to be directly 
related to the physical protection of the population.299 
 
 
It was crucial that something be seen to be being done about civil defence, though 
Home secretary William Whitelaw was aware that “…the most effective response to 
the threat might be to enhance our offensive capability. But this would be insufficient 
to reassure the public of the Government’s supporters in parliament”.300 Whitelaw 
subsequently asked the Treasury for permission to draw from the government’s 
Contingency reserve, intended for national emergencies.301 It was with an eye to 
criticism of the neglect of civil defence from both the public and political 
opponents (both from Labour and within the Conservative party) that the increased 
spending was approved.  The Treasury cautiously approved the proposed review, 
but with a proviso that amendments were made, the inclusion of which were 
calculated to avoid any assumption that significantly greater expenditure on civil 
defence was needed: 
 
While the Treasury appear not to dispute the need for further studies, 
they attach emphasis to the importance of ensuring that the studies 
concentrate on the cost-effectiveness of options going beyond the 
immediate measures to be announced. In particular they are anxious 
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lest public awareness of, for example, a review of shelter and 
dispersal policies might make it difficult for the government to 
announce subsequently that there was to be no radical change if, in 
the event, the study indicated that alternative policies were unlikely 
to be feasible or economic.302 
 
 
The Treasury was explicit that a deliberate increase in expenditure on civil defence 
was not a proper charge to the existing Contingency reserve, and that as the 
government was “....determined to keep total public expenditure within the limits 
set in Cmnd. 7841, additional money for home defence could only be found at the 
expense of other items in departmental programmes.”303 William Whitelaw 
recognised the Treasury's resistance but made clear his intentions to proceed with 
the review, indicating that he would handle any issues with the Treasury “...by 
making a personal approach to the Chancellor.”304 
 
Suggesting that a comprehensive plan of protection for the public may not have 
been the primary motivating reason in announcing the review, a Home Defence 
Review briefing paper notes that “...taking account of current financial restraints, I 
think that the proposed programme (i.e. the full package costing about an extra 
£20m a year) is a reasonable and defensible one, which should go some way to 
satisfy critics of our present state of preparedness.”305 This attitude can also be seen 
in a Home Office memorandum dated 7h July 1980, which clarifies the government’s 
position on the rationale for increased spending on home defence, recommending 
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that the proposals for increased spending as determined by the review is put to 
Cabinet: “To do otherwise must raise doubts about the credibility of the very 
expensive measures we are taking in relation to other aspects of defence policy, and 
it may also raise serious political problems for us.”306 
 
Whitelaw believed, however, that it was necessary to “...be more forthcoming in 
order to allay public and party criticism while recognising the current constraints 
on public expenditure.”307 Consequently, in his statement to the House of 
Commons in August 1980 concerning the results of the review, he stated that “...the 
Government decided to accord high priority to the defence of the nation; and a 
review of civil preparedness for home defence was set in train so that this important 
element of our defence strategy could be considered as part of the improvement of 
our general defence effort.”308 As such, certain measures – the modernisation of the 
United Kingdom warning and monitoring organisation, increasing the civil defence 
responsibilities of local authorities and the increased involvement of government 
departments and the emergencies services in civil defence planning and training – 
were announced.309 As the Home Office memorandum suggested, however, these 
measures included no immediately obvious increase in provision for the physical 
protection of the population.  
 
The total cost of these measures over three years was estimated at a total of £45 
million, a rise of 60% by 1983–84 from £27 million a year before the review; from 
                                               
306  TNA: HO 322/941 Home Defence Review (7 July 1980) 
307  TNA: HO 322/939 Ministerial Meeting on 15 May 1980 (21 May 1980) 
308  Whitelaw, W. HC Deb,  07 August 1980, vol. 990, cc.790-804  
309  Whitelaw, W. HC Deb, 07 August 1980, vol. 990, cc.790-804 
129 
 
65p to 83p per head.310 Whitelaw proposed that this additional expenditure would 
be “covered by a reallocation of resources within existing programmes and without 
adding to the total of public expenditure.”311 This also reflected a feature of the 
Conservative administration which favoured increased defence spending.312 
However as a proportion of defence spending this additional expenditure allocated 
to civil defence was minimal, from 0.237% in 1980 to 0.308% in 1983 and the 
1980-81 expenditure levels after the review still amounted, in real terms, to less 
than was spent under the Labour administration from 1974 to 1977.313 
 
When questioned by the opposition as to whether the Review contained any plans 
to initiate a programme of public shelter construction in key target areas, Whitelaw 
answered “the provision of public shelters through the government would be 
enormously costly and something which we could not contemplate.”314 This 
conclusion was the result of the findings of a 1977 Working Party on shelter policy 
led by scientist James Cotterill which concluded that to provide shelters for each of 
the 10 million households in Britain would cost between £60 and £80 billion, or 
roughly £1,000 to £1,500 per head, over three times the cost of the entire defence 
budget.315 The government's reasoning behind the apparent reluctance to provide 
what might have reasonably been argued to be an essential part of a strategy for 
public protection was carefully explained in the publicly available 1980 HMSO 
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leaflet Civil Defence: why we need it: 
 
The risk of war is at present considered so slight that the enormous 
expense of providing shelters to every family in the land could not be 
justified. It would cost billions of pounds. As it is, more is being 
spent on civil defence than previously – about £45 million a year by 
1983/84.316 
 
The same publication also made clear that there would be no revival of the pre-
1968 volunteer Civil Defence Corps, as it “...would cost an unjustifiable amount of 
money.”317  Critics of this policy were quick to highlight what was seen as an 
equally unjustifiable dereliction of the government's duty of care towards the public 
on insupportable economic grounds. Arguing for greater civil defence spending in a 
House of Commons debate in March 1983, the Conservative MP and vice president 
of the National Council for Civil Defence John Loveridge stated: 
 
The pamphlet states that, as it is, about £45 million a year is due to 
be spent in 1983–84. That is less than £1 a year per head of the 
population. That is under £1 a year for the insurance of a child's life 
for civil defence. Is that enough? We should examine the costs. It has 
been said time and again that we cannot afford this insurance to 
safeguard our families. However, this country believes in looking 
after people.  
 
£500 billion will be spent [during the next 10 years] on health and 
social services. If we spent 2 per cent only of that sum, itself only a 
part of Government spending, on [civil defence] it would be a cheap 
insurance. The figures cannot be more than estimates but it has been 
said that such expenditure might well increase the survival rate in 
these islands from a low threshold of nuclear attack, with one, two or 
more bombs, from 15 million to 30 million survivors. Those lives are 
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worth an insurance premium. 318  
 
 
As Stafford notes, the military and political context in which the renewed interest 
in civil defence was taking place was very different to those seen in the post-war 
period.319 While the early Cold War model of civil defence saw campaigns to 
encourage public participation in British defence in the form of the Civil Defence 
Corps320, the post-1972 focus was on self-reliance and personal responsibility. In a 
continuation of the shift away from community-based policy making to the self-
reliant model of civil defence first seen in the Strath Report, Whitelaw was keen to 
assure the public that this economic concern would not negatively affect public 
survival in the event of a nuclear exchange, stating that “Most houses in this 
country offer a reasonable degree of protection against radioactive fallout from 
nuclear explosions and protection can be substantially improved by a series of quite 
simple do-it-yourself measures.”321 Part of this open-market, individualistic 
approach to personal protection came in the form of the 1981 HMSO publication 
Domestic Nuclear Shelters, which gave some information on various domestic 
shelters that could be built by the householder.322 The booklet outlined several 
types of shelter, ranging from a basic trench dug in the garden to an indoor brick 
shelter and a permanent, fully-sunk blast proof shelter.323  
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Advice on implementing the recommendations was circulated to local authorities, 
establishing the government's position on shelters: 
 
There are no specially-designed communal fallout shelters in the 
United Kingdom. Successive governments have taken the view that 
it would not be feasible to provide a system of purpose-built shelters, 
partly because of the shortage of suitable sites sufficiently close to 
major centres of population, but also because of the prohibitive cost. 
324 
 
It was suggested, however, that in light of this financial constraint local authorities 
promote Domestic Nuclear Shelters as an alternative to communal facilities. 
Whitelaw's plan for householder-led protection schemes never became popular, 
however, either with local authorities or individuals. A 1982 episode of the BBC 
science programme QED, Nuclear War: A Guide to Armageddon325 imagined the 
scenario of a 1 megaton nuclear weapon dropped over London and constructed a 
garden shelter built to the specifications of one in Domestic Nuclear Shelters to test 
what protection it would afford. The shelter was found to easily flood, provided 
unverifiable protection against blast and took several times longer to construct than 
stated, with the living conditions inside cramped and unsanitary. The failure of 
home shelters was primarily due however to their prohibitive costs - the largest, 
most sophisticated designs outlined in Domestic Nuclear Shelters could cost 
anything up to £20,000, often more per head than it was estimated it would cost for 
the government to provide public shelter places.326  
                                               
324  TNA: CAB 322/1012 Scottish Office Circular ES (SCOT)/1981 
325  QED – Nuclear War: A Guide To Armageddon (26 July 1982) BBC 
326  Campbell, D. (1983) p.375 
133 
 
Critics of the government's position on public shelter provision were vocal, and 
centred around the government's apparent refusal to consider the cheaper option of 
mass, public shelters327 while continuing to make available the means for the 
protection and continuation of government and the large sums of money spent on 
Britain's new nuclear deterrent, Trident. Labour's former Foreign Secretary David 
Owen encapsulated the arguments when he denounced the government's civil 
defence policy in his work Negotiate and Survive: 
 
Having decided that home defence must be geared to what the 
country can afford, and yet having decided that it can afford £5000 
million for Trident, the Government should not be unduly surprised 
to find a considerable measure of scepticism about the genuineness 
of their intentions to protect against nuclear attack – or as a result of 
that scepticism – opposition to their defence policy. 
The Home Secretary reveals the paucity of his approach [and] goes 
on to advocate spending to ensure that the ruling establishment 
survive – the Royal Family, central government and local 
government politicians, the admirals and generals and air marshals 
and senior administrators all survive. But millions of others lose their 
lives. Money is to be spent on Sub-Regional Headquarters; the 
governors will go underground, the governed will stay on top.328 
 
 
Despite these criticisms, the government consistently argued in favour of the 
specific distribution of the additional civil defence expenditure, stating that 
spending on civil defence was not necessarily linked with any escalation in nuclear 
armaments.329  Proponents of increased civil defence spending often cited the worth 
of civil defence using the example of Scandinavian countries who, despite being 
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considerably less of a target than Britain in any nuclear exchange, nevertheless 
provided comprehensive civil defence protection for the majority of their 
populations.330 Additionally, critics of the lack of government expenditure on civil 
defence on both sides of the House of Lords were quick to seize on the continuing 
promotion of civil defence as an adjunct to Britain's deterrent. They argued that the 
USSR also had a sophisticated and widespread civil defence organisation and 
shelter programme reputed to cost over £500 million annually331, and Britain's 
place as one of the lowest spenders on civil defence amongst all the NATO 
countries showed a lack of commitment to home defence that weakened the 
deterrent posture.332 Peter Goodwin, writing in 1981 on why Russian and Chinese 
plans for civil defence were much more advanced than those seen in Britain and the 
US, touches upon the core dichotomy at the heart of a Conservative civil defence 
policy based on the concept of deterrence: 
 
 
It is interesting to speculate why the same devotion to civil defence 
expenditure is not followed in the West. The answer may be that the 
democratic system of government necessarily submits any proposed 
civil defence expenditure to greater public scrutiny in the West. This 
would very probably lead to the whole concept of deterrence being 
severely questioned if a government stresses the need for any 
expensive programme of protective measures for the public. And of 
course it might encourage stronger criticism of military expenditure. 
Since Western governments hope and believe that deterrence will 
keep the peace, they are understandably reluctant to jeopardise their 
means to engage in it or to acknowledge that the policy might not be 
ideal by arguing for a big civil defence programme. 333 
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This highlights a major contradiction inherent in any civil defence policy created 
by a government at the head of a nuclear-armed state not faced by those countries 
with neutral foreign policies.  The state cannot be seen to increase expenditure on 
civil defence as a large amount of spending on such implies an uncertainty about 
the reliability of a deterrence policy by admitting the possibility that such a policy 
could fail. As such, some critics denounced the government for spending any 
money on public protection at all, considering civil defence policy as a process 
which legitimised certain military and economic policies which would only 
exacerbate the likelihood of nuclear war.334  A Times editorial in March 1980, 
commenting on civil defence spending warned “...for far less expenditure the 
enemy could make a mockery of all this by increasing  the number of attacking 
weapons, especially against a country so small, centralised and densely populated 
as Britain.”335 Spending on civil defence in the case of nuclear war was, the 
government insisted, perfectly justified. Minister of State for Home Affairs, Patrick 
Mayhew, said at the annual conference of Civil Defence and Emergency Planners 
in 1981 that: 
 
We cannot have an effective home defence policy unless and until 
we carry with us the majority of people in this country in believing it 
to be a wise and a necessary insurance. I make no bones about it. I 
wish we had much more money to use.336 
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The government had made it clear; civil defence policy would be dictated not by 
what was needed but by what could be afforded. As Leon Brittan, then a Minister of 
State at the Home Office, stated in a debate in the House of Commons just prior to 
the publication of the Review: 
 
But, of course, civil preparedness costs money, just as much as 
military preparedness.... In our review we ask the fundamental 
question of what is the right level of expenditure, both in absolute 
terms and in terms of what the country can afford now. That is a 
question which must be answered by anyone who advocates that 
more attention be paid to civil defence. Let there be no doubt about it 
- any significant enhancement of the state of our preparedness will 
cost money. The debate on this subject is not so much about what 
extra preparedness is needed as about whether the money can be 
found and, if so, at the expense of what other area of expenditure it is 
to be found.337  
 
 
During a meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee on Civil Defence Policy on the 
16th June 1980, the sub-committee noted that there would be an inevitable element 
of self-evacuation but “...agreed that there was no effective alternative to the 'stay 
put' policy but there was a need to educate the population and restore 
confidence.”338 The sub-committee also concluded, however, that it did not “...view 
with favour government financial assistance to the general public for the 
installation of domestic shelters.”339 Fulfilling the sub-committee’s remit for 
increased public education, although perhaps not in restoring confidence, the series 
of public information that would be known as Protect & Survive would urge the 
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public to remain at home: 
 
No place in the United Kingdom is safer than any other. The risk is 
as great in the countryside as in the towns. No one can tell where the 
safest place will be. So you are just as safe in your own home area as 
anywhere else. In fact, you are far better off at home because it is the 
place where you know and where you are known. So, stay where you 
are. 340 
 
 
In August 1980 the Cabinet's Home Defence Committee established the Working 
Group on Shelter and Evacuation, led by civil servant Robert Wade-Gery of the 
Cabinet Office. The remit of the Working Group was to “...consider and make 
recommendations on the future direction of the Government's shelter policy and on 
ways of improving the public perception of the 'stay put policy'.”341 As the private 
government view was that there was “...no prospect of large public expenditure on 
either,”342 in practical terms the concerns of the Working Group were mostly firmly 
fixed on the latter.  The 'stay put' policy on evacuation was in itself one that had 
been approved by NATO in October 1977, designed principally to restrict cross-
border, uncoordinated movement of populations. Britain's version was one that was 
justified by the argument that no place in the United Kingdom would be safer than 
any other, both from the direct effects of nuclear weapons and the resulting 
radioactive fallout.  Despite this, the conclusion of the Working Group was that 
“...under present policy the proportion of casualties from the direct effects would be 
very much higher than those from fallout; protection against fallout may be 
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obtained much more simply than protection against blast.”343 In March 1981, a 
progress report of the Working Party noted that: 
 
There has been no public provision of purpose-built communal or 
domestic shelters since World War II, and there is no current 
intention of making such provision. The risk assessment is very low 
and the cost would be very high. Public provision of reasonably 
effective domestic shelters...would be likely to cost at least £1000 
per family.344  
 
In January 1982, a research paper entitled Population Response To War by Sally 
Leivesley and Jane Hogg at the Home Defence and Emergency Services Division 
of the Home Office summarised government thinking on evacuation and shelter 
planning, echoing the concerns of prohibitive costs and issues of population control 
that could be seen running through civil defence policy until the end of the Cold 
War: 
 
Evacuating the population from high-risk areas in the expectation 
that a strike is imminent, only to find that this expectation was a false 
alarm, would cause massive social disruption and lower the public's 
positive response to future warnings. An alternative policy which has 
the merit of minimising the social disruption is to urge the population 
to take shelter.  
If it is likely [that] the build-up of the threat will be such that a 
nuclear strike and its timing can be predicted with considerable 
certainty, then an evacuation policy driving the population away 
from high-risk areas is clearly preferable to a shelter policy. 
Otherwise the relative desirability of evacuation and shelter must 
depend on the circumstances prevailing, politically, socially and 
economically, and upon the weight of the attack.345 
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An interim report of the Working Group in October 1982 on evacuation agreed 
with the Leivesley and Hogg paper when it argued in favour of an evacuation 
policy, stating that: “The 'stay-put' policy is largely discredited in the public mind 
and is impossible to justify to people living in obvious target zones,”346 and 
recommending “...a change of policy from 'stay-put' to the evacuation of some 14 
million people from prime target areas.”347  
 
When presented with the results of the Working Group's recommendations in the 
form of a feasibility study, various government departments made their objections 
known. The recommendation was a cause for alarm for the Ministry of Defence, 
who foresaw “considerable problems of public presentation”348, especially in the 
areas earmarked for possible evacuation. It had been expected that the Ministry of 
Defence would raise objections “...on the grounds that it will make people think 
that we expect such an attack and so undermine our policy of relying on 
deterrence”349 but it also directly contradicted the line given by the Ministry of 
Defence that the whole of the United Kingdom would be a target in the event of 
East-West conflict and was the opposite of the advice in Protect and Survive which 
stated that no area in the United Kingdom was safer than anywhere else.  
 
The Department of Health and Social Security responded by stating that in their 
“...considered view there is no point in attempting to work out the logistics and 
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implications for a proposal which is impossible to pursue.”350 A similar response 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food stated that “...it would be 
impossible to feed adequately a dispersed population of some 31 million”.351 
Despite on-going advice on the desirability of an evacuation procedure in certain 
circumstances, the government continued until 1983 to support a policy of no 
evacuation, the reality of the logistical and financial impossibilities seeming to 
outweigh the humanitarian benefits. This reinforced critics' beliefs that civil 
defence continued to lack the crucial humanitarian function that would distinguish 
it from a policy purely designed to bolster the effectiveness of Britain's deterrent 
posture.  
 
Civil Protection and Government Spending 
During their opposition years from 1974 to 1979, the Conservatives made it clear 
that one of their highest priorities on returning to government would be an increase 
in defence spending, stating as one of their top five tasks of their 1979 manifesto 
their intention to “...strengthen Britain's defences and work with our allies to 
protect our interests in an increasingly threatening world.”352 Margaret Thatcher's 
view was that the defence budget was one of the few elements of public 
expenditure that could truly be described as essential; “This point was well-made 
by a robust Labour Defence Minister, Denis (Now Lord) Healey, many years ago: 
‘Once we have cut expenditure to the extent where our security is imperilled, we 
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have no houses, we have no hospitals, we have no schools. We have a heap of 
cinders. “353 As Duncan Campbell argues, many members of the Conservative party, 
both in the constituencies, local associations and the parliamentary party, supported 
civil defence as a companion to a strong military and the budgets of the early to mid-
1980s reflect this.  
 
Table 1 compares the amount spent on defence with civil defence from the revival 
of civil defence in 1972 until 1986 and illustrates the proportion of the defence 
budget allocated to civil defence.  
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 Table 1: Civil Defence spending as proportion of defence spending 1972-1986 
Year 
Defence 
spending  
(£ million)  
Civil Defence 
spending 
(£ million) 
Civil Defence 
spending as 
proportion of 
Defence spending 
1972 3477 9 0.258 
1973 4106 11 0.267 
1974 4747 13 0.273 
1975 5836 11 0.188 
1976 7275 28 0.384 
1977 8184 12 0.146 
1978 9563 16 0.167 
1979 11319 40 0.353 
1980 13491 32 0.237 
1981 14574 27 0.185 
1982 16730 35 0.209 
1983 16200 50 0.308 
1984 17400 67 0.385 
1985 19100 69 0.361 
1986 20100 80 0.398 
 
 Source:  ukpublicspending.co.uk and Hansard 
 
 
With the exception of 1982-1983, the defence budget is shown to increase year on 
year, although spending on civil defence as a percentage of the overall defence 
budget is shown to have not increased proportionately, remaining much more 
variable. Civil defence spending declines in 1974-5, 1976-7 and 1979-81 and as a 
proportion of defence expenditure it  almost halved between 1979-81 (from 0.353% 
to 0.185%). The invasion of Afghanistan followed by the cruise missile problem in 
1979 and the growing unease caused by Soviet expansionism helped to reinvigorate 
the issue of nuclear defence as a policy concern, and in 1979-80 this translated into 
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a spike in both defence and civil defence expenditure, but civil defence expenditure 
did not see sustained year on year increase until the review of 1981.  
 
Table 2 and 3 compare the amount spent of civil defence compared with total 
government expenditure and nominal GDP respectively between 1972 and 1986. 
 
Table 2: Civil Defence spending as proportion of total government spending 
1972-1986 
Year 
Total 
government 
spending  
(£ million)  
Civil Defence 
spending 
(£ million) 
Civil Defence 
spending as 
percentage of total 
spending 
1972 26390 9 0.034 
1973 30546 11 0.036 
1974 39218 13 0.033 
1975 51524 11 0.021 
1976 58464 28 0.047 
1977 61867 12 0.019 
1978 71949 16 0.022 
1979 85166 40 0.046 
1980 103858 32 0.030 
1981 116060 27 0.023 
1982 128044 35 0.027 
1983 132700 50 0.037 
1984 140500 67 0.047 
1985 150900 69 0.045 
1986 158600 80 0.050 
 
Source: ukpublicspending.co.uk and Hansard. 
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As a proportion of total government spending, civil defence expenditure rises 
consistently in the three years following the revival of civil defence as a policy 
concern in 1972. However, as with spending on civil defence as a proportion of 
overall defence spending, no sustained growth is seen until 1982.  As a percentage 
of nominal GDP however, the numbers do not correlate in a similar way. The 
proportion of GDP represented by civil defence expenditure fluctuates between 
0.008% and 0.022% throughout the fourteen year period, with no sustained period 
of growth from 1982 as seen in the previous two tables. 
 
Table 3: Civil Defence spending as proportion of nominal GDP 1972-1986 
Year Nominal GDP (£ million)  
Civil Defence 
spending 
(£ million) 
Civil Defence 
spending as 
proportion of GDP 
1972 64631 9 0.013 
1973 74545 11 0.014 
1974 84513 13 0.015 
1975 106717 11 0.010 
1976 126274 28 0.022 
1977 146973 12 0.008 
1978 169344 16 0.009 
1979 199220 40 0.020 
1980 233184 32 0.013 
1981 256279 27 0.010 
1982 281024 35 0.012 
1983 307207 50 0.016 
1984 329913 67 0.020 
1985 361758 69 0.019 
1986 389149 80 0.020 
 
Source: ukpublicspending.co.uk, Hansard and measuringworth.com 
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Table 4 shows civil defence expenditure 1972-1986 in real terms, adjusted for 
inflation. 
 
Table 4: Civil Defence spending adjusted for inflation 1972-1986 
Year 
Civil Defence 
spending 
(£ million) 
Real terms 
inflation 
adjusted354 
spending 
(£ million355) 
Average inflation 
rate for the year 
1972 9 86 7.1% 
1973 11 96 9.2% 
1974 13 98 16.0% 
1975 11 66 24.2% 
1976 28 146 16.5% 
1977 12 56 15.8% 
1978 16 66 8.3% 
1979 40 146 13.4% 
1980 32 99 18.0% 
1981 27 75 11.9% 
1982 35 89 8.6% 
1983 50 122 4.6% 
1984 67 156 5.0% 
1985 69 151 6.1% 
1986 80 169 3.4% 
 
Source: ukpublicspending.co.uk, Hansard and the Office of National Statistics 
 
In real terms, civil defence expenditure rises consistently in the three years 1972-
1974 under Edward Heath's Conservative government following its reactivation as 
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a policy concern. During the years of Labour government under Harold Wilson and 
James Callaghan which saw inflation average 16.1% during the five year term, 
expenditure declines in 1974-5, 1976-7 but rises 1975-1976, 1977-1978 and again 
from 1978-79. The economic crises faced by the Labour government of this period 
was at the front of policy maker’s minds as they sought to curtain unnecessary 
expenditure, but given the variability in spending on civil defence during this 
period it seems likely that other variables other than economic factors alone were 
making an impact. In real terms it is also shown that while the Conservatives' home 
defence review in 1981 produced a marked increase in real terms spending, it was 
not a continuous year on year increase as seen when compared to overall 
government spending or GDP. Although the overall economic conditions in the 
1970s were worse than in the 1980s, in real terms civil defence expenditure in the 
1970s was higher.  
 
The discrepancy in civil defence spending against total defence expenditure was 
seized upon by critics of the government's policy as proof that civil defence was the 
poor relation of Britain's defence forces356 and opponents were quick to recognise 
that arguments about the risk of war could also be applied to proposed military 
spending.357 There were calls from within the Conservative party for an increase in 
civil defence spending, as the gap between expenditure on military defence and 
civil protection was such that, it was argued, it was difficult for the government to 
be seen to be seriously considering using its force. This made the decision to 
                                               
356  Thorne, N. HC Deb, 29 July 1982, vol. 28, cc.1422-33  
357  Holland, S. HC Deb, 26, October 1983, vol. 47, cc.336-74  
147 
 
replace or modernise the British independent deterrent “...no more than a very 
expensive bluff.”358 As Lord Elystan-Morgan argued in a House of Lords debate in 
1982: 
 
The Government, it seems, have no plans for seeing to it that a 
substantial proportion of the people of Britain are provided, either 
communally or privately, with deep shelters. If the Government say 
that the risk of nuclear war is negligible, then, of course, I accept that 
it would be folly to commit ourselves to the vast expenditure that 
such a project entails. But if the risk of nuclear war is negligible, 
why should Her Majesty's Government commit Britain to the 
expenditure of £8,000 million upon the Trident scheme?359  
 
 
The government sought to reassure opponents of its policy that spending on 
defence was closely interconnected with the humanitarian functions of civil 
defence, as increased expenditure on defence would serve to prevent war and 
therefore negate the need for civil defence. Speaking in the House of Commons, 
Conservative MP and former Minister of State at the Home Office, Patrick Mayhew 
argued against the opinion held by many in the opposition that civil defence 
spending increased the chances of war.360 He justified the government's spending 
on military defence by emphasising the need for Britain to contribute towards 
NATO: “We must all the time remember that we are putting our protective money 
on the membership of NATO and the maintenance of our deterrent.”361 But he 
further justified this by saying this policy would limit Britain's defence capabilities 
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to trying to protect the population from a war that the government would be seen as 
having done nothing to prevent. He stated: 
 
I believe not only that civil defence is a humanitarian duty but that 
those who say that civil defence has a part to play in the [defence] 
considerations that have been mentioned in this debate are right. Our 
total defence programme will cost between £14 billion and £15 
billion this year.362   
 
 
Debate on civil defence expenditure as an adjunct to overall defence strategy also 
centred around one of the inherent contradictions of civil defence planning, as 
illustrated by the government's civil defence response (or lack of it) to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962, where despite considerable perceived threat to Britain, no 
civil defence measures were activated.  Both Conservative and Labour supporters 
of limited civil defence funds in proportion to the overall defence budget argued 
that to accord greater expenditure and effort to the national civil defence 
programme would in itself create international tensions and undermine the concept 
of deterrence. This is illustrated by Labour MP Clive Soley, speaking in a House of 
Commons debate in July 1985: 
 
If the whole Western world raised expenditure and intensity of effort 
in relation to civil defence to a level that made the Soviets think we 
were planning to fight and survive a nuclear war, the deterrent theory 
becomes even less meaningful. If one goes about it in such a way as 
to make one's opponent think that one is planning to win and survive 
a nuclear war, again, one increases the chances of it happening. 363  
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The average estimated expenditure per head of population on civil defence was 
£0.89 in 1982 - 83 and £1.20 in 1983 - 84.364  The government also faced criticism 
from both Labour MPs and some of its own backbenchers who, while broadly 
supporting the party's defence spending and objectives, nevertheless saw Britain's 
defence posture weakened by the government's apparent refusal to consider the 
potential outcomes of this strategy and believed that if the government undertook 
the risk then they must provide the expenditure for public protection.  As Neil 
Thorne, a Conservative MP and outspoken critic of the government's lack of 
spending on civil defence policies, stated in a House of Commons debate on the 
Defence Estimates in June 1985: 
 
In other countries, as much as 3 per cent of the total defence budget 
is allocated to civil defence measures, but in this country we spend 
less than half of 1 per cent on that. There is a great difference. If we 
are to work towards the type of result that the strategic defence 
initiative may produce, we must be ready for what might happen at 
the end of the day. It would be a costly exercise to try to make the 
necessary arrangements in a hurry, whereas if it were done over a 
period of 10 or more years there could be a series of phased 
developments, particularly in the sphere of shelters.365 
 
 
For a government whose strategy was so heavily dependent on the theory of 
deterrence, an economic commitment that might possibly invoke the spectre of 
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failure of this posture was a dangerous one, especially if it called into question 
defence spending levels. Once again, Neil Thorne MP, speaking in a 1983 
parliamentary debate on the issue of civil defence, asked: 
 
One of the most vital and controversial questions about civil defence 
is protecting the civil population from nuclear attack by means of 
deep shelters. Other nations, such as Sweden and Switzerland, which 
I have already mentioned, do that successfully, so why can we not do 
so? The answer must be that the cost of providing that on a full scale 
would be economically impracticable with our existing defence 
commitments.366 
 
 
The response of the Home Secretary, Patrick Mayhew, was in keeping with his 
government's policy of deterrence when he stated that it: “...is better to put one's 
money into preventing a war than to restrict one's activities to trying to provide for 
the population all possible protection against the risks of a war that one has done 
nothing to help to prevent.”367 
 
Local Authority Responsibilities and the 1983 Civil Defence 
Regulations 
The total civil defence budget during the 1970s amounted to an average of £15-20 
million per annum, out of which around £2-3 million was earmarked for local 
authority use, to be spent primarily on emergency planning, regional control 
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bunkers and communication networks.368 The Conservatives’ review of home 
defence in 1980 considerably increased the civil defence responsibilities of local 
authorities, however. Acknowledging that “...effective civil defence arrangements 
depend upon co-operation between central Government and local government,”369 
the Review proposed to double the money available for civil defence provision at a 
local level and promised to consult with local authority associations about the 
allocation of additional resources for local planning and training.  Home Office 
Circular No. ES 1/1981 issued to local authorities after the review stated that: 
 
The government recognises that in present financial circumstances it 
will be difficult for local authorities to find additional resources for 
even the comparatively modest measures listed above. For this 
reason they intend to continue for the time being to pay specific civil 
defence grant at the rate of 75% of approved expenditure. For the 
purposes of the 1981/82 rate support grant settlement it has been 
assumed that the additional expenditure incurred by authorities 
during that year on these and related measures will be £4.4m (at 
November 1980 pay and price levels). Total local authority 
expenditure eligible for civil defence grant in 1981/82 will be in the 
region of £9m. The Government hope that local authorities will take 
full advantage of the opportunities offered by these extra 
resources.370 
 
The grant-aided rate of 75 per cent still often amounted to a significant financial 
obstacle, given that the local authorities now bore primary responsibility for the 
discharging of civil defence duties in their area. Following the 1980 review of 
home defence, local authorities were expected to expand their preparations to 
encompass not only nuclear but conventional warfare and also be able to maintain 
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these plans at a considerably shortened period of readiness. Scottish Office Circular 
ES (SCOT)/81 lays out the increased burdens on local authorities, couched in the 
rhetoric of deterrence: 
 
The government does not regard war as inevitable. They are firmly 
committed to the promotion of peace, and they believe that a sensible 
state of preparedness, civil as well as military, will make war less 
likely. Changes in strategic thinking mean we must be prepared for 
conventional as well as nuclear attack on this country, and for the 
possibility of hostilities occurring at short notice. In future, 
emergency plans will have to be maintained at a higher state of 
readiness and be capable of dealing with a variety of forms of 
attack...for planning purposes it should be assumed that there may be 
as little as seven days warning of attack, and the basic essentials of 
plans should be capable of implementation within 48 hours. 371 
 
This commitment to the essential nature and purpose of civil defence as an adjunct 
of deterrence not only highlights the essential dichotomies in the government's civil 
defence policy - with which even the local authorities who were supportive of 
government policy struggled – but the conflict between civil defence and other 
policy concerns. The government freely acknowledged the difficulties these 
expectations placed upon authorities whose budgets were already tightly stretched 
and were aware of the difficulties of central government interfering in the budgets 
of local councils:  
 
Each of the associations, whatever their political colouring, is 
opposed to specific guidance on local government expenditure by 
central government. This position is recognised in government 
statements on local government expenditure which invariably take 
                                               
371  TNA: HO 322/1012 Scottish Office Circular ES (SCOT)/1981 
153 
 
the view that it is for individual local authorities to decide their 
priorities in light of local needs and conditions. … I think that we 
should be open to a charge of being extremely insensitive to the 
present financial difficulties of local government if we pressed 
individual authorities to incur additional expenditure at a time when 
each authority is being required...to reduce its overall expenditure by 
over 5% and may be penalised by the loss of government grant for 
failure to do so. 372 
 
The government remained unambiguous in their expectations, however, as a letter 
from the Home Secretary to the Chairman of Metropolitan Authorities shows: 
 
Ministers are, of course, aware of the difficulties the individual 
authorities may face because of the economies they have been asked 
to make in the current year. … They are free to increase expenditure 
in any particular service. But if they do so it must be as a result of a 
conscious decision, and any such expenditure must be compensated 
for by counter-balancing savings elsewhere. 373 
 
 
The result was that the challenge of the expectations facing local authorities – even 
those whose administrations fully backed the government's civil defence policy – to 
bring their sometimes non-existent plans into readiness was often economically and 
practically insurmountable.374 As  a briefing note provided for Home Secretary 
William Whitelaw in March 1981 notes, the Association of County Councils 
generally endorsed the aim of the government to increase civil defence 
preparedness, but found it difficult to reconcile further expenditure with the 
pressures placed by the government to reduce expenditure and staff. It was also 
noted that “...complex political cross-currents within both the Association and its 
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county membership, and the strong prevailing resentment of central government 
interference, compound their reservations.”375 
 
It was recognised by the government that “...if we are to do anything effective it is 
going to require more money, and the Treasury will strongly oppose it.”376 In order 
to encourage local authorities to increase their spending on civil defence it was 
proposed in a 1981 report by the Emergency Planning Division that the grant 
should be raised: 
 
It is doubtful if a modest increase – say, to 80% - would produce any 
marked improvement in view of its trivial effect on an authority's 
contribution. A county council spending £100,000 on civil defence 
would achieve a saving of only £5,000 on its present contribution of 
£25,000. So it is unlikely to be worthwhile seeking to increase the 
rate to less than 90%. We could, alternatively, go the whole hog of 
full central government reimbursement of all approved civil defence 
expenditure. Again, some authorities would be more willing to spend 
if it involved no direct cost to them.377 
 
However as expected and like the other initiatives put forward in this report for 
increasing local authority engagement with central government policy, this request 
for further funding was rejected. The inability or refusal to participate in civil 
defence planning and training was not wholly born of financial constraints; many 
Labour controlled councils had ideological opposition to central government policy 
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and cause and the influence of ideology on policy making decisions will be detailed 
in chapter 4. 
 
The extent of the local authorities’ non-compliance was outlined by Conservative 
MP Robert Banks in a House of Commons debate in July 1982: 
 
It is highly regrettable that only £620,000 of the original £3.3 million 
made available to build and improve wartime headquarters and other 
civil defence measures was taken up in 1981–82 by local authorities. 
The proportion of the further sum of £3.3 million taken up by local 
authorities for planning and training is, unfortunately, not 
identifiable. But it means that many opportunities and jobs have been 
lost and considerable delay has been occasioned in implementing 
new civil defence measures.378  
 
 
In 1982, continued non-compliance by local authorities forced the cancellation of 
the Hard Rock civil defence exercise, the aim of which was to practice civil and 
military plans and procedures for civil defence in conventional and nuclear war.379  
As a result of this, the government was forced to re-evaluate its policy on home 
defence with specific reference to the devolution of civil defence responsibilities. 
 
At a meeting between the Home Office and the Association of District Councils in 
March, 1983, it was agreed that if “...civil defence were to take off the ground [the] 
grant should be paid at 100% for all civil defence purposes”.380 In October 1982 
Baroness Young, leader of the Conservative party in the House of Lords, wrote to 
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William Whitelaw to express her support for new regulations which allowed for a 
100% reimbursement in local authorities civil defence planning expenses. 
Significantly, her assent to these changes were based not on the ability of local 
authorities to provide for public protection but to enable them to participate in 
future training exercises, avoiding further embarrassment for the government: 
 
The new regulations are an obvious necessity and I feel that the extra 
expenditure involved in introducing a measure of 100% 
reimbursement would be well justified if it serves to improve future 
co-operation between local authorities and the Government on civil 
defence matters. In view of our commitments in this area, we cannot 
afford a repeat of the situation which led to the postponement of 
exercise Hard Rock earlier this year. 381 
 
 
Not all members of the government were supportive of the increase in civil defence 
grant, however. In June 1980, Environment Secretary Michael Heseltine wrote to 
William Whitelaw, expressing his doubt about the new regulations suggesting: “If 
we are in earnest about civil defence the only credible approach seems to me to 
give authorities unambiguous statutory duties and pay them in full to act as out 
agents.”382 Nevertheless, the Civil Defence (General Local Authority Functions) 
Regulations383 came into force in December 1983, reimbursing local authorities for 
100% of costs incurred in planning for civil defence and compelling them to 
participate in future exercises. 
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The budget for civil defence was increased to £69 million for 1984 – 85, of which 
£11 million was allocated to local authorities, and the balance of which to the 
national warning system and the sub-regional government controls.384 The 1983 
regulations removed the grant-aided limit of 75% for some items in order to 
promote local authority compliance with policy, including communication 
equipment, training programmes for volunteers and participation in training 
exercises. Grants were not available for building work and administration, making 
local authorities still responsible for 25% of main Civil Defence Activity costs.385 
Despite this, it was estimated that by 1984 only 10% of local authorities were 
discharging their full civil defence duties as obliged,386 and applications for grant 
aid remained considerably less than the money available.387 
 
Opposition to the regulations came primarily from those on both sides of the House 
who were in favour of a more comprehensive civil defence policy. Critics accused 
the government of failing to grasp the fundamental problem of the inadequacies of 
the 1948 Civil Defence Act as providing a framework for modern home defence, 
and cited both the financial burden upon local authorities as an unacceptable 
imposition that was preventing them from implementing central government 
policy388 and the fact that “...local authorities as a whole have very little confidence 
in the fact that they are able to use that money usefully and in the provision of an 
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effective civil defence service.”389 
 
By 1985, civil defence expenditure had reached £80 million390 and “despite the 
continuing need to maintain control over public expenditure”391, the government's 
stated aim was to maintain this over the next three years, with planning for 
peacetime emergencies receiving increasing attention. The Conservative party had 
already announced in their 1983 election manifesto that they would introduce 
legislation to enable civil defence resources to be used in peacetime emergencies 
by proposing to “...amend the Civil Defence Act 1948 to enable civil defence funds 
to be used in safeguarding against peacetime emergencies as well as against hostile 
attacks”392 and this was followed in 1984 by the issuing of comprehensive 
emergency planning guidance to local authorities. This was a consolidation and 
revision of existing guidance setting out the expanded planning assumptions which 
particularly emphasised the possibility of conventional attack and the government 
stated the intended aims of expenditure on civil defence as to facilitate “...a 
humanitarian response to all emergencies, military and civil, which may threaten 
our people.”393  
 
In 1986, as the nuclear threat began to recede, the Conservative Party's 1983 
election pledge became the Civil Protection in Peacetime Act which permitted the 
use of civil defence planning resources in peacetime emergencies. As a piece of 
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legislation it was essentially permissive, rather than directive, in nature394 and while 
it sought to encourage the use of civil defence personnel and equipment in 
domestic disasters but was “...not a measure that will release new resources”395  and 
had no significant financial policy implications. Of the £80 million allocated to 
civil defence in this year, between £11 million and £13 million was available to 
local authorities in the form of a grant and such expenditure was, as stated by Giles 
Shaw, Minister of State for the Home Office, “...related to the [local authority] 
regulations that were published in 1983 and formally issued last year.”396  
 
By the end of the 1980s however, events on the world stage were making their 
influence felt on British civil defence policy. The signing of the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987 and the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan beginning in 1988 was the beginning of the end for the Cold War and 
the need for a policy of public protection against the possibility of nuclear war was 
significantly lessened. The move from a civil defence policy based on defence 
against an external, nuclear threat to one based on domestic emergency 
preparedness that had been put into motion two decades ago was complete, and the 
causes and effect of this will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.  
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Conclusion 
Financial constraints were frequently and openly stated by governments as reasons 
for the limited development or early termination of policy, and it is often assumed 
that the correlation of budget to provision can be easily traced. Questioning the 
reasons civil defence policy developed as it did, Robin Woolven asserts that the 
economic dimension was a primary consideration: 
 
Economics in its broadest interpretation is surely the basic reason 
why, with technological advances in the threat causing changes in 
our defence posture (hydrogen bombs, deterrence and if that fails 
then survival rather than protection) all in an increasingly grim 
economic environment from the mid-1950s.397 
 
 
 
The revival of civil defence in 1972 is an example of the incrementalism that 
characterised civil defence policy making during the later Cold War. This was not a 
policy shift indicative of a national response to significant threat but an incremental 
change in the nature and scope of the policy itself borne of financial constraint, 
where funding could only be considered if civil defence was gradually adapted and 
developed to encompass domestic emergencies in addition to the threat of nuclear 
attack. 
 
Between 1972 and 1986 it is often possible to draw parallels between the nature 
and scope of civil defence policy and economic situation. However, it can be 
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demonstrated that civil defence expenditure does not automatically correlate either 
with the state of the economy or the economic ideologies of the party in power. As 
Table 4 demonstrates, despite the perilous economic circumstances faced by the 
Labour government 1974-1979, civil defence expenditure rose three times. This 
indicates that while cost-cutting measures were undoubtedly making their influence 
felt across policy, other concerns were causing expenditure on civil defence to 
increase. This Labour government were not the first to openly acknowledge that 
providing public shelters for the population would be economically untenable. 
Mass public protection of this kind had been rejected on the grounds of it being 
prohibitively expensive since the 1950s.  As such, despite periods of increased 
spending seen under Labour during this period, policy itself remained unchanged.  
 
It can therefore be argued this it is in the nature rather than the scope of civil 
defence where economic factors have been most influential. Despite civil defence 
as it existed in its 'care and maintenance' state falling below standards of even 
minimal efficacy, it was considered that further reductions in Home Office 
expenditure could not be found in order that the budget for civil defence might be 
increased. The Heath government acknowledged in 1972 that civil defence was not 
fit for purpose, however operating under the severe economic constraints of 
spiralling inflation, increasing unemployment and widespread industrial action, 
demanded that in order to justify additional funds, the brief of civil defence be 
stretched to fit domestic peacetime emergencies as well as the threat of nuclear war. 
The need for economic restraint fundamentally changed the nature of civil defence 
policy; the coat was cut to fit the cloth and this caused policy to shift from one 
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primarily of wartime protection to that which encompassed additional 
responsibilities of domestic security. 
 
The civil defence review of 1981 resulted in year on year increased expenditure 
after two years of spending stagnation at the beginning of the Conservatives' first 
term, which in turn exercised considerable influence on the nature of policy itself. 
The subsequent significant increases in civil defence spending seen under 
successive Conservative governments flew in the face of the economic backdrop of 
the early 1980s recession, reflecting instead the ideology of the party in 
government's belief in civil defence as a necessary adjunct to a strong defence 
strategy. With the increase in budget came increased civil defence duties for local 
governments, devolving the responsibilities for civil defence planning to the local 
level and reinforcing the self-reliant, cost-effective approach to public protection. 
The financial burden that the increased responsibilities placed upon the local 
authorities resulted in widespread non-compliance and as such, this approach 
directly caused the change to policy seen in the Civil Defence Regulations of 1983, 
developed in order to compel recalcitrant local authorities to comply with policy. 
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Chapter 4 
Ideological Influences 
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This chapter is the second of three chapters concerned with the three main areas of 
potential policy determinants and will focus on to what extent ideological and party 
political factors influenced policy making decisions. The first part of this chapter, 
Civil Defence and Deterrence, introduces the argument that civil defence policy 
was influenced by defence policy, specifically by the theory of deterrence, 
exploring the pre-1972 history of civil defence as an adjunct of a deterrent posture. 
It examines the lasting effects of the Strath report's conclusions on the necessity of 
a nuclear deterrent on the aims and objectives of civil defence policy and explores 
the changing attitudes towards the role of civil defence in Britain's overall defence 
strategy and the defining debate of 'insurance' versus 'deterrence'.  
 
The second part of the chapter, The Labour Party and Civil Defence, offers a brief 
historical appreciation of the Labour Party's position on the nuclear deterrent and 
the basis for change in policy concerns. Labour's attitude towards the value and 
effectiveness of civil defence as a complementary defence policy is analysed. The 
disarmament policy of Labour in opposition during the 1980s is reviewed and the 
divisions within the party over the issue of unilateralism and defence are explored 
in light of successive election defeats.  
 
The third part of the chapter, The Conservative Party and Civil Defence, examines 
the ideological attitudes of the Conservative party from 1955's Strath report until 
the end of the Cold War. It begins with a concise analysis of the party's policy 
position pre-1972 and examines how civil defence policy first became intertwined 
165 
 
with the Conservatives' position on defence and how civil defence as a policy 
concern was revived in 1972. Finally, the Conservative election victory in 1979, the 
Home Review of 1980 and the effect of subsequent ideology-driven Thatcher 
administrations on civil defence policy are explored 
 
Civil Defence and Nuclear Deterrence 
Throughout the Cold War the strategic rationale underpinning Britain’s possession 
of an independent nuclear force was designed to meet two related goals; to enhance 
deterrence by providing a second centre of decision within NATO while 
maintaining the capability to act independently if supreme national interests were 
threatened.398 The desire to maintain this balance between alliance cohesion and 
independent action was a central and constant aspect of British nuclear policy.399 In 
1981, an official government publication described civil defence as “... an 
'insurance premium' against the remote risk that NATO's continuing deterrent 
policy might fail”400 and it was this concept above all others that came to define 
civil defence policy in the last two decades of the Cold War. In the nuclear-armed 
Britain of the 1970s and 80s, planning for civil defence was intimately related to 
both the existence and operational needs of the nuclear deterrent. In contrast with 
the humanitarian rationale of civil defence, the deterrence rational is primarily 
concerned with strategy; a policy created not to mitigate the effects of an attack but 
to deter the attack itself.  
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In the broadest terms, deterrence as a military strategy means using the threat of 
action in order to compel an adversary or enemy state to do, or prevent them from 
doing, something that a particular state desires. The strategy is one based on the 
threat of massive-scale retaliation if attacked by aggressors, one that would have 
such severe consequences for the aggressor that they are deterred from action 
unless they are willing to accept significant damage as a result.  As Richard Brody 
states: 
 
Deterrence refers to the attempt by decision-makers in one nation or 
group of nations to restructure the set of alternatives available to 
decision makers in another nation or group of nations by posing a 
threat to their key values. The restructuring is an attempt to exclude 
armed aggression from consideration.401 
 
The theory of deterrence as a military strategy did not originate in the Cold War, 
but it was during this time that it gained significance in relation to the use of 
nuclear weapons and it figures prominently in the history of both British nuclear 
defence and civil defence policy. American military strategist Bernard Brodie 
asserted in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must always be at the ready but 
never used.402 A strategy of nuclear deterrence was closely interwoven with British 
thinking on military defence throughout the Cold War and this was to have 
significant and far-reaching influence on civil defence policy making and 
subsequently considerable consequences for civil defence planning.  
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Civil defence as an adjunct of a deterrent posture was a concept found in political 
debate as early as the immediate post-war years as evidenced in a House of 
Commons debate in 1948. Conservative backbenchers, displaying the party 
political and ideological support for the link between a strong military and civil 
defence that would come to characterise the debate in later years, asked the 
government whether it would “... accept the principle that if Civil Defence is in a 
proper state of preparedness it can, in fact, act as a deterrent to war, and have an 
effect before war begins?403  It was the advent of nuclear weapons however, 
especially the realisation of the widespread destructive capability of the hydrogen 
bomb in the mid-1950s, which precipitated the shift in emphasis of civil defence 
policy as it moved from a rationale of protection to one of deterrence.404 The 
Conservative government's 1954 White Paper on Defence proposed the concept of 
civil defence as deterrence when it stated “... the emergence of the thermonuclear 
bomb has overshadowed all else. Nevertheless our problem is still fundamentally a 
dual one. We have to prepare for the risk of war and so prevent it.”405  The 
subsequent 1955 White Paper on Defence went on to preface the deterrence versus 
insurance rationale that would form a key debate at the heart of civil defence for 
the next four decades: “... the knowledge that aggression will be met by 
overwhelming nuclear retaliation is the surest guarantee that it will not take 
place.”406 
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As has been discussed in Chapter 2, the defence review of 1957 led by the Minister 
for Defence, Duncan Sandys, was a critical point in British civil defence policy 
making, cementing the move away from the World War Two model of civil defence 
to one as a subsidiary of the deterrent posture: “... the central aim must be to 
prevent war rather than to prepare for it. In present circumstances the only way to 
deter nuclear aggression is to possess the means of retaliating in time.”407 The 
subsequent 1957 report Defence: Outline of Future Policy made clear the 
government's attitude towards the role of nuclear deterrence in Britain's defence 
strategy and the part that civil defence policy had to play in that defence posture: 
 
While comprehensive disarmament remains among the foremost 
objectives of British foreign policy, it is unhappily true that, pending 
international agreement, the only existing safeguard against major 
aggression is the power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons. 
While available resources should as far as possible be concentrated 
on building up an active deterrent power, it would be wrong not to 
take some precautions to minimise the effects of nuclear attack, 
should the deterrent fail to prevent war. Civil defence must 
accordingly play an essential part in the defence plan.408 
 
 
It was clear from the Paper that policy makers were to allow civil defence policy to 
be shaped by other defence considerations. The Conservative government at the 
time, led by Churchill – a strong proponent of Britain as an international power – 
and later Anthony Eden, had set defence as a primary concern, as evidenced by the 
Conservative Election Manifesto of 1955 which stated that their “...interest and 
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duty is to make war less likely by building up, with our allies, the most powerful 
deterrent to aggression we can achieve.”409 Defence: Outline of Future Policy not 
only inextricably tied together the success of British nuclear defence policy with 
that of civil defence but laid the foundations for what would become an ideological 
battleground between Conservative policy makers and Labour opposition on the 
issue of civil defence.  
 
In the years that followed, much of the debate surrounding civil defence became 
increasingly expressed in terms of 'deterrence' and 'insurance'. The model of civil 
defence seen during World War Two, with civil defence's primary function being 
one of protecting the population against nuclear attack, was a policy of insurance 
aimed at mitigating the consequences of war. The deterrence model, one that 
became increasingly dominant as the Cold War continued, was based on the idea of 
civil defence as part of an overarching defence strategy, useful insomuch as it made 
the military defence more credible, making the threat of Britain's nuclear weapons 
more credible and, as critics of this model would latch on to, making the idea of a 
nuclear war seem survivable. 
 
In 1956, the insurance model of civil defence was one favoured by the Home 
Office and in particular the Home Secretary, Gwilym Lloyd-George who criticised 
the view that civil defence was only useful in terms of the deterrent when he said 
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that “... a reduction in home defence expenditure....can be justified only if it is the 
government's considered view that the global war can be discounted altogether, 
which obviously would carry implications in much wider fields than that of home 
defence.”410 While the humanitarian function of civil defence was still stressed, 
critics of the increasing link between public protection and foreign policy argued 
that the language used betrayed the government's intent, however. In 1956, a report 
by the Home Defence (Ministerial) committee stated  that the government's 
objective “... is to maintain a level of defence preparations which will contribute to 
preventing war by ensuring that the Russians are not led to believe that they can 
destroy us without being destroyed themselves: but not to insure against the failure 
of the deterrent.”411 
 
Left-leaning commentators such as Duncan Campbell have critiqued the 
deliberately homely political use of such language, stating that the insurance 
analogy was a false one, as “... insurance premiums are paid to an insurer whose 
task it is to provide the resources for reconstruction after loss.”412 Ideological 
concerns as engendered by the effects of the creation, maintenance and opposition 
to the nuclear deterrent started to assert their influence on civil defence policy. It 
was a move to a model of civil defence that drew increasing criticism and 
opposition both from peace groups and Labour in opposition, who saw the essential 
humanitarian functions of civil defence discarded in favour of a policy supporting 
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an aggressive defence posture and as a factor in deciding to decrease spending on 
public protection measures such as shelters. Labour MP Konni Zilliacus voiced 
criticisms typical of more left-wing opponents in a 1959 House of Commons 
debate on civil defence: 
 
...is it not the fact that the Government's policy is to resort to nuclear 
weapons against a major attack on any allied country by 
conventional arms without any attempt to defend the civil population 
against the consequences of that policy? Will not the Government 
make clear the measures they propose to take to burn, bury or 
otherwise dispose of the tens of millions whom they propose to 
immolate on the altar of their nuclear deterrent strategy?413 
 
 
Civil Defence and Ideology in the Labour Party 
The decision to place civil defence on a 'care and maintenance' basis in 1968 was 
made by a Labour administration, ostensibly “...in the light of economic and 
international circumstances”414 given the perceived reduced risk in the likelihood of 
war. This apparent abandonment of civil defence met with expected criticism both 
politically and from the public and the government's ideological opponents viewed 
the winding down of civil defence as a weakening of Britain's defence posture that 
would leave the country open to aggressors.415 While Labour MP and CND 
member Hugh Jenkins congratulated the government on ending a policy of 'mass 
deception416 and expressed the hope that Britain's nuclear arms would follow suit, 
the opposition denounced the disbanding of civil defence as having party political 
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motivations, typified by comments such as: 
 
We can afford vast sums of money running into several hundred 
millions of pounds in order that the Party opposite can carry out their 
old fashioned Marxist dogma of more nationalisation but we cannot 
afford 2d a week per head of the population to maintain civil 
defence.417 
 
When questioned by the opposition in a House of Lords debate on the disbanding 
of civil defence as to whether the government's assessment of the credibility of the 
deterrent no longer relied significantly on a strong civil defence policy, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Minister, Allan Gwynne Jones, belied the ideology-led social 
priorities inherent in Labour's attitude towards defence: 
 
We must put the whole of this matter of defence and deterrence into 
an even wider context, and decide how much of our limited national 
resources we can apply to them without damaging the whole quality 
of life of our people. It has been said before in your Lordships' 
House, and it will bear saying again, that while the Government are, 
of course, responsible, and must be, for the security and safety of 
these Islands and the people in them, it is no good assuring that 
safety and security at the cost of constantly lowered standards of 
education, health and living standards in general.418 
 
In contrast, a House of Commons debate on the 1972 Defence Estimates four years 
later when civil defence was once more an important subject for political debate. 
The divisions within the Labour Party on the value and effectiveness of civil 
defence as a complementary defence policy can clearly be seen in the comment by 
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Frank Judd MP: 
 
The credibility of that deterrent must depend upon the fear of our 
potential enemies that we are prepared to use it. This must mean that 
we have to convince those potential enemies that we are prepared to 
take the retaliatory holocaust which would inevitably follow from 
our pushing the button. If we are to convince them of that, surely a 
comprehensive civil defence system is an indispensable element of a 
deterrent policy.  
I here hasten to say, before it is said from the other side of the House, 
that I have never been altogether satisfied about policy on this front 
since the original decision was taken by the previous Government to 
run down drastically the civil defence programme. Why do the 
present Government stick to this policy? It seems to be a serious gap 
in our credibility.419  
 
 
The Wilson and Callaghan governments from 1974 to 1979 struggled with the 
problem of how to reconcile increasing defence commitments with a parliamentary 
party that was largely unsympathetic to nuclear weapons. In October 1974, Labour 
continued in office with a manifesto commitment renouncing any intention of 
acquiring a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons and outwardly at least, 
Labour was a strong advocate for disarmament.420 The strongly Callaghan-
influenced party manifesto of 1979 represented the last moderate, pro-US defence 
position that would be seen by the Labour Party for the best part of a decade, with 
its reiteration of the importance of détente, arms control negotiations and limiting 
the move towards production of nuclear weapons rather than disarmament.421  
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During this period in government, Labour outwardly supported the strategy of civil 
defence as part of an overall deterrent posture, a policy consistent with that of the 
previous Conservative administration. In commenting that the government did not 
see any need for significant changes of policy from that maintained by successive 
governments, this view was reiterated by Home Office junior minister Dr Shirley 
Summerskill in 1977: 
 
As long as there are large nuclear arsenals in the world, civil defence 
must be mainly, if not solely, concerned with the possibility of a 
nuclear war. We and some of our NATO allies have nuclear weapons 
to deter aggression and for no other purpose. Our civil defence 
planning must also be directed towards deterrence. It must be 
sufficient to persuade any potential aggressor that, in defence of our 
freedom, we shall not give in to nuclear blackmail.422 
  
 
The general election defeat of 1979 and the 1980 election of Michael Foot - a 
founder member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament - to leader accelerated 
a rejection of this moderate stance and heralded Labour’s adoption of a policy that 
did not rely on British nuclear weapons and which would see Labour contest the 
1983 general election on a radical platform of non-nuclear defence.423 This policy 
was not universally supported within the party however and loomed large as an 
illustration of the deep ideological divisions within the party itself. As one writer 
notes: 
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[the Labour Party] had long been embroiled in a row over nuclear 
weapons which, at various stages, had threatened to tear it apart. 
Some supported Britain’s nuclear deterrent, others bitterly opposed it. 
The latter group was divided between hard line advocates of 
unilateral disarmament and those that wanted a nuclear free Britain 
but realised that to campaign for it would be political suicide. Civil 
defence exacerbated this bitter wrangle.424 
 
 
The disarmament policy of the Labour opposition in the 1980s was tightly bound 
with the political conditions of the party at the time and as such its policy on 
nuclear weapons and civil defence was both a cause and consequence of internal 
developments. However Labour adopted unilateral nuclear disarmament as policy 
at its 1980 conference and increasingly decried the escalating promotion of civil 
defence as, according to Robin Cook MP, “an attempt to foment a war psychosis 
…making the population more willing to contemplate war.”425 In June of 1981 a 
party policy statement denounced the government’s civil defence policy as a 
scandalous waste of resources and stated Labour’s policy: 
 
For a densely populated country like Britain, there can be no 
effective civil defence against nuclear attack. The only effective civil 
defence is to ensure that Britain is not involved in a nuclear war, and 
to oppose all nuclear weapons and nuclear war preparations by 
Britain or any other country.426  
 
 
The government answered these criticisms by seeking - in the absence of plans for 
mass public shelter or evacuation - not to place emphasis on the incontrovertibly 
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humanitarian functions of civil defence but to further link the successful defence of 
the realm with the execution of a credible civil defence policy. This is evident in a 
House of Commons debate on the 1980s Defence Estimates where the subject of 
the perceived inadequacies of the government's civil defence policy was raised 
again and again and was answered in the same way each time: 
 
 
Our possession of the nuclear deterrent is less effective as a deterrent 
if it is not associated with a credible civil defence policy? The two 
lock together. If possession of the deterrent is to deter a potential 
aggressor, that aggressor must believe that we would be prepared to 
use it and that involves an effective civil defence programme.427 
  
 
At the same time, the government was similarity not immune to criticism from its 
own backbenchers. Dissenting right-wing view was often of the opinion that 
current policy did not extend far enough and civil defence should be expanded and 
managed not by the Home Office but the Ministry of Defence with a military-
trained civil defence 'army' demonstrating “... that this country has the will to 
survive.”428  
 
As can also been seen in the actions of local authorities as discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 5, Labour's ideological distaste for the nuclear deterrent and what 
it viewed as the government's corruption of civil defence to fit its hawkish defence 
agenda could clearly be seen in its support for the Labour-controlled authorities’ 
fight against participation in central government civil defence exercises and their 
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declaration as ‘nuclear-free zones’. In June 1981, the National Executive 
Committee of the Labour Party issued an advice note in response to requests for 
guidance by local authorities.  not only offered advice in dealing with civil defence 
duties imposed by central government but also unequivocally established Labour's 
ideological position on civil defence, one that was diametrically opposed to the 
Conservative government's: 
 
The Labour Party does not believe that the small civil home defence 
measures proposed by the government can in any significant way 
provide protection for the people of Britain against the consequences 
of nuclear war. 
We believe that the government's proposals are a fraudulent waste of 
scarce resources – resources which could be much better used in 
expenditure on education, housing and peacetime emergency 
planning such as improving the fire service. 
'Civil defence' in the sense of protecting the civilian population from 
the effects of nuclear war does not exist. The government's plans are 
in fact more concerned with 'Home Defence' designed to protect a 
small government and military elite. The fact that the civilian 
population is told to stay at home, and that essential supplies and all 
major communications routes are to be reserves for the military 
means that the government anticipates the death of a very high 
proportion of the population living in cities or in rural areas near 
military bases, communication centres and other targets. 429 
 
 
At the same time, ideological motives were evidently apparent and making their 
influence felt even within the ostensibly united Association.  As well as attacking 
the apparent ideological motivations behind local authority non-compliance, the 
government also criticised Labour's support for these actions as an attempt to 
detract from an unworkable policy of non-nuclear defence: 
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The truth is that the Labour Party has finally given up any attempt to 
find a realistic and responsible policy for defence and disarmament. 
A perpetual protest march is no substitute; nor is hysterical anti-
Americanism. Encouraging local authorities to declare nuclear-free 
zones is a diversion from the real business.430 
 
 
 
In 1979 only 2% of the electorate thought defence was a major issue compared to 
38% in 1983.431 Defence, and the question of nuclear disarmament and deterrence 
in particular, emerged as one of the most important issues of the 1983 election.432 
Civil defence policy was also of critical importance to the changes that occurred in 
the Labour Party on the interconnecting levels of policy and political ideas. The 
1983 election manifesto of the Labour Party had no reassurances about civil 
defence to offer the electorate however, emphasising its commitment to collective 
defence, maintaining its support for NATO but rejecting the nuclear option and 
choosing instead to focus its efforts on a renewed call for disarmament. It stated: 
 
Labour’s commitment is to establish a non-nuclear defence policy 
for this country. This means the rejection of any fresh nuclear bases 
or weapons on British soil or in British waters, and the removal of all 
existing nuclear bases and weapons, thus enabling us to make a 
direct contribution to an eventually much wider nuclear-free zone in 
Europe.433 
 
 
The Conservatives seized upon the Labour Party’s arguably weak position on 
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national security, objection to nuclear deterrence and calls for unilateral 
disarmament, equating it with having no defence policy at all, placing Britain in the 
'greatest jeopardy'.434  Their victory in the general election allowed the 
Conservatives to claim a mandate for their defence, and therefore their civil 
defence, policies, and gave Labour the opportunity to draw lessons on the need for 
a more credible defence policy based on an agreed position.  
 
Much of the parliamentary Labour Party remained of the opinion that the 
inadequacies of central government policy could only be explained in terms of the 
purpose of civil defence being a public relations exercise, primarily concerned with 
getting the general public to accept the likelihood of war, therefore reducing public 
pressure on the government to reduce the risks of nuclear war.435 Some also argued 
that by spending any money on civil defence at all, the government was effectively 
preparing for war and knowingly deceiving the public about the survivability of a 
'limited' nuclear exchange when in reality, as concluded by the Greater London 
Area War Risk Study,436 there was no way that affordable civil defence could be 
made effective.437 In debating the Civil Defence (Grant) (Amendment) Regulations 
1983, opposition criticism of the draft regulations touched frequently on the 
dichotomy at the heart of a defence policy based on deterrence: 
 
Civil defence preparations and these regulations are trying to get the 
British people to think the unthinkable. If deterrence works—as long 
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as that is the policy of this country, we must all hope that it does 
work—there is no necessity for civil defence, because deterrence 
will prevent a war and therefore we shall not need civil defence. The 
emphasis now — the new emphasis, I stress, since 1971 on civil 
defence in these regulations means that the Government appear to be 
losing confidence in their own deterrence policy. I wonder whether 
the Ministry of Defence is aware of that. The Government may laugh 
at this, but I believe that it is a matter of pure logic: if one believes in 
deterrence, one does not need a civil defence policy.438 
 
 
Roy Hattersley, the newly-elected Deputy Leader and a more moderate voice 
within the Labour Party on the subject of disarmament, who would later go on to 
claim that nuclear deterrence worked during the Cold War,439 criticised the 
politicisation of civil defence after the 1983 election and accused the government 
of using civil defence as an ideological weapon with which to achieve unrelated 
objectives: 
 
It is entirely undesirable that the preparation of civil defence and the 
promulgation of civil defence regulations should be used as a vehicle 
for arguments about defence and disarmament.  
However, if civil defence has been politicised, it has not been 
because of the actions of those who take the unilateral nuclear 
disarmers' view. When the preceding regulations were promulgated 
two years ago, the Government regarded the civil defence debate as 
part of their campaign for Britain's defence, the Alliance of which 
Britain is a member, and their attack on some forms of local 
government autonomy and independence.  
… the Minister of State said ... that our civil defence policy is part of 
our defence strategy. They do not want to argue it in terms of 
compassion, protection, defending or looking after those who might 
be at the periphery of some unintentional nuclear horror; they want 
to address themselves to the general strategic considerations that the 
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Minister and his colleagues have introduced into the debate.440  
 
 
The Conservative party in turn accused Labour of attempting to block central 
government policy with a mixture of “…non-co-operation, obstruction, rhetoric 
and hysteria."441 They referenced Labour's close ties with peace groups, in 
particular CND, which had considered that aligning with Labour during the 1983 
election campaign as an opportunity to directly influence government policy, as an 
example of more entrenched ideological opposition to civil defence than that which 
stemmed from a distaste for the nuclear deterrent:  
 
It would be a mistake to think that opposition to civil defence from 
the extreme Left arises only from opposition to nuclear weapons. 
There are deeper reasons, too. For example, in the current journal of 
CND, called Sanity, there is an appeal to members to campaign 
against the latest civil defence exercise, called Wintex. It is in these 
terms: The systems which already exist for use in a 'civil emergency' 
were developed during the 1970s in response to industrial disputes; 
the Regional Emergency Committees … were first set up during the 
`winter of discontent' in 1978 to deal with the road haulage strike. 
The most recent example is the development of Police Support Units 
… at the moment being used in the miners' strike". There is no 
mention at all anywhere in this article, this appeal for campaigning, 
of nuclear questions. Opposition to nuclear deterrence is one reason 
for CND's obstruction of civil defence, but support for strikes is 
another reason, as one would expect in an organisation which is so 
vulnerable to manipulation by the hard Left.442 
 
 
This criticism had its roots in the 1971 Home Defence Review, which sought to 
redefine the scope of civil defence in line with renewed concerns over domestic 
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security, but despite these concerns, civil defence legislation was never used in 
industrial disputes and Labour did not campaign against it on this basis. 
 
Labour continued to campaign on disarmament and for a conventional, non-nuclear 
defence policy443 though the party's defeat in the 1987 election cannot be attributed 
to a single factor or policy decision. As Croft (1992) states, while Labour's leader 
Neil Kinnock showed outward loyalty to the idea of unilateralism, it became clear 
to the leadership of the party that for both electoral reasons and for the sake of 
genuine policy reappraisal unilateral disarmament was no longer tenable and a re-
evaluation of defence policy was undertaken.444 The move away from unilateralism 
reflected changes in the personal convictions of Kinnock, the internal state of the 
party and improving international developments which rendered the need for civil 
defence policy as an adjunct to the nuclear deterrent obsolete.  
 
 
Civil Defence and Ideology in the Conservative Party  
In the early 1970s civil defence continued to be seen by the Conservative 
parliamentary party as a necessary adjunct to the overall defence policy of a 
nuclear-armed state, related both to the existence and operational needs of nuclear 
weaponry. In 1972, two years after a Conservative government came to power, civil 
defence was once again on the political agenda. The 1971 Home Defence Review 
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had acknowledged the shortcomings of existing civil defence policy445 and the 
Heath administration, while broadly in agreement with the preceding government's 
assessment about the reduced risk of war, were still keen to be seen as strong on 
defence and saw an opportunity to both strengthen Britain's defence position and 
redefine the scope of civil defence in line with renewed concerns over domestic 
security.  
 
1973's Home Defence Planning Assumptions, with its emphasis on 'securing the 
UK against any internal threat' and providing 'alternative machinery of government 
at all levels to increase the prospects of, and to direct, national security”446  
introduced a new theme in civil defence policy making.  This change in the focus 
of civil defence policy drew criticism from the Labour opposition amid fears that 
civil defence measures would be used by the Conservative government not only for 
strikebreaking and other industrial disputes but also as a means of controlling the 
population not only after an attack but in the possible periods of instability if an 
attack looked imminent. 447 Critics seized upon the no shelters, no evacuation 'stay 
put' policy as evidence of the government's fundamentally ideology-driven policy 
making, dismissing civil defence in its new guise as emergency planning as a 
thinly-veiled cover for increased powers of population control and government 
survival. 
 
The contention within this policy dichotomy was highlighted in a letter from the 
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Association of Municipal Councils, stating pointedly that local government 
“…would perhaps regard survival as the main aim and the ‘machinery of 
government’ as a necessary measure and not an aim in itself.”448 Duncan Campbell, 
writing a decade later, typifies the arguments of the Left when he argues that the 
Conservative civil defence policy of the time was fundamentally undemocratic: 
 
The one event that would undoubtedly turn a mass of people against 
the government would be the imminence, or perceived imminence, 
of nuclear conflict. ... In this context, a policy of nuclear deterrence 
places an impossible strain on democracy. If you wish nuclear 
weapons to deter, then you must be ready, willing and able to use 
them, whatever the strength of public opinion against a nuclear 
deterrence in a late stage of political crisis or conventional military 
conflict. Planning for home defence thus places a primary emphasis 
on the control of the civilian population.449 
 
 
Despite the redefining of the aims of civil defence, the concept of public protection 
as an adjunct to nuclear defence remained a primary concern to the Conservative 
party during their time in opposition in the 1970s, a policy in which they were 
broadly supported by Labour. This can be seen in the 1977 Home Office Manual 
for Scientific Advisers: 
 
No defence policy based on deterrence can be convincing if it fails to 
include an element for home defence. A potential attacker must be 
persuaded that the nation is ready to accept and survive an attack, at 
least to the extent of being able to retaliate.450 
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Objections to government civil defence policy from the right often stemmed not 
from ideological or moral objections to the concept of deterrence that was 
inextricably linked to civil defence or from, as the government later sought to style 
it, a refusal to believe in the humanitarian capabilities of civil defence, but rather 
from the belief that current civil defence provisions were inadequate and untenable. 
This was an argument that persisted throughout subsequent Conservative 
administrations up until 1986; Conservative MP Patrick Thompson was typical of 
the objections from Conservative backbenchers when he asked in 1984 if civil 
defence “...deserves and should command more widespread support. We are 
spending on civil defence only one tenth of 1 per cent of the money that we spend 
on the major Departments.”451 
 
 
After five years of relative silence, concern over civil defence from some quarters 
of the Conservative party was renewed with the publication in August 1978 of 
Britain's Home Defence Gamble,452 written by two Conservative MPs. The 
publication fundamentally disagreed with party policy on no shelters or evacuation 
and criticised the assumption on which home defence policy hinged, that there 
would be a long enough period of escalating tension before a nuclear exchange to 
allow operations to be organised and implemented.453 It urged the Conservatives 
that within the policy framework of a strong military defence:  
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... measures should be taken to protect the nation in case or war not 
only because it is the duty of a Conservative government but also 
because taking steps to protect the nation the effectiveness of our 
deterrent forces in increased.454 
 
 
Such internal party pressures helped to ensure that when the Conservatives came to 
power in the following year, civil defence reform received serious consideration. 
The Conservative election victory in 1979 under Margaret Thatcher coincided with 
the end of détente. A year later, the election of Ronald Reagan, who with Thatcher 
would go on to cultivate a close political and personal relationship, heralded a 
fundamental political change. Reagan's election saw the issue of nuclear deterrence 
and civil defence become more politicised, ideologically influenced and polarised 
than at any other time during the Cold War as the issue of defence shifted to the 
Right.455 This hard line foreign policy was foreshadowed in a speech made in 
January 1976 in which she made a scathing attack on the Soviet Union in which 
she accused it of  being “... bent on world dominance, and they are rapidly 
acquiring the means to become the most powerful imperial nation the world has 
seen. The men in the Soviet Politburo do not have to worry about the ebb and flow 
of public opinion. They put guns before butter, while we put just about everything 
before guns."456 
 
Thatcher became closely aligned with the policies of Reagan and in her own words 
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“...believed in so many of the same things.”457 Most significantly for British civil 
defence and deterrent policy she believed that the way to peace was through 
strength, both ideologically and militarily.458 Reagan took a hard-line ideological 
stance towards the USSR459 and the result of this was close transatlantic 
cooperation between the US and the UK, especially on issues related to defence 
and the Soviet Union which was reflected in domestic policy on the nuclear 
deterrent and civil defence.  
 
The new Conservative government fully supported the British independent nuclear 
deterrent and embraced the concept of deterrence in its defence policy making460 
and accepted the criticism by NATO that the disparity between Britain's military 
and civil preparedness weakened the country's deterrence posture.461 It was 
acknowledged that “...the cumulative effect of political disinterest, shortage of 
funds and the absence of any national plan”462meant that the general state of civil 
defence planning fell far short of the ability to put Britain on a war footing within 
7-10 days. This was an unacceptable state of affairs for a Conservative government 
with an unyielding ideological belief in a strong military defence: 
 
In a sudden crisis this would cause severe political embarrassment, 
possibly distract from the credibility of deterrence and, in 
conventional war, jeopardise our ability to sustain the economy and 
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so maintain support for our own and allied military forces. 463 
 
 
The Conservatives believed that “...in an era of nuclear supremacy a low level of 
civil preparedness and protection could be argued to indicate confidence in the 
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence”464 and a widespread review of civil defence 
was announced in 1979. It was acknowledged that a significant influence in 
bringing about the political will for a review of civil defence did not necessarily lie 
with a balanced assessment of the external threat but from ideological pressures 
within the government's own party. In a Home Office meeting held in May 1980, 
William Whitelaw remarked upon “...the growing feeling in an influential part of 
the Conservative party that a substantial new set of actions would be needed, going 
beyond budgetary and other limits”465 and the influence of this political 
manoeuvring could clearly be seen in the civil defence strategic planning document 
later the same month: 
 
Although a strong feeling had emerged...that the present state of 
home defence preparedness was inadequate, this owed more to back-
bench pressure than to an objective reassessment of the threat and the 
measures required to counter it. 466 
 
 
The results of this review – the most significant investigation into civil defence 
seen in the last two decades of the Cold War - were announced to the House of 
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Commons in August 1980 by Whitelaw.467 He opened his statement with the 
confirmation that the review was both inextricably linked with party political view 
on defence and closely tied to an overall defence strategy, the new government 
having decided “... to accord high priority to the defence of the nation; and a review 
of civil preparedness for home defence was set in train so that this important 
element of our defence strategy could be considered as part of the improvement of 
our general defence effort.”468   
 
Protect and Survive 
Despite no official information for the public being published until 1980, Home 
Office memoranda seem to suggest that a booklet for public consumption had 
already been discussed. A letter from the Central Office of Information, dated 12 
March 1974 requested information from the Home Office for inclusion in a 
proposed booklet, with the assumption that it would “...form the text of the Official 
Announcement and that what Probert is discussing with your Information Division 
is the production of a booklet on public advice”.469 This request was replied to three 
days later by the Home Office, clearly stating that such a booklet was being 
produced, and that they were also targeting the same information at television and 
that it was likely that “... a basic booklet will be produced...we expect rather more 
attention to be paid to the dissemination of this advice through other media, in 
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particular television.”470 Parts of the advice contained within Protect and Survive 
had come to light in a string of leaks before it was published in series of critical 
articles in The Times in January 1980, one of which characterised civil defence as a 
“lethal failure of duty”471 and this publicity caused  Home Office minister Leon 
Brittan to stress to parliament that: 
 
This was not a secret pamphlet. There was no mystery about it. It had 
been available to all local authorities and chief police and fire officers. 
It had not been published for the simple reason that it was produced for 
distribution during a grave international crisis when war was imminent. 
It was calculated that it would have the most impact then.472 
 
It was noted in a Cabinet and Overseas Policy Committee meeting in March 1980 
however that the information contained within the pamphlet was recognised to be 
of such inadequacy that it might be “…unwise to actively promote sales of Protect 
and Survive”473 after it was published. Brittan may have sought to limit the damage 
caused by placing the image of nuclear war into the public sphere, but as Shaw 
states, unlike the debate surrounding the nuclear issue of the 1950s and 1960s, it 
was significantly less easy to control public and media discussion around the 
realities of nuclear conflict in the 1980s.474 Both The Times and the BBC475 were 
openly critical of civil defence planning and the arguments surrounding public 
protection were increasingly shaped by deeply-rooted ideological and political 
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agendas, raising, as Stafford puts it, fundamental questions about “…the 
relationship between the state and the individual in the thermonuclear age.”476 
 
The manifestation of this policy of self-reliance and personal responsibility for 
protection, Protect & Survive477 was published in May 1980 by HMSO and priced 
at 50p and accompanied by a series of short films, to be shown on television in the 
event that a nuclear strike became inevitable. There is minimal change in the tone 
or content behind information here and the advice given in a 1938 publication titled 
The Protection of Your Home Against Air Raids478 and a later series on information 
published in 1964 titled Advice To Householders.479 This was not necessarily borne 
of ideological considerations but one that recognised the overwhelming destructive 
power of the nuclear arsenal held by the Soviet Union. As John Preston notes: 
 
Geopolitics and the number of nuclear weapons made it very 
difficult for the UK to do anything other than to basically adapt 
previous advice in the 'Advice to the Householder' campaign.  If you 
look at the history of public information on civil defence there is 
little difference between 'Advice...' and 2004's 'Preparing for 
Emergencies'.480 
 
The production of Protect and Survive is essentially incrementalist rather than 
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rational, a move away from the idea of civil defence as the immediate life-saving 
response to an air raid to one where the priority was the protection and preservation 
of national institutions. There were implicit assumptions made about who should be 
protected, based on the deeply held assumptions by policy makers which, as John 
Preston notes, were ideologically beyond question in their focus on the protection 
of public property and societal roles.481 However, these ideological assumptions 
were not necessarily just the preserve of a Conservative government; while the 
focus on self-reliance and not the protection of a larger society were undeniably 
Thatcherite, Protect and Survive was initiated under a Labour government and the 
ideology it displays could be argued to also be a product of its time. 
 
Protect & Survive was primarily concerned with informing the public on how to 
make an improvised shelter in their own homes; as the Working Group on Shelter 
and Evacuation progress report put it, “...the hasty construction in crisis from 
household materials of a 'core shelter' in a 'fall-out room'.”482 Protect and Survive 
was complimented by two booklets published in 1981 regarding the construction of 
personal protection shelters: Domestic Nuclear Shelters483, with techniques for 
building a home shelter, and Domestic Nuclear Shelters - Technical Guidance.484  
 
Unlike its US counterparts and to a limited extent, earlier British films such as The 
Waking Point, Protect and Survive offered no political or community rallying or 
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appeals to unite behind desirable facets of national character and the moral 
dimension so inextricably intertwined with survival in US films is in every respect 
absent. In the face of mutually assured destruction all advantageous concepts of 
national identity were stripped away; survival of the nation dependent not on the 
population but on the continuity of state apparatus. Also absent, however, are any 
mentions of what happens to the surviving state in a post-attack landscape. As John 
Preston notes: 
 
The ideology was certainly to secure continuity of the state and to 
keep people in their homes to wait for information.  In contrast, 
policy in the US was about maintaining civil society. In my 
discussion with Home Office scientists they were concerned about 
what was the 'bare minimum' for survival – calories rather than 
exercise classes.  The pragmatic rather than the political.485   
 
 
This message of pragmatism is reinforced by the absence of human intervention or 
detailed representation of life or society in the films. At the end of each film the 
Protect and Survive logo is imposed, a homogenous nuclear family removed of all 
identity, simultaneously protected and isolated by the white shield of government 
advice. British civil defence measures during the cold war were wholly reliant on 
the fundamentally self-governed preparations of private citizens and offered no 
state shelters or evacuation policy, but gave greater emphasis to the responsibilities 
of the individual to protect themselves and placed special value on the role of the 
family as an agency of the state.486 This was not always a direct result of ideology; 
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as John Preston argues, the creation of Protect and Survive was influenced in its 
message and direction by the ideologies of society and successive governments, but 
its production itself was hampered by other means: 
 
…the money given to civil defence was small (divide the Protect and 
Survive production budget by number of households and it is tiny - I 
calculated this once) and so there was a limit to what could be done. 
 Add this to the ad hoc nature of production… and it is not always 
possible to draw a direct link from ideology to production.487 
 
Protect and Survive reflected the extremely limited nature of policy and, as 
Churcher and Lieven note, presented a series of oversimplified images and 
assumptions based on an unrealistic, contradictory and distorted view of both the 
ease of cost-limited protective measures and the landscape of post-attack Britain.488 
As the only official advice for the public on the subject of civil defence, these 
booklets were widely lampooned489 and counter-publications promoted by 
organizations such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The result of this 
internal confusion was a civil defence policy with internal security and the 
continuation of government at its core that was derided as elitist and ineffective for 
the population at large by its many detractors. John Preston highlights the structural 
and ideological issues inherent in attempting to translate a chaotic policy process 
into concrete public advice: 
 
Firstly, there are issues about the authorial intent and ownership of 
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policy which, in its formations, does not necessarily reflect the views 
of the authors. A desire to play with the new animation format and 
distrust between scientists and policy makers make ‘Protect and 
Survive’ less useful than it might have been in terms of providing 
clear information. Secondly, there are issues about conflicting 
objectives. In this case, national security and (political desire for) 
support for nuclear weapons rather than the safety of the population 
led to a conflict of interest. The decision to distribute information (at 
least from politicians) was about winning consensus rather than 
ensuring survival. Thirdly, policy science makes assumptions about 
the subject of policy and their ownership of property and resources. 
Fourthly, policy documents and ‘social science fiction’ and not 
necessarily written for a ‘reality’ of practice.490  
 
 
Ideological assumptions within the civil defence policy are very much in evidence 
within the actual facts the government chose to make available to the public. The 
gross oversimplifications regarding likely nuclear scenarios and unrealistic 
expectations of public behaviour seen in publications such as Protect and Survive 
betray what Churcher and Lieven term the “ideological web”491 that civil defence 
planners created and ultimately found themselves caught within. In order to be 
truly humanitarian, a more realistic picture of nuclear war combined with the 
government’s willingness to open the issue of civil defence to political debate was 
needed but, as Churcher and Lieven go on to argue, this was prohibited by the 
ideological fear “…that they might not be able to carry the public with them in 
support of Britain’s role as a nuclear state, and [an] anti-democratic paternalism 
that informs much of the structure of democratic politics in this country.”492 
 
                                               
490  Preston, J. (2012) p.51 
491  Churcher, J, and Lieven, E. (1983) p.118 
492  Ibid. p.130 
196 
 
It is these assumptions that in their turn reinforced and justified certain aspects of 
civil defence policy and planning such as the focus on secrecy, plans for police and 
military control of a post-nuclear Britain and the identification of anti-nuclear 
“subversives and potential subversives.”493 Stafford argues that given the limited 
financial constraints, it made sense for policy makers to recommend the survival of 
machinery of government over improvements to civil defence preparation as these 
would bring “…only marginal benefits to most citizens”494 and that Protect and 
Survive was in itself dictated by the need for it to “…induce some sort of 
compliance with the imperatives of national survival”.495 Peace groups however  - 
whose criticism focused extensively on the preparations for government survival 
and the civil liberties implications of the internal policing role of this ‘home 
security’ – argued that the government should put effort into preventing nuclear war 
rather than preparing for it.496 A nation forced for the first time to consider a threat 
they perhaps would previously have preferred to ignore breathed new life into CND 
and various other anti-nuclear activist groups throughout the country and civil 
defence became a central symbol in the nuclear disarmament debate.  
 
The Conservative Election Manifesto for 1979 had promised ‘significant increases’ 
in defence spending and the importance of ensuring the continuing effectiveness of 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent was stressed.497 This promise was evident in the 1979 
home defence review, with its pledges to increase spending on civil defence and 
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Whitelaw's reiteration of the belief that effective civil defence is an 'essential 
feature' of making war less likely.498 As a consequence of this belief, the 
Government considered that “... an expanded civil defence programme is both 
prudent and necessary to achieve an appropriate balance in our defence 
capability”499 and various modifications to policy were rubber-stamped. The role of 
civil defence as deterrence was argued in a letter to The Times in January 1980 by 
historian Michael Howard: 
 
An initially limited Soviet strike would have the further objective, 
beyond limiting weapons based in this country aimed at their own 
homeland, of creating conditions here of such political turbulence 
that the use of our own nuclear weapons, followed as this could be 
by yet heavier attacks upon us, would become quite literally 
‘incredible’. Civil defence on a scale likely to give protection to a 
substantial section of the population in the event of such a ‘limited’ 
strike is thus an indispensable element of deterrence.500  
 
 
In addition to the strengthening of the deterrent posture, the Thatcher 
administration sought to further bolster the overlapping plans already in place for 
the provisions of internal security and civil defence, making them considerably 
more homogeneous. A 1981 Home Office circular501 later redefined civil defence as 
an integral part of home defence, with the latter’s official aims of securing the UK 
against domestic threats and providing alternative machineries of government at all 
levels. Thus the primary concern of Conservative civil defence policy continued 
with the strong administrative bias seen in home defence strategy since the early 
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1960s; the first priority being the continuation of government. A considerable 
emphasis was placed on the mitigation of ‘internal threats’ and it has been 
suggested by commentators on the Left that the civil defence provision of this time 
was not primarily about protecting the country from foreign aggression, but about 
protecting the government from the civilian population in situations of extreme 
national emergency.502  
 
Supporters of the Conservatives' renewed, security-focussed civil defence policies 
were vocal in the face of increasing opposition from Labour and peace groups as to 
the value of not only civil defence itself but of what its critics saw as the potentially 
dangerous use of civil defence legislation for “protection against subversion.”503 In 
order to ameliorate public opinion, the government made sure to stress the elements 
of its policy that provided for public protection. Patrick Mayhew, answering 
questions in November 1981 from Conservative backbenchers as to whether 
government civil defence spending was enough, replied: 
 
The Government are equally concerned to make the point that the 
case for civil defence is a humanitarian one and that one can be 
wholly committed to unilateral disarmament and at the same time be 
very firm for proper civil defence. 504 
 
 
The Conservatives were keenly aware of the public’s growing interest in defence 
matters. In 1981 the Government had published a leaflet entitled Civil Defence: 
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why we need it505 which explained that the increase in civil defence spending was 
“... an 'insurance premium' against the remote risk that NATO's continuing 
deterrent policy might fail.”506 In assessing the threat to the UK from the Soviet 
Union, the Government continued to use the language of insurance and risk seen in 
civil defence policy since the end of World War Two: 
 
...the risk of a war in Europe leading to air or missile attack on the 
United Kingdom must be considered unlikely. … If, therefore, the 
danger of war is low – if for no other reason than the West, including 
the United Kingdom, has already paid a high price by way of 
deterrence – then it might be concluded that the premium to be paid 
by way of home defence insurance should similarly be low.507 
 
 
Recognising the increased importance of civil defence as an election issue, the 
Conservatives dedicated a section of their 1983 manifesto to reassure the public in 
the face of accusations of elitism of their commitment to civil defence for the 
population at large and its necessary partnership with a strong military and strategic 
deterrent, both nuclear and conventional. 
 
Our overriding desire and policy is to go on preserving peace. 
However, no responsible government can simply assume that we 
shall never be attacked. To plan for civil defence is a humanitarian 
duty – not only against the possibility of nuclear but also of 
conventional attack. That is why we must take steps to provide the 
help that could be vital for millions. To proclaim a nuclear-free zone, 
as some Labour councils have, is a delusion. The Conservative 
Government has accordingly carried out a thorough review of civil 
defence, brought forward new regulations to require local authorities 
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to provide improved protection, strengthened the UK Warning and 
Monitoring Organisations, and nearly doubled spending on civil 
defence. We propose to amend the Civil Defence Act 1948 to enable 
civil defence funds to be used in safeguarding against peacetime 
emergencies as well as against hostile attacks.508 
 
 
Conservative defence planning at the beginning of the 1980s was based on the 
assumption that a limited nuclear war was survivable and therefore planning of 
civil defence was not merely a matter of deterrent posturing but of justifiable 
national value, based on membership of NATO and the ability to respond to 
“...aggression at any level”.509 However the only reference in the 1983 regulations 
regarding the protection of the public was contained solely within the assertion that 
any emergency plans should consider the utilization of “such buildings, structures, 
excavations and other features of land….as are suitable for use for the purpose of 
providing civil defence shelters for the public”510. In the absence of a shelter or 
evacuation plan for the general populace the emphasis was placed on the need to 
retain the means for regeneration after a nuclear attack, which by implication 
necessitates the need for the maintenance of state apparatus.  
 
Ideological objections to government policy also came from within the 
Conservative party. In June 1980, a memorandum published by the Home Affairs 
Standing Committee of the centre-right Conservative think tank The Bow Group 
was highly critical of what it perceived to be the failure of the government to 
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provide a strong nuclear deterrent by under investing in civil defence:  
 
The United Kingdom defence budget is currently running at over 
£8000 millions a year in providing a contribution to NATO 
deterrence. But only £26 millions a year is allocated to civil defence. 
…. As a result of this abysmally inadequate financial support which 
in real terms is less than a third of the 1968 civil defence 
expenditure, and because there is no shelter policy no effective 
national civil defence plan, our population is defenceless against the 
effects of a nuclear attack, and, knowing that the public is 
unprotected, what British Government could possibly maintain the 
will to resist such an attack – or even the threat of attack? And 
without such a will to resist, what is the use of the £8000 millions a 
year spent on a deterrent?511 
 
 
The view of civil defence as a vital and necessary adjunct to a strong military and 
deterrence posture first and as humanitarian aid second can be seen in right-wing 
objections typified by critics of government policy from within the Conservative 
party. The Conservative Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Civil Defence circulated 
a questionnaire to every member of the parliamentary party who signed an early 
day motion on the subject of civil defence. The results of the questionnaire 
discovered that while parliamentary party members considered “...an adequate 
Civil Defence structure is essential if our deterrent forces are to be credible,”512 this 
put them at odds with official government policy of 'no evacuation, no shelters' as it 
was believed that “...the evacuation element of CD is inseparable from the deterrent 
aspect, because an orderly evacuation at a crucial stage of negotiation prior to 
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hostilities would evidence of serious intent.”513 
 
Despite this pressure on the Government during the early 1980s from both right 
and left wing sources, Conservative civil defence policy did not waver from the 
ideological direction it had taken since 1979, balancing the belief in deterrence 
with increasing economic pressures. Nuclear deterrence was considered stable and 
preferable to attempting to maintain sovereign security in a Cold War world 
without it; British disarmament could not be countenanced, regardless of Soviet 
policy.  Home Secretary, Patrick Mayhew, whilst telling the House of Commons in 
March 1984 that “... we must all the time remember that we are putting our 
protective money on the membership of NATO and the maintenance of our 
deterrent"514 still reiterated the importance of civil defence to that deterrent posture: 
 
All the Government's efforts in defence and in foreign policy are 
bent to avoiding any risk of attack and to doing our best to avoid a 
breach of the peace in Western Europe that has been maintained for 
the past 38 years. But none of us can guarantee that such a horrific 
event will not occur, and it is against that possibility—a low risk at 
present—that we must provide appropriate civil defence.515  
 
 
The Civil Defence (General Local Authority Functions) Regulations of the same 
year legally compelled recalcitrant local authorities to make and review civil 
defence plans and was ostensibly introduced by the government on the basis that 
while Britain was better off with the deterrent, “...if there is to be civil defence it 
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might as well be effective.”516 The Labour opposition was quick to pick ideological 
holes in the regulations however, seizing upon what Roy Hattersley condemned as 
the new regulations' concerns “...with the Government's philosophy rather than the 
principle on which the regulations should be based,”517 an accusation of overt and 
undue ideological influence on policy making. 
 
During the second half of the 1980s, Conservative foreign and defence policy 
continued to exhibit full belief in the need for an independent British nuclear 
deterrent. Thatcher showed how entrenched the nuclear way of thinking was to the 
Conservative parliamentary party when she stated: “Conventional weapons alone 
do not deter, and two world wars in Europe have already proved that. We want a 
war-free Europe, and we need to keep nuclear weapons to achieve that.”518 an 
ideological position that had been cemented in the Statement on the Defence 
Estimates 1987:  
 
It is easy to forget that in the first half of this century the world was 
twice plunged into immensely destructive global war... In the last 
century Europe was torn asunder by several major wars.  By contrast, 
in the...40 years of nuclear deterrence - there has been no war in 
western Europe, either conventional or nuclear, in spite of deep 
ideological hostility between East and West.519 
 
 
However, the threat that this hard-line stance was designed to meet was slowly 
receding. Despite continued belief in the deterrent, government civil defence policy 
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was developing into an 'all-hazards' approach not solely focussed on either 
humanitarian protection from a foreign aggressor or as an adjunct to deterrence and 
with this policy change a new consensus between the parties would be achieved.  
In a House of Lords debate on the Defence Estimates 1985, the conciliatory mood 
between the parties on the previously tense issue of civil defence was highlighted 
by Labour peer Lord Graham of Edmonton who stated that there was “... a 
powerful case for what is called the all-hazards approach - an attempt to 
depoliticise the civil defence issue, so that the believers in deterrence and 
disarmament alike can agree upon civil defence measures without prejudice to their 
different standpoints on military policy."520 In 1986, the Conservative Party's 1983 
election pledge became the Civil Protection in Peacetime Act521 which permitted 
the use of civil defence planning resources in peacetime emergencies. This 
signalled not only the decline of both the Cold War model of civil defence as 
nuclear protection and the party political and ideological involvement in public 
protection policy making.  
 
Conclusion 
It is the influence of ideology in policy making which can be mostly clearly seen 
'once-removed' in policy development. The creation of British civil defence policy 
was not always influenced by the ideological or party political beliefs of policy 
makers but was more often shaped by the impact of policies of defence and 
deterrence that were themselves ideologically driven.  
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Until the consensus that dominated British politics until the economic crises of the 
1970s came to an end, post-war British politics did not often present the voter with 
a polarising choice between Left and Right and it was within this context that Cold 
War civil defence policy was developed. Rhetoric concerning civil defence changed 
in response to the party in power but could not be said to be a solely 'Labour' or 
'Conservative' issue until the Conservative election victory of 1979. As Lawrence 
Vale notes, civil defence was an issue where the party in opposition almost always 
carried the strongest argument for reform522 and consensus was not always reached 
within the parliamentary party itself.  
 
During the last two decades of the Cold War, the argument in favour of civil 
defence as an adjunct to nuclear defence made by those in favour of the British 
deterrent was primarily argued by those on the Right and was born of no less logic 
than the arguments from the Left. The advocates for civil defence as a 
complementary defence policy argued that any potential foreign aggressors who 
observed that the object nation had taken no measures for civil protection would 
consider the credibility of that nation's deterrent as being low, regardless of the 
capability of the nuclear deterrent itself. The aggressor would be tempted to assume 
that the deterrent was a bluff by a country that has no intention of fighting for 
survival. But if measures for public protection have been taken then the credibility 
of its deterrent posture is enhanced and the power to deter increased accordingly.  
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The ideological belief in a strong military and defence posture was crucial to the 
Conservative’s government development of civil defence policy during their time 
in power. Subsequent Conservative administrations have, from the time of the 
Strath report's conclusions about the destructive power of the hydrogen bomb in 
1955, argued that the primary defence responsibility of government should be to 
prevent war and that this was most effectively done by spending time and money 
on an effective method of deterrence. The conclusions of the Sandys Defence White 
Paper of 1957 first embraced civil defence as a subsidiary of Britain's nuclear 
defence posture and from that point until the end of the Cold War, decisions on 
civil defence policy were highly influenced by their perceived effectiveness as an 
aid to defence. 
 
After civil defence's revival as a policy concern in 1972, two ideological influences 
on policy making could clearly be seen. The first was the results of the 1973's 
Home Defence Planning Assumptions which sought to redefine the aims of civil 
defence in order to direct national security. This change in focus drew intense 
criticism from the Conservative party's ideological opponents who argued that this 
change in civil defence policy was simply cover for increased powers of population 
control. Despite this, the concept of public protection as an adjunct to nuclear 
defence remained a primary concern to the Conservative party and as such, the 
second major influence was a continuation of the Conservative belief in a strong, 
nuclear-armed state. This intensified under the successive governments of Margaret 
Thatcher as détente came to an end and signalled the beginning of a hard line 
foreign policy that saw the issue of nuclear deterrence and civil defence become 
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more politicised, ideologically influenced and polarised than at any other time 
during the Cold War. 
 
The most significant critics of this link between military and home defence were on 
the Left of the political spectrum and their objections stemmed from an ideological 
distaste for nuclear weaponry and from the apparent use of civil defence as a 
bolster to the deterrent posture. Their most fundamental objection was one born of 
the argument that any civil defence policy which includes provision for public 
protection implies uncertainty about the reliability of nuclear deterrent policy by 
admitting the possibility of failure. And if the nuclear deterrent failed, ran the 
argument, the nuclear-armed state faces destruction to the extent that the state 
would have been better off without nuclear weapons. Critics of the government's 
civil defence policy labelled it a fraud, one that the public was actively encouraged 
not to think too closely about lest it damage the support for the nuclear deterrent.  
 
In the early years of the Cold War the Labour Party had been supporters of Britain 
obtaining a nuclear deterrent and this decision was to have long-lasting influence 
on the shape of civil defence policy until the end of the Cold War. Despite the 
party's rejection of this decision by the mid-1950s and its slow move towards a 
policy of disarmament, Labour in opposition continued to broadly support the 
government's policy of civil defence as a necessary insurance policy against the 
failure of the British nuclear deterrent. By the time Labour were returned to power 
in 1964 on the back of a campaign against the deterrent this had changed and splits 
began to be seen in the parliamentary party between those who reluctantly 
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considered a policy of public protection necessary and those who viewed civil 
defence as an ultimately useless public relations exercise. During this time, 
however, issues of party politics and ideology were not a significantly contributing 
factor towards the development of civil defence policy and a cross-party consensus 
on the nuclear weapons programme and civil defence was often in evidence.  
 
It was the parliamentary party's ideological move towards unilateralism and a 
growing disbelief in the guarantees given by the nuclear deterrent that proved to be 
the greatest influence on civil defence policy made by Labour in opposition during 
the 1970s and 80s when they put ridding Britain of nuclear weapons at the top of 
their political agenda. The election defeat of 1979 and the election of CND member 
Michael Foot to leader heralded Labour’s formal adoption of a non-nuclear defence 
policy with its resultant effects on official attitudes toward civil defence, though 
internal divisions within the party on the issue of nuclear weapons and defence 
were still evident. It proved much easier to convince both party members and the 
public of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons than it was that Britain should 
give up the right to that power altogether; as such, public support for unilateralism 
had fallen to just 15% of the population by 1983523  
 
An ideological distaste for the nuclear deterrent, and what the party considered to 
be the government's corruption of civil defence to fit its hawkish defence agenda, 
was in evidence in the party's support for the nuclear-free local authorities and their 
non-compliance with civil defence exercises. The government's increasingly 
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coercive amendments to civil defence legislation could be said to be the most 
significant example of Labour's ideology influencing central government policy 
making; though not in the direction they had hoped.  
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Chapter 5 
External Influences  
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This chapter focusses on the external influences on national civil defence policy of 
international relations, world events, local government and non-governmental 
agencies. The first of the two major external factors that this chapter examines is 
the influence of détente and international relations. It explores the fears of Soviet 
expansionism during the 1970s that led to criticism of government policy as 
inadequate and short sighted and analyses the factors contributing to the end of 
détente in 1979, and investigates the effects of the increasingly 'all-hazards' 
approach and move away from the traditional nuclear model of civil defence.  
 
The second influence to be examined is the effect on central government policy of 
local authority dissent. It explores the legislation that was constructed in the 1970s 
to oblige local authorities to make plans for civil defence and analyses the seeds of 
local authority dissent that were sown during this period. The 1979 Home Defence 
Review is taken as a starting point for a more detailed analysis of local authority 
non-compliance and the genesis and development of the nuclear-free zones 
movement of the 1980s is explored together with the effects of the authorities' 
refusal to plan for civil defence on government. Finally, the cancellation of the civil 
defence exercise Hard Rock is examined as the largest example of local authority 
action directly influencing government policy, along with the influence the 
dissenting local authorities had on policy creation. 
 
A brief analysis of the role of the Scientific Advisory Branch as independent 
advisors to the government in the development of practical protective advice to the 
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public is provided, before the chapter concludes with an examination of the 
influences of peace groups with particular reference to the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament.  It explores the anti-civil defence position of such groups and 
investigates to what extent the existence and activities of such groups could be said 
to have a direct influence on either the development or early termination of policy.  
 
International Relations and Détente 
In the early 1970s the UK, along with the USA and Canada, continued to move 
away from specific planning for nuclear war towards more generalised contingency 
planning. Despite a period of relative international harmony, however, underlying 
tensions still remained between the US and the Soviet Union. In the UK, fears were 
raised about the continued growth of Soviet military strength and of the 
increasingly unfavourable military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 
especially in light of the reduction in defence spending outlined in the Statement on 
the Defence Estimates 1976.524 Critics of government policy from within the 
Conservative party asked questions not only about military disparity but also what 
meaning could be implied by the gulf in provision for public protection, as Stephen 
Hastings MP stated: 
 
It is not mentioned in the White Paper, but I understand that the 
Soviet spending on civil defence is over $1,000 million a year. That 
is not necessary for sabre-rattling. That is only there as an earnest of 
absolute intent to survive in actual war. Of course, we have 
abandoned our civil defence altogether. But what sort of 
interpretation do the Government place on this figure?525 
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Growing concern about the uneasy relationship between the Soviet Union and the 
West was evident in the objections of the Conservative opposition to the 
Government's inadequate civil defence policy; Nicholas Winterton MP in a debate 
in the House of Commons on the defence estimates in April 1976 stating: 
 
We have no civil defence in this country. It is extraordinary that the 
Soviet Union has allocated more than £300 million for civil defence 
within its own boundaries. There is one rule for them and another for 
us. They are prepared to plan, but we are not. We delude ourselves 
and think that a few worthless signatures from the Soviet Union on 
the same piece of paper as the signatures of President Ford of the 
United States or of the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary enable 
us to ignore the growing future Soviet threat. 
It is against that background that the Government—and I condemn 
them for their policies—are prepared to countenance the folly of 
détente and place at risk the remainder of the ever-declining free 
world. 526  
 
By the end of the 1970s, the contrast between the £8,000 million spent annually on 
military defence and the £20 million spent per year on civil defence527 was striking. 
It was also clear to the Government that the lack of a civil defence programme 
significantly weakened the credibility of the strategic nuclear deterrent by casting 
doubt on whether the UK would ultimately be willing to use nuclear weapons if the 
population was unprotected.528 
 
In the 1940s and 1950s, rising international tensions has led to a significant revival 
of civil defence as a policy concern.  This was to recur as the ‘second cold war’ 
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from 1979 to 1985 saw an ideological and geopolitical renewal of conflict between 
East and West. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which was harshly 
criticised by the West, led to the failure to ratify and the eventual abandonment of 
the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of the same year which signalled the 
beginning of the end of détente. In the same year the Conservative party under 
Margaret Thatcher was returned to power and just a year later in 1980 the US 
election saw Republican Ronald Reagan elected on a platform opposed to the 
concessions of détente. In her own words, Thatcher and Reagan “...believed in so 
many of the same things”529, most relevantly, that the way to peace lay through 
strength, both ideologically and militarily. Reagan took a hard-line ideological 
stance towards the USSR, stating in 1983 that “The Soviet Union is an Evil 
Empire, and Soviet communism is the focus of evil in the modern world.”530  The 
result of this was close transatlantic cooperation between the US and the UK, 
especially on issues related to defence and the Soviet Union.  
 
In light of this stance and the increase in international tensions signalling the end of 
détente which Conservative peer Baroness Emmet believed to be caused by “...the 
threatening attitude of certain countries towards nuclear warfare”531 when the party 
was returned to power in 1979 a review of civil defence was announced, the 
economic and ideological influences of which have been discussed in greater depth 
in previous chapters.  At the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee meeting in 
May 1980, ministers instructed officials to prepare a series of papers proposing 
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civil defence planning objectives and options in light of current threat assessments. 
The Soviet Union was judged to have the capability to carry out “...significant 
attacks on the United Kingdom with conventional, chemical and nuclear weapons. 
Their intentions are less easy to judge thus making it difficult to match home 
defence preparations to the threat”.532  
 
In June 1982, the Home Office stated “In Britain, the Government's attitude 
towards civil defence is a measure of the perceived risk of enemy air attack on the 
civilian population.”533 However, while the threat from the Soviet Union was 
evidently a clear consideration in the development of civil defence policy, the 
formation of a response was tempered by several other considerations. In May 
1980, a briefing document establishing the strategic rationale for a civil defence 
policy acknowledged that although the Soviet Union had the capacity to “...conduct 
almost any form of campaign they regard as necessary,”534 the Government's 
response would also depend on other factors: 
 
The means which might be taken to provide some measure of 
protection...will depend on what are judged to be the main policy 
objectives. The survival of the maximum number of the population 
might be seen as an obvious objective. But to protect anything 
approaching the total population is not an attainable end. 535 
 
 
The strategic review recommended a public warning service, a self-help policy on 
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shelters, a decentralised system of government and stockpiles of food to help 
ensure the survival of “at least half”536 the population. While some in the Ministry 
of Defence felt that there was no doubt that the Soviet threat was “massive and 
increasing”,537 it was ultimately considered that the risk to the population at large 
was insufficient enough “...to justify what would necessarily be very expensive 
protective measures”.538  
 
Shortly before the results of this home defence review were announced, an 
assessment by the Home Office as to the nature of the Soviet threat stated that: 
 
...the 'measures' under review could in no sense affect the 
fundamental Soviet considerations of the United Kingdom's 
importance as a target. Nor could they affect Soviet perceptions of 
the vulnerability of the United Kingdom, or any key installation or 
facility within it, to either conventional or nuclear attack.539 
 
 
This statement as to the ineffectiveness of civil defence in making the United 
Kingdom less of a target for Soviet aggression is an interesting one in light of civil 
defence's priority role as an adjunct to military deterrence. Civil defence in this 
situation does not seem to be considered valuable as an early deterrent to target in 
the first place, but more as a sandbag to add to the last line of defence once all else 
has failed. This is reflected in Government thinking, which acknowledged that civil 
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defence “...would not reduce the Soviet military threat to this country but would 
help to demonstrate the United Kingdom's determination to survive as well as 
fight.”540 
 
 
Subsequently, the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, performed a complicated 
juggling act, keen to stress that plans to substantially increase spending on civil 
defence were not linked to any perceived risk or external threat while still ensuring 
that the intended statement “...will be seen as a sufficient response to the 
international situation and to the concern being expressed by the public and in 
parliament.”541 A ministerial committee review of the statement was eager to stress 
that any announcement “...should aim to diminish public concern despite the 
seriousness of the subject.”542 A draft version of the statement had also been 
flagged up by the Prime Minister as possibly alarmist when she queried whether it 
“...may give the impression that there has been a sudden increase in the threat,”543 
requesting that Whitelaw amend that statement to counter a feeling that the 
Government was not doing enough in the civil defence arena in comparison with 
other nations. This was a view echoed by John Biffen, Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury who urged Whitelaw to “...begin it with a reassuring statement that war is 
not likely in the foreseeable future provided that we continue our policy of peace 
through strength.”544  As such, the statement when it arrived was quick to mollify 
any possibility for concern: 
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I begin by emphasising that, despite the difficulties of the present 
international situation, the Government do not regard armed conflict 
with the Warsaw Pact countries as probable, let alone inevitable or 
imminent, provided that we maintain, as we intend, a firm 
commitment to peace, while ensuring that our defence forces remain 
balanced and effective. We believe that to be seen to be prepared at 
home, as well as capable of military deterrence and defence, will 
make war less likely. Nevertheless, I remind the House of what my 
Right Hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence said in 
paragraph 110 of his statement on the defence Estimates 1980. He 
said that Soviet strategists hold that any war in Europe is likely to 
escalate into a nuclear exchange, though it might start with 
conventional warfare, and that the warning time we might receive 
could be very little. This period of warning might, we believe, be 
measured in days rather than weeks. 
Against this background, the Government consider that an expanded 
civil defence programme is both prudent and necessary to achieve an 
appropriate balance in our defence capability.545 
 
 
A Memorandum by the Chairman of the official Committee on Home Defence 
stated that the current assumption about the nature of the Soviet threat “clearly 
affects”546 the drive towards a civil defence policy while simultaneously 
acknowledging that the exact nature of the threat remained unclear. This concern 
was also echoed by the Treasury, who expressed their doubts about the suitability 
of placing a report by the Home Defence Planning Sub-committee on the state of 
civil preparedness before Treasury ministers: 
 
They felt that the wrong approach to the subject had been taken by 
the Sub-Committee and that the conventional threat set out in the 
report had not been adequately defined and did not justify the 
recommendations that had been made. They felt that there was 
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insufficient evidence to adopt a changed strategy for civil defence 
planning. 547 
 
 
It could be argued that while this factor was still uncertain, the greater influence 
and subsequent policy determinant was the recurring concern, stated once more in 
the same Memorandum that civil defence should not appear to be a detracting 
factor in the efficacy of the deterrent: “...the lack of plans for the protection of the 
public could be seen by the Russians as inhibiting any Western decision to initiate 
the use of nuclear weapons, and could thus affect the credibility of Britain's nuclear 
deterrent.”548 As previously discussed, this was also a highly influencing opinion of 
Conservative backbenchers who were intensifying the “political pressure”549 around 
the subject. The proposed trebling of civil defence spending in three years by 1984 
also indicates that policy was being driven by considerations of a nuclear exchange, 
if not probably then at least possibly. Expenditure was therefore justified in as 
much as “...the government consider that an expanded civil defence programme is 
both prudent and necessary to achieve an appropriate balance in our defence 
capability."550   
 
The Home Office Circular No. ES 1/1981 that was issued in March 1981 as a result 
of the review also disabused the claim that the review of civil defence policy and 
its subsequent reactivation were not linked to any perceived external threat. The 
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circular provided further information on the measures to be taken by local 
authorities to improve the state of civil preparedness for home defence and gave 
prominence to the Government's assessment of the existence or imminence of any 
potential threat: 
 
Changes in strategic thinking mean that we must be prepared for 
conventional as well as nuclear attack on this country, and for the 
possibility of hostilities occurring at short notice. In future, 
emergency plans will have to be maintained at a high state of 
readiness and be capable of dealing with a variety of forms of attack, 
ranging from the effects of conventional aerial attack with high 
accuracy weapons against a limited number of targets to the 
devastating consequences of a strategic nuclear attack.551  
 
Speaking in a debate in the House of Commons in 1981, Patrick Mayhew 
confirmed the Government's thinking with regard to the necessity of expenditure 
being directly linked to the calculated risk of war: 
 
The central Government must provide funds and central 
organisation. They will naturally judge or calculate the scale of 
provision by reference to their assessment of the likelihood of war. 
As my hon. Friend will recall, in 1937, 1938 and 1939, all with eyes 
to see and ears to hear reckoned that war was inevitable. Inadequate 
though it then was, by reason of the imminent onset of war, the scale 
of provision for civil defence was higher than we now believe to be 
necessary. A higher likelihood of war would justify and induce 
higher expenditure than we consider it right to allot at present. 552 
 
 
The collapse of détente at the end of the 1970s transformed the context in which 
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civil defence policy making was developed. Political objections to any perceived 
preparations for public protection were often fuelled by the perception that the 
superpowers, supported by Britain, were preparing to wage war on European 
territory.553 While the home defence review was supported by many on both sides 
of the House,554 the more unilateralist view of some in the parliamentary Labour 
party, as represented by Tony Benn MP in a Debate on the Address in November 
1980, accused the government of using the perceived threat represented by the 
Soviet Union to further their own policies: 
 
The truth is that the civil defence policy of this country is not a 
credible policy. What people want now is an exploration of a non-
nuclear defence strategy... they are not prepared to see the 
Government use the Cold War as an instrument of their own 
domestic policy.555  
 
 
This is an example of not only how external actors and agencies influenced policy 
decisions, but how critics of government policy believed those actors were given as 
reasons in order to legitimise or justify policy developed for alternative reasons. 
There was some justification for this suspicion; in November 1982 a policy briefing 
document on attack assumptions was produced by the Emergency Planning 
Department at the Home Office which offers some significant insight into policy 
determinism: 
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We began raising the profile of civil defence in 1980 not because we 
thought the risk of war in Europe has increased but largely in 
response to pressure from Government supporters who, for a wide 
range of motives, thought that there should be at least a partial return 
to the pre-1968 days.556 
 
 
However, the paper reiterates the prevailing belief in adequate civil defence as an 
essential ingredient in the capacity of a nation to withstand attack: “In short, we can 
never totally exclude the risk of nuclear war but we can legitimately discount it as a 
reason for disruptive and expensive civil defence measures against improbably 
contingencies at the far end of the threat spectrum.”557 The Emergency Planning 
Department was also keen to emphasise in public that increased planning was 
happening not because they government believed in the inevitability of war or to 
condition the public to greater acceptance of war, but, as The Times reported, “... a 
response to greater awareness of the Russian capability and increased public 
interest in civil defence”.558  
 
Immediately following the review, the subject of civil defence became a popular 
topic in the media and was widely reported in both the broadsheet newspapers and 
on the television.559  The Times was typical of the broadsheet newspapers at the 
time in how it reported on civil defence, giving the reasons behind the renewal of 
interest in civil defence as resulting from: 
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...Russia's big build-up of more conventional fire power. Latest 
intelligence assessments include the likelihood of a period of 
conventional warfare, and the warning period before any attack is 
assumed to be less than 10 days rather than three or four weeks.560  
 
The Government was also keen to draw attention to the provision its civil defence 
policy made against attack by conventional weapons, as a foil to its critics who 
argued that civil defence policy as it stood could have no hope of protecting the 
population against nuclear warfare. Conservative peer Lord David Renton, 
president of the pro-civil defence organisation the National Council for Civil 
Defence, confirmed the Government's justification of its policy and the influence of 
the perceived Soviet threat by stating: 
 
Some people wrongly assume that this third possibility is the only 
one which is conceivable, arguing that there would be no survivors 
and that all civil defence preparations are a waste of time even to 
protect people on the periphery and in remote areas from fall-out. 
Their argument is then falsely extended to the denial of civil defence 
in all circumstances. In the past 30 years all the great powers have 
been involved in conventional wars and no nuclear weapons have 
been used. The greatest danger is therefore that of a conventional 
attack, especially after the recent massive increase in Soviet 
conventional arms.561  
 
 
When questioned by opposition backbenchers in a House of Commons debate, in 
October 1983 to justify the case for their civil defence policy as it stood, the 
Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Ancram, took care to move the 
debate away from the threat of nuclear action between the superpowers, 
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acknowledging the 'never say never' insurance policy provided by civil defence but 
stressing the need for protection against unspecified incidents of harmful but 
indirect origin: 
 
The case, essentially and simply—and I believe that it should be 
restated — is that no Government can guarantee that this country 
will never again be involved or caught up in war, directly or 
indirectly.... If we cannot be sure that we shall never again be 
involved or caught up in any kind of warfare, nuclear or 
conventional, we have a duty to do what we can to protect our people 
from its effects, were it to happen. 
The Government are committed to peace—a peace which we believe 
our defence policy will maintain and preserve. But we recognise, as 
we must, that no Government have control over our own destiny. In 
an imperfect world there must always be dangers and risks, and it is 
these dangers and risks which in all responsibility we must be 
prepared to reduce.562 
 
The focus of civil defence policy was shifting further and further away from 
protection against the actions of a foreign aggressor towards the establishment of a 
civil defence capacity to deal with civil disasters as opposed to wartime 
emergencies. The Conservative party made commitments to extend the Civil 
Defence Act of 1948 to allow civil defence resources to be used for peacetime 
emergencies, in what was claimed to be an example of the “...further indication of 
the humanitarian nature of civil defence.”563 This was a shift in policy concern first 
seen in the 1950s (see Chapter 2). However a change in the relationship between 
East and West unthinkable at the time was soon to accelerate this shift permanently 
away from traditional models of civil defence policy towards one of pure 
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emergency planning.  
 
It was in this international and domestic context that civil defence policy continued 
fundamentally unchanged until 1985, when East-West tensions eased after the 
appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev who brought a new style of leadership to the 
Soviet Union. Despite initial scepticism in the West, Gorbachev's reformist policies 
– including the commitment to reverse the Soviet Union's deteriorating economic 
condition instead of continuing stockpiling arms - led to increased cooperation 
between the superpowers that marked the start of the end of the Cold War. As a 
result, international tensions started to subside - Margaret Thatcher famously 
labelling Gorbachev as a man with whom it was possible to “...do business 
together”564 - and civil defence policy began to undergo a change.  
 
In its 1983 election manifesto, the Conservative Party had announced “We propose 
to amend the Civil Defence Act 1948 to enable civil defence funds to be used in 
safeguarding against peacetime emergencies as well as against hostile attacks.”565 It 
was this 'all-hazards' approach increasingly seen in civil defence policy that 
eventually led to the introduction of the Civil Protection in Peacetime Act 1986, an 
Act “...to enable local authorities to use their civil defence resources in connection 
with emergencies and disasters unconnected with any form of hostile attack by a 
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foreign power.”566  As Nicholas Bosner, MP for Upminister who introduced the 
measure as a Private Members Bill, stated upon its second reading in the House of 
Commons: 
 
It is a short and simple Bill which enables those local authorities who 
are required by law to carry out functions under the Civil Defence 
Act 1941 - and, I should add, the regulations made under that Act - to 
use for peacetime purposes the resources that are available to them 
for civil defence. The Bill is designed to encourage but not to enforce 
the use of civil defence personnel and other resources when making 
plans and preparations to deal with peacetime disasters, and, of 
course, to deal with them when they occur.567  
 
 
The Bill was broadly supported by all the major parties, including the Government 
who welcomed it for allowing the party to fulfil its manifesto commitment568, and 
the parliamentary Labour Party who stated that “We must welcome anything that 
tries to concentrate resources on the peacetime use of civil defence rather than on 
preparation for hypothetical war use."569 The Act was an evident sign of the 
Government's belief in the receding threat posed by the Soviet Union. However 
while the Act gave local authorities more freedom in the scope and manner of their 
public protection it stopped shy of authorising any reduction in preparations for 
defence against foreign hostilities. 
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Local Authority Dissent 
Since the creation of civil defence in Britain, planning and provision for public 
protection had been a function of local authorities on the basis that they had 
existing structures, staff and equipment on which to base and build a civil defence 
organisation and they knew and are known by the people within their jurisdiction. 
Local authorities were first given responsibility for civil defence by the Air Raid 
Precautions (ARP) Act of 1937 which obliged local authorities to construct ARP 
schemes in order to defend the population and their property from air attack.570 
Further amendments were made to the Act in 1938 and 1939 to enable local 
authorities to carry out their designated function without hindrance, enabling them 
to “... earmark in advance buildings, or parts of buildings, either for use as public 
shelters or for other necessary Civil Defence purposes”571  It was the 1948 Civil 
Defence Act that broadened the remit of civil defence to include “... any measure 
not amounting to actual combat for affording defence against any form of hostile 
attack by a foreign power or for depriving any form of attack by a foreign power of 
the whole or part of its effect, whether the measures are taken before, at or after the 
time of the attack.”572  It also obliged local authorities to “perform such (defence) 
functions as may be prescribed….by the designated Minister”.573  
 
Until the revival of civil defence in 1972, it was not a particularly noteworthy area 
of local government activity and such duties as were imposed upon local 
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authorities were not particularly onerous. This began to change with the 
introduction of the Local Government Act 1972 which clarified local authorities' 
power to spend money in the event of a disaster situation “Where an emergency or 
disaster involving destruction of or danger to life or property occurs or is imminent 
or there is reasonable ground for apprehending such an emergency or disaster, and 
a principal council are of opinion that it is likely to affect the whole or part of their 
area or all or some of its inhabitants.”574 This provision marked the beginning of 
what was to be central government's increasing reliance on the local state to 
provide the backbone of its civil defence policy.  
 
It was long acknowledged by the government that local authorities had not only an 
important role to play in the protection of the public but also in ensuring that plans 
for the regional seats of government in the post-attack period were properly in 
place.575 Since the Strath Report in 1957 and the following Home Defence Review 
of 1960, civil defence policy had started to move away from traditional ideas of 
public protection towards concentrating instead on plans for the survival of 
government and community order. Local authorities had a vital role to play in the 
continuation of government and the importance of planning to ensure the proper 
discharging of this function was stressed by the Government in 1973: 
 
The keystone of our preparations in civil defence for national 
survival after an attack lies in the measures which are designed to 
provide a regional system of internal government.... Therefore, the 
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basis of the wartime machinery of internal government is 
decentralisation and concentration of all domestic functions within a 
number of home defence regions.... But, and more immediately 
relevant as an integral element of our domestic regional government, 
we cannot overestimate the part which local authorities would have 
to play in a post-attack situation. It is therefore essential that the 
plans made by the local authorities in peacetime for discharging their 
post-attack responsibilities should be realistic and workable and 
constantly kept up to date in the light of the latest assumptions and 
best scientific advice we can give them.576  
 
 
In order to ensure that local authorities were complying with the civil defence 
duties, the Government introduced the Civil Defence (Planning) Regulations 
(1974), an example of a direct change in policy resulting from the actions of 
external agencies. The early 1970s had seen a significant change in the structure of 
local government resulting in the emergence of larger and more competent 
authorities at county level and it was thought that these would be more able to cope 
with the planning and operational needs of civil defence than their predecessors.577 
Consequently, in 1974 these regulations were issued under the 1948 Civil Defence 
Act requiring local authorities to make plans for the purposes of civil defence.578  
 
As noted in more than one debate in the House of Commons following the 1974 
regulations, the Government had no actual power to ensure that local authorities 
carried out their duties under the Civil Defence Act, relying instead on “... the good 
sense of local authorities properly to discharge their civil defence functions.”579 
Concerns began to be raised towards the end of the 1970s that local authorities 
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were failing to comply with the requirements set out in the 1948 Act and 
subsequent Regulations and in April of 1977 the Under-Secretary of State for the 
Home Office, Dr Shirley Summerskill, replied to these concerns by stating: 
 
I accept that in all those matters in respect of which Parliament 
imposes a function on local authorities, some councils are better than 
others. But, as I have said recently ... the Home Secretary has no 
powers of inspection and report. Government officials can proceed 
only by persuasion - because we are dealing with civilians - and by 
quoting the example of the better authorities.580  
 
 
This inability to directly control the plans made by local authorities would come to 
be a thorn in the side of central government policy. In announcing the results of the 
1979 Home Defence Review to the House of Commons in August 1980, William 
Whitelaw stated that: 
 
Effective civil defence arrangements depend upon co-operation 
between central Government and local government. I know that 
concern has been expressed about variations in civil defence 
arrangements in different parts of the country. I am satisfied that the 
Government have adequate powers to ensure that proper standards of 
protection are provided throughout the country, and it will naturally 
be our aim, with the local authorities, to see that that is done.581  
 
 
However, as increasingly tense East-West relations at the beginning of the 1980s 
signalled the end of détente, believing that government-approved civil defence 
plans were wholly inadequate and the local authority sanction of such would 
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encourage military spending and reinforce the belief that limited nuclear war was 
acceptable, some local authorities across Britain began to refuse to comply with 
central government policy on nuclear weapons and civil defence.  
 
The refusal by local authorities to participate in civil defence preparations was not 
a new phenomenon. As discussed in Chapter 2, in 1954 Coventry City Council, and 
later in 1956 the London borough of St Pancras both refused to carry out their civil 
defence responsibilities. St Pancras called civil defence a waste of time and money, 
with a view that there could be no real protection against nuclear attack.582 On these 
occasions civil defence commissioners were sent to the councils to undertake their 
civil defence responsibilities and the authorities charged for their work and the 
threat of similar action kept other dissenting local authorities from terminating their 
war planning altogether.583  
 
Labour-controlled Manchester City Council was the first to pass a resolution 
against nuclear weapons in 1980 and circulated this resolution, which became a 
model for other nuclear-free zones, to other authorities with a request for similar 
action. A national nuclear free local authorities (NFLA) organisation, under the 
City's leadership, was set up. The Manchester City Council resolution “…calls 
upon Her Majesty’s Government to refrain from the manufacture or positioning of 
any nuclear weapons of any kind within the boundaries of our city.”584 While it did 
not specifically target civil defence commitments, an unwillingness to comply with 
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Government plans is inherent in the statement: 
 
We believe it is not in the interests of the people to be either the 
initiators or the magnet of a nuclear holocaust and firmly believe that 
such unequivocal statements would clearly indicate the 
overwhelming desires of the people we represent and could lay the 
groundwork for the creation and development of a nuclear-free 
Europe.585 
 
 
The nuclear free movement and its role in the civil defence debate grew rapidly, 
and in a significant number of cases was directly influenced by an ideological 
distaste for central government policies. Many nuclear free local authorities saw the 
adoption of the declaration as largely a symbolic gesture, often born of (mainly) 
Labour councillors’ desire to use their position to align themselves with a larger 
peace campaign. Some of the larger local authorities such as Leeds, Oxford and 
Bristol went beyond the declaration and set up peace education courses and local 
exhibitions and published literature setting out the effects of nuclear war and their 
position as nuclear free authorities.586 The single issue which united all nuclear-free 
zones was their opposition to civil defence; that being the only area in which local 
authorities had a statutory defence role. As a booklet published by Bristol City 
Council in 1981 states: 
 
To foster the illusion that to prepare civil defence plans is to help us 
survive a nuclear attack is as dangerous as it is unrealistic. We must 
never be led to accept the inevitability of nuclear war nor give up our 
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opposition to any Government policies that take us closer to the 
brink of war…..that is why Bristol with Labour is one of Britain’s 
Nuclear Free Local Authorities all working for peace – the only real 
defence.587 
 
 
After Manchester City Council’s declaration of non-compliance, the issue of the 
nuclear-free local authorities became a topic for political debate that would 
continue until the end of the Cold War. The first question to be raised concerning 
the threat to central government policy posed by the nuclear-free local authorities 
was raised in the House of Lords in February 1981 after seven separate local 
authorities adopted Manchester’s declaration. In a motif to be seen repeatedly over 
the following years the Government dismissed the actions of the local authorities, 
stating that Moscow would not make a distinction between those local authorities 
that were nuclear-free and those that were not. The Government would not be 
drawn into a debate on what it proposed to do concerning the rogue authorities, 
only stating that “…the Government are responsible for national security and they 
will continue to take any steps necessary to maintain it”.588  By March of the same 
year, a total of 13 local councils had subscribed to the declaration589 and following 
the local elections in May 1981, which returned administrations of several leading 
local authorities who were supportive of the declaration, this total reached 60, 
including the Greater London Council.590  
 
However it would be simplistic and misleading to ascribe the battle between central 
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government and the nuclear-free local authorities as merely one of ideology 
between right-wing pro and left-wing anti-nuclear defence lobbies. While the 
majority of dissenting local authorities were Labour or Liberal controlled, some 
moderate Labour councils, such as Salford, were concerned that the Government 
“...was not doing enough in the way of publishing facts to counter the CND's 
propaganda.”591 Conservative majority councils such as Huntingdon - who passed a 
motion in 1980 declaring the civil defence plans of the time to be ‘absurd'592 and 
calling on the Government to provide money for public shelters – also participated 
in non-cooperation. After the cancellation of the exercise Hard Rock in 1982, it was 
noted by the Government that “...it is also necessary to recognise privately that 
some Conservative County councils had done no more that the statutory minimum 
required of them in the civil defence field.”593 
 
Additionally, for organisations such as the Association of County Councils, the 
issue was not necessarily one of ideological objection but practical, and 
occasionally humanitarian, concern when they declared that “...the government's 
response lacks credibility as a total package, having no effective policy for shelter 
and evacuation.”594The lack of a credible humanitarian function and subsequent 
public support was recognised as a sticking point for local authorities. A Scottish 
Office response to Home Office proposals on dealing with the recalcitrant local 
authorities noted: 
 
                                               
591  TNA: HO 322/1016 Letter from D. Heaton to J. Howard (2 December 1982) 
592  Campbell, D. (1983) p.169 
593  TNA: CAB 322/1021 Exercise Hard Rock and Civil Defence Policy (9 July 1982) 
594  TNA: HO 322/944 Home Defence Review (3 February 1981) 
235 
 
I have reservations about proceeding to default action against any 
council in the foreseeable future, partly because such action is not 
likely to be effective but mainly because we are unlikely to get the 
support of the general public to default action until we have, from 
their point of view, a credible civil defence policy. 
I doubt whether our civil defence posture will ever be accepted as 
credible by the general public until we can demonstrate the we are 
planning, at least to some extent, for the public's protection. The 
general public is much more likely to press the local authorities to 
carry out their functions if shelter and evacuation is a prominent part 
of them. This policy would also answer points 1 and 3 of the Labour 
Party NEC Advice Note no.6 of June 1981.595 
 
 
 
The Labour Party National Executive Committee's advice note in June 1981 issued 
to local authorities not only established Labour's position on civil defence but 
issued advice to local authorities as to how they should respond to direction on civil 
defence from central government: 
 
We recommend local authorities to reject attempts to use so called 
civil defence to condition people to accept that a nuclear war is 
somehow 'survivable'. 
We recommend local authorities to adopt a policy of opposition to 
nuclear weapons being manufactured, deployed or positioned within 
the boundaries of the local authority. So far over 60 Labour-
controlled authorities have declared their areas 'nuclear-free zones'. 
We recommend that other local authorities do the same. 
We recommend that local authorities refuse to co-operate with all but 
the bare legal minimum necessary under the 1974 Civil Defence 
(Planning) exercises and arrangements which are concerned with 
nuclear weapons and nuclear war preparations.596 
 
 
 
The Home Office also recognised the ideologically-motivated damage this advice 
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by Labour had on their policy. A memorandum by William Whitelaw would later 
cite that “Sheeplike response to the opposition party's irresponsible issue of the 
advice recommending Labour-controlled councils, inter alia, to boycott national 
civil defence exercises....has brought to a head a long-standing difficulty with the 
existing civil defence planning regulations.”597  
 
The Labour-controlled Greater London Council, which declared itself a nuclear-
free zone in May 1981, was particularly vocal in highlighting what it saw as the 
fraudulence of a civil defence policy influenced by the idea of nuclear deterrence. 
In a booklet published later the same year entitled London and Civil Defence; Why 
the GLC disagrees with the government it set out its objections to government 
policy as part of an overall defence strategy: 
 
Civil defence is seen by the Government as a necessary part of 
nuclear 'deterrence' policy. In peace time, its role is to win support 
for the nuclear deterrent by creating the false impression that civil 
defence measures would significantly assuage the destruction of a 
nuclear counter attack.598 
 
 
Labour believed such local action would highlight both the inadequacies and 
essential 'fraud' of civil defence policy and provide an impetus for public awareness 
on the deterrent issue that would eventually lead to renewed calls for disarmament 
and gave its backing to local authorities doing only the very minimum in order to 
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comply with the Civil Defence (Planning) Regulations (1974).599 Supporters of 
government policy dismissed local authority claims that the civil defence grant was 
inadequate for the duties imposed upon them, Robert Banks MP encapsulating the 
Conservative government's frustration with the dissident authorities when he stated: 
 
...in view of the fact that, with the substantial Government grants 
now available, the actual burden of costs that falls upon a local 
authority in maintaining civil defence requirements is minimal 
compared with that authority's total budget, it can only be on 
ideological grounds that those authorities oppose the progress of civil 
defence or are in wanton ignorance of its importance. 600 
 
 
Central government acknowledged the Labour-controlled Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities long standing opposition to spending on civil defence 
while other local authorities were being cut, but also believed that there were 
“...objections in principle to expenditure on civil defence”.601  The Chairman of the 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities, in conversation with the head of the Home 
Office's Emergency Planning Division, stated his uncertainty as to whether 
objections to government policy from within this organisation derived from 
fundamental opposition to civil defence in principle or was based on tactical and 
financial considerations.602 He explained that: 
 
...cross-currents of attitude which existed in the Association between 
the old-school 'moderates' led by the leader, Sir Jack Smart, and the 
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strongly left-wing element in the constituencies which was 
continuously monitoring the performance of the leadership for what 
might be described as doctrinal purity.603  
 
 
In the July 1981 issue of Protect and Survive Monthly, a national magazine by the 
right-wing lobby organisation National Council for Civil Defence, a letter by the 
Deputy Leader of the Greater London Council was published which stated: 
 
Such preparations can only serve to make nuclear war more 
thinkable and more likely. They are irrelevant, provocative and a 
waste of time and money. GLC Officers have already been instructed 
to report on the implications of the council scrapping its nuclear 
preparations. I have no doubt this is the decision which will be taken 
in the near future. In the meantime, no more work will be done on 
implementing the outcome of the government’s so-called Civil 
Defence review. All maintenance and improvement work on wartime 
headquarters will be suspended. Civil Defence training schemes and 
exercises are being halted. 604  
 
 
The conclusions raised from the report into the potential results the letter describes 
of the GLC dispensing with civil defence preparations were indicative, and held 
significant implications for the successful implementation of central government 
policy: 
 
The London boroughs could be deprived of the essential framework 
on which their war plans are based. Without stimulus from the GLC 
it is likely that, in many cases, civil defence preparedness in the 
boroughs would cease or be carried out at a reduced level.605  
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In a letter to the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, in August of the same year, 
the chairman of the GLC's Public Services and Fire Brigade Committee clarified 
the GLC's position – and that of many other dissenting, Labour-controlled local 
authorities - one of direct contrast to that of the Government in terms of local 
authority autonomy in defence matters, framing the argument in terms of political 
rather than ideological conflict: 
 
In particular the Labour Majority at County Hall has made no secret 
of the fact that we are reappraising the GLC's position in the light of 
the objective set out in our Election Manifesto, which states 'Labour 
will terminate the present wasteful expenditure on so-called “home 
defence”'. This reflects the conviction shared by many that the 
concept of civil defence in the face of nuclear war is both futile and 
unjustifiable – that it fosters an illusion of security thus misleading 
the public, gives a misplaced respectability to the idea of nuclear 
conflict and makes heavy demands on scarce national resources. In 
an area in which there is clearly such divergence of opinion and 
room for doubt as to the value of the basic policy pursued and the 
effectiveness of its implementation, it seems entirely inappropriate 
that Government should impose duties with statutory force on local 
authorities.606  
 
 
The letter also sought to argue that civil defence was a matter on which the law 
should be amended in order to permit local authorities' discretion in determining to 
what extent and in what way they chose to implement civil defence measures in 
their localities.607 The petition was not successful in changing Government policy 
however, and the Government would later move to amend the regulations to force 
local authorities' compliance. In a letter from the Secretary of State to the Prime 
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Minister, William Whitelaw expressed his intention to force the GLC and other 
recalcitrant local authorities to fulfil their civil defence duties: 
 
The opponents of civil defence continue their efforts to discredit it, 
and the GLC has attracted much publicity for its declared intention 
of doing only paper planning. In these circumstances the 
Government has a clear obligation to assert its commitment to civil 
defence and to ensure that local authorities discharge those essential 
responsibilities which until recently they have accepted without 
question. 608 
 
 
In June 1982 the GLC officially declared London a nuclear-free zone with thirteen 
boroughs demanding that existing statutory obligations on local authorities to 
provide civil defence should be removed.609 With its professional and well-funded 
information department the GLC was able, under the banner of its Nuclear Policy 
Unit, to provide a wide range of alternative civil defence materials, seeking to raise 
the profile of the nuclear debate and pressurise central government into addressing 
awkward questions on the nature of public provision610. The actions of the GLC 
were met with condemnation from the Government who argued that it was beyond 
the power of the GLC – or any other local authority – to influence defence matters 
in their area and that such declarations would not spare them in the event of foreign 
hostilities.611 With the GLC’s notification of non-compliance, the largest and most 
politically influential of all local authorities to make such a declaration, the debate 
began to grow more widespread and more heated.  Roy Hattersley, Shadow Home 
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Secretary, expressed this attitude succinctly in a debate on the Civil Defence 
(Grant) (Amendment) Regulations in the House of Commons when he said:  
 
[the regulations] required massive preparations to be made for 
evacuating major cities. They also required an arbitrary insertion into 
every local authority employee's contract—whatever their terms of 
service—of a legal obligation to carry out civil defence duties. Who 
would be surprised if the Greater London council...considered a 
proposal which required it to evacuate the population of London into 
the home counties and said, "Surely the Government cannot be 
stupid enough to believe that this is practical; they must be doing this 
for reasons of propaganda"?612 
 
 
Secretary for Defence, Francis Pym, labelled Labour’s stance as one designed to 
detract from an unworkable policy of disarmament: 
 
The truth is that the Labour Party has finally given up any attempt to 
find a realistic and responsible policy for defence and disarmament. 
A perpetual protest march is no substitute; nor is hysterical anti-
Americanism. Encouraging local authorities to declare nuclear-free 
zones is a diversion from the real business.613 
 
 
Similar condemnations of Labour-backed nuclear-free activities could be found in 
the specialist media of the time. The short-lived, pro-civil defence journal Protect 
and Survive Monthly was particularly critical of anti-nuclear peace groups and the 
nuclear-free zones in particular, labelling them as “... linked with various political 
or pacifist inspired organisations... sometimes having a pro-Soviet viewpoint, 
which has lent respectability to the most extremist ambitions now being promoted 
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by newly-won Labour councils.”614 
 
When questioned whether it would respect the decision of the nearly 70 local 
authorities that had, by July 1981, declared themselves to be nuclear-free, the 
Government once again answered that it was responsible for national security and 
would take any steps necessary to ensure this, including “…all those activities 
related to the deployment of nuclear-capable forces as part of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation's deterrent strategy”615 stating once more that it was 
‘impractical’ that local authorities should be involved in decisions relating to the 
deployment of military forces or weapons. In the same year the Transport 
Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, dismissed the local authorities’ actions as irrelevant, 
stating: “The phrase "nuclear-free zone" appears to have no legal meaning or 
practical effect and the declarations by local authorities are political statements 
rather than effective decisions under their powers.”616  
 
However in February 1982, after Clwyd County Council declared itself 'nuclear 
free', the Nuclear Free Wales Declaration was made. This policy was made possible 
by the 1972 Local Government Act, which allowed local authorities control over 
expenditure for whatever members considered was in the interest of their area.617 
By 1982 all of the Welsh county councils had joined with Clwyd County Council 
and it was announced that Wales was the first nuclear free country in Europe, an 
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embarrassment for the Government who were attempting to play down local 
authority dissent as insignificant.618 Geraint Morgan, Conservative MP for Denbigh 
whose constituency included much of the county of Clwyd, echoed central 
government’s position on the local authorities’ actions when he dismissed the 
actions of the County Council as reckless and irresponsible: 
 
There have already been threats, publicly uttered, to force my right 
hon. Friend the Secretary of State to abandon the civil defence 
programme for Wales under the threat of a local revolt. There have 
been threats to block planning applications from the Ministry of 
Defence, to publish local war plans, to open war bunkers—whatever 
they may be—for public inspection and even to provide evening 
classes in what are euphemistically described as "peace studies".619 
 
 
At this stage the Government still did not appear to consider the declarations made 
by the dissenting local authorities to be of any great threat to central government 
policy and it was not openly acknowledged that they had the power to influence 
Government civil defence planning. If there could be said to be an official reaction 
to the local authorities’ actions it was one of mocking dismissal, as exemplified in a 
House of Lords debate of June 1982: 
 
Some authorities have gone so far as to declare themselves nuclear-
free zones. I find that to be a singularly meaningless term. It is rather 
like a bald man writing "rain-free zone" on the top of his head and 
expecting to remain dry throughout the summer—which of course he 
could not, unless he had a special arrangement with the Almighty. I 
suppose that the local authorities concerned may feel that they have 
some special and reliable arrangement with the Warsaw Pact 
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countries, but if so it will be an arrangement that they will not only 
not drop a bomb on them but that they will not drop one anywhere 
upwind of them, in whatever direction the wind may be. That seems 
to me to be an admirable defence but one upon which we cannot 
rely.620 
 
 
Despite repeated assertions from the Government that defence planning was a 
matter for central, not local, government,621 the Nuclear Free Wales Declaration 
and the actions of the GLC had stimulated debate on the issue, a debate that was to 
grow in intensity following the failure of the planned 1982 civil defence exercise 
Hard Rock.  
 
 
Hard Rock 
Hard Rock was a major national home defence exercise jointly planned by the 
Home Office (in Scotland, the Scottish Home and Health Department) and the Joint 
Exercise Planning Staff with the Home Office taking the lead. The exercise was 
planned to take place from 9th September to 3rd October 1982. Unlike previous 
home defence exercises, Hard Rock was planned from the beginning as one 
providing local authorities with the opportunity to test their civil defence planning 
and emergency services within a national framework. Although Hard Rock was 
originally conceived as a post-nuclear strike exercise it was decided, in response to 
strongly expressed views of local authority County Emergency Planning Officers, 
to extend it to include a conventional war phase which was considered likely to 
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precede a nuclear strike. The former was regarded by the local authority emergency 
planning staff as an area of activity which could most usefully be exercised.622 
 
Hard Rock was the biggest civil defence simulation since the 1960s involving all 
county councils and the first civil defence exercise not wholly military in origin 
and planning, designed to be the first real test of the supposedly more effective civil 
defence arrangements of the Conservative administration. However, the planned 
exercise was dogged from the beginning by the reluctance of local authorities to 
participate. This reticence was not born of one concern but of several; the financial 
burdens of civil defence planning, ideological objections to civil defence and the 
refusal to accept increased direction of local government affairs by central 
government.623 
 
The Government struggled with how they should deal with local authorities who 
were, to varying degrees, refusing to carry out their civil defence obligations: 
 
The choice for the Home Office lay between threatening the 
recalcitrant local authorities and persuading them. To do nothing was 
not acceptable. In his [Patrick Mayhew's] view a threatening 
approach would be unlikely to produce the desired results, and he 
favoured a persuasive approach, to be carried out by first 
approaching Conservative leaders in the relevant councils.624 
 
 
This approach, both to the Government policy of devolved responsibility and the 
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actions of the local authorities, was questioned by organisations such as the 
Association of Civil Defence and Emergency Planning Officers, who perceived 
there to be an ulterior motive in the local authorities' non-compliance: “...they are 
using Home Defence issues in pursuance of their major objective of 'freedom from 
central government control'....the truth is that Home Defence is too vital and 
complex a part  of our overall defence preparations to be left to the discretion of 
local authorities”625. The Government, however, was firm; the civil defence 
obligations placed upon local authorities to implement the decisions laid out by 
William Whitelaw's statement to parliament on 7th August 1980 would be 
“vigorously pursued”.626 
 
Nearly a third of county councils scheduled to take part in Hard Rock, including 
the GLC, voted for non-compliance with the planned civil defence exercise and in 
the end, 20 out of 54 county level authorities declined to take part in Hard Rock and a 
further 7 would only play on a limited basis.627 This non-participation effectively 
killed the exercise. In a letter to John Nott at the Ministry of Defence, William 
Whitelaw stated: 
 
...planning for the exercise at county and regional level is, in wide 
areas of the country, behind and seriously deficient in quality and 
commitment. In consequence it now seems likely that the exercise if 
held as planned will fail to meets its objectives and – more important 
– fail to the extent of discrediting home defence and the 
government's handling of it. 
In my judgement, and that of Patrick Mayhew....the stage has been 
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reached when the risk of political damage if the exercise is held this 
year outweighs the potential value of the exercise coupled with the 
political damage if postponed.628  
 
 
 
It could certainly be argued that in forcing the Government to acquiesce and cancel 
the exercise, the dissident local authorities had already managed to discredit a civil 
defence policy that relied so heavily on the devolution of powers from central 
government to local hubs of control, a conceit on which the whole of government 
planning was based, from local command bunkers to regional headquarters. The 
blame for this failure was laid squarely at the feet of the dissenting local authorities 
but, more significantly, with the ideologically-motivated Labour party:  
 
This situation has been brought about in large part as a result of the 
decision taken by the National Executive Committee of the Labour 
Party to frustrate civil defence work, and it would be right to allocate 
the major  part of the blame accordingly in defending the 
Government's decision to cancel the exercise.629 
 
 
Despite the Government's fear that to cancel Hard Rock carried considerable 
political dangers, and could “...be seen by some as a climb-down to the Campaign 
for Nuclear Disarmament and the Labour Party National Executive Committee,”630 
in July 1982 William Whitelaw announced that Hard Rock would be postponed, 
concluding that: 
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I am not satisfied with the state of local planning for Exercise Hard 
Rock and I have decided that it should be postponed. I am 
considering urgently with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State 
for Scotland the need to amend the planning regulations made under 
the Civil Defence Act 1948.631  
 
 
When questioned on the failure of Hard Rock the day after its cancellation was 
announced, the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, could not be pressed to 
comment upon this as a reflection on the Government's civil defence policy but 
reiterated her disappointment towards the local authorities whose actions had made 
the exercise untenable: 
 
Many of us wish that nuclear weapons had not been invented, but 
they have, and it is our duty to make preparations for civil defence to 
defend the population. It was very disappointing that out of the 54 
local authorities that were scheduled to take part in exercise Hard 
Rock, only 34 were ready to do so. The 20 that were not prepared to 
do so were all Labour councils.632 
 
 
In practice, while the dissenting councils were Labour-controlled and the Labour 
opposition was quick to claim that the cancellation of the exercise was a comment 
on the fact that there could be no possible protection against nuclear war,633 central 
government was as ill prepared to take part in the exercise as most local authorities. 
It is possible that if information about protected seats of control for government 
officials had been made available to the local authorities such information would 
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have been used by peace groups and the opposition to the detriment of the 
Government and political capital made from what appeared to be provision for the 
protection of the political elite – in the form of regional seats of government - and 
not the population at large. The disclosure of planning information into the public 
domain was to remain a difficult dilemma for the Conservative administration 
throughout the 1980s and by forcing the Government to publish the plans for the 
aborted Hard Rock exercise the nuclear-free local authorities won a significant 
political victory.  
 
It is clear that politicians on both sides of the House viewed the failure of Hard 
Rock as a significant chapter in civil defence policy history.  The Government 
decried the actions of the local authorities as ‘disgraceful' 634 but could not deny the 
effect they had had on central government planning. While the threat of action 
against the authorities by the Government stopped the councils from abandoning 
their war plans altogether, the rebellious local authorities provided a unique gauge 
with which to test both the limits of government policy and disarmament as a way 
to prevent nuclear war. CND literature at the time was typical of the nuclear-free 
movement when it claimed the cancellation of Hard Rock as a political victory: 
 
The support of local elected representatives gives legitimacy to 
alternative policies put forward by the peace movement and focuses 
attention on where the responsibility lies for the arms race – central 
government.635 
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The Government's policy of devolving civil defence responsibilities to local 
authorities suffered considerable public relations damage from the cancellation of 
Hard Rock. CND stated that “We believe Hard Rock has been cancelled largely 
because of our nuclear free zone campaign”636 and while the Government disputed 
this in public, claiming that Hard Rock would be a success when it was run at a 
later date with the co-operation of all local authorities,637 this was never to happen. 
Privately, the Government acknowledged the influence of the campaigns from 
those opposed to civil defence in forcing the cancellation of Hard Rock, admitting 
their own failure to counteract these messages: 
 
The adverse publicity attaching to the Government's nuclear 
programme as a whole seriously inhibited the ability of local 
authority civil defence planners to get on with their job. … There 
would be great advantage in Ministers themselves grabbing the 
propaganda nettle.638 
 
 
Some Labour politicians backed the view that “... certain defence ministers were 
quite pleased that Hard Rock was abandoned because it would have proclaimed the 
inadequacies of present civil defence.”639  Despite this, the Government insisted 
that its broad defence plans would remain in force, with provision for civil defence 
organised “…on the basis that the local authorities shall be the agents of central 
Government.”640 However it could not be ignored that the failure of Hard Rock was 
the direct result of local authority inaction and William Whitelaw, speaking at the 
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annual conference of Civil Defence and Emergency Planning Officers on July 14th 
1982 laid the blame for the shelving of the exercise at the feet of the 'wayward' 
nuclear-free authorities.641 
 
A report compiled by the Emergency Planning Division in July 1981, on the 
direction of Home Office Permanent Secretary Brian Cubbon, detailed the legal 
position that central government found itself in in dealing with the nuclear-free 
local authorities and the powers available to ensure the authorities complied with 
their statutory duties.642 The primary regulation that empowered the Government to 
intervene when a local authority failed to perform its statutory duties was 
Regulation 4 of the Civil Defence (Regulations) 1949 which states: 
 
If the designated Minister is satisfied that any local authority has 
failed or refused properly to discharge any of the civil defence 
functions conferred on them as aforesaid he may by order either 
empower himself to discharge those functions in the name and at the 
expense of that authority or authorise or require some other authority 
or person to exercise those functions in the name and at the expense 
of the authority so failing or refusing.643 
 
 
However the report recognised the difficulties in the appointment of commissioners 
as seen in the cases of non-compliance by Coventry in 1954 and St Pancras in 
1956, questioning the effectiveness of such a measure now that civil defence was 
so inextricably bound with other local services. The 1948 Civil Defence Act did 
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give ministers the right to 'direct' a local authority as to how to make plans but as 
author Duncan Campbell asserts, to exercise this right would have been 
constitutionally unusual,644 and indeed the first Emergency Services Circular issued 
in 1974 indicates the limitations of ministers’ powers in this instance: 
 
The Ministerial power to issue directions is regarded as a reserve 
power to be used only when the national interest is at stake and when 
long-established procedures of advice and guidance fail to ensure the 
necessary local action.645 
 
 
The Government's tactics had been to “... rely on encouragement, advice, 
persuasion and money in getting local authorities to fulfil their obligations”646 but, 
when this ultimately failed, the Government sought to alter policy to meet the 
desired outcomes. The report recommended some changes to policy to encourage 
local authorities to discharge their civil defence duties. The first of these was to 
increase the rate of specific civil defence grant above 75% to encourage more 
spending on civil defence. The second was an initiative to raise public awareness of 
civil defence, with emphasis on the survivability of conventional warfare and 
therefore the value of civil defence preparations, in the hope that “.. a more 
informed public may through the normal democratic process begin to apply 
pressure on recalcitrant authorities”647 which included a proposal for a widespread 
propaganda campaign to counteract the information placed in the public domain by 
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groups such as CND. The last suggestions included letters from central government 
to local authorities and public exhortations concerning the value of civil defence, 
with the aim of “... stiffening the resolve of the fainthearted.”648 However, rejecting 
the ideas laid out in the report and perhaps recognising the futility of trying to get 
local authorities to comply with legislation set out nearly 40 years previously, 
William Whitelaw indicated in July 1982 that new legislation would be brought in 
to address the problem.649 
 
The result of this was the Civil Defence (General Local Authority Functions) 
Regulations 1983 which legally compelled local authorities to make and review 
civil defence plans, establish and maintain premises which could be used as 
emergency control centres, train civil defence staff and participate in civil defence 
exercises, placing each local authority “... under a duty to comply with any 
directions given to it by the designated Minister in such circumstances as might 
prevail.”650 The primary difference between these regulations and the Civil Defence 
(Planning) Regulations 1974 which they replaced was that earlier regulations 
required local authorities only to make contingency plans, whereas the new 
regulations required them to keep their plans up to date; a policy change in order to 
prevent disruption by 'minimal compliance' local authorities and an example of 
policy consolidation.651 
 
In discussing the Regulations in October 1983 the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, 
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was keen to establish the policy climate into which the new regulations were being 
introduced. Aware that the majority of non-compliant local authorities were 
Labour-controlled, Hurd emphasised the non-political nature of the new 
regulations, painting civil defence policy as an essentially humanitarian function, a 
'common sense' policy with no other aim than to reduce suffering and loss of life.652  
 
Powers exist in case a local authority fails or refuses to discharge any 
functions conferred on it. But I wish to make it absolutely clear that 
we have no appetite for using these powers. We are not spoiling for a 
fight. We want to use reason and persuasion to achieve effective civil 
defence for this country. Because this is essentially a humanitarian 
policy, it can be separated from polemics on other matters. It should 
not be a matter of political colour. We hope that all responsible local 
authorities, whatever their political views, can co-operate in civil 
defence.653 
 
 
The most notable humanitarian function included in the 1983 Regulations was the 
inclusion, for the first time, of the necessity that local authorities make plans for 
evacuation, or the transfer of “...members of the civil population from one area to 
another in the event of hostile attack or threat of hostile attack and the 
accommodation and, so far as may be necessary, the maintenance of the persons so 
transferred.”654  
 
 
This position of civil defence in terms of the all-disasters approach was one that 
had been carefully managed by the Government; in February 1983, briefing notes 
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for the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, emphasised that the Prime Minister 
“...believed the Government's case should be presented in terms of deterrence; it 
would be much more difficult to win a debate on what might happen in a nuclear 
war; the new regulations should therefore seek to require local authorities to 
prepare for disasters of any kind..”655 A note by Whitelaw three days later observes 
wryly that the regulations would “...demoralise our supporters and enormously 
encourage CND.”656 
 
Critics of the new regulations argued that the Government was using the 
regulations as a thinly veiled attack on local authority autonomy, stating that 
government civil defence policy appeared to either be based on humanitarian 
function or was a part of Britain's overall defence strategy as it suited their 
purpose.657 This dichotomy could also be observed at the heart of Government 
itself; in January 1983, Patrick Mayhew wrote to William Whitelaw questioning the 
purpose of civil defence in light of this positioning: 
 
I still concur with the proposition that a realistic measure of civil 
defence provision gives some additional credibility to the deterrent. 
But I think its primary purpose is humanitarian, and must be so 
proclaimed. 
The primary need for civil defence is the need to provide protection 
for people in the event of an attack which we cannot guarantee to 
prevent. In terms of numbers of people who could be helped, as 
distinct from proportions of the population of an attacked area, its 
value even at the low level we are proposing is not inconsiderable.658 
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Mayhew was strongly in favour of introducing the regulations as quickly as 
possible, citing the need to maintain impetus in civil defence planning and also in 
order to thwart the actions of CND.659 It was acknowledged by both sides of the 
House however that the regulations had been devised as a direct result of the 
influence of local authority inaction, whether this was considered to be caused by 
either the irresponsible, misleading influence of peace group propaganda or 
justified, local action against the potentially disastrous, ideologically-influenced 
defence policy of central government.660 By the time the Regulations had been 
passed, 155 local authorities had declared themselves to be nuclear free.661 
 
No new powers to compel local authorities to discharge their civil defence duties 
were included with the new regulations, the Government stating that they hoped 
that “...in discharging their functions under the new regulations, the local 
authorities will respond to guidance and advice from central Government, without 
the need for formal directions.”662 In May 1984 a questionnaire was issued to local 
authorities in order to find out what level of civil defence planning had been 
achieved and the results showed wide differences in what had been done by the 
authorities both in planning and in providing resources.663  
 
In 1984-85 the Government’s budget for civil defence expenditure was set at £69.7 
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million, £11.1 million of which was allocated to local government.664 The relatively 
scarce funds allocated further fuelled the belief amongst nuclear-free local 
authorities and peace groups that the Government’s concern was for the illusion of 
protection for the populace rather than the actual provision of such; despite the 
Government's emphasis on the humanitarian function of civil defence when 
introducing the 1983 Regulations, there remained no provision for public shelters 
or evacuation. 
 
In response to the failings highlighted by this report the Government decided to 
take a direct role in monitoring the local authorities’ activities. This resulted in the 
Planned Programme of Implementation (PPI), a policy reaction to local authorities’ 
continual reluctance, issued to local authorities on 30 October 1986 as Home Office 
Circular ES 1/1986. This was coupled with a threat to withhold the civil defence 
grant, which by this time was also available to be used indirectly to support 
peacetime emergency planning after the introduction of the Civil Protection in 
Peacetime Act 1986. The Home Office explained the introduction of these new 
powers less in terms of preparing for nuclear-led foreign aggression but as part of 
the 'all-hazards' approach increasingly seen in civil defence policy making: 
 
A number of local authorities are making encouraging progress in 
meeting their civil defence responsibilities. But the rate of progress 
varies considerably and there is a great deal still to be done before 
there is a satisfactory and balanced state of preparedness across the 
country. We therefore propose to require local authorities to pursue a 
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rolling three-year programme setting priorities and a timetable for 
implementation of the 1983 regulations. The programme emphasises 
the central importance of detailed operational civil defence plans. It 
sets six-monthly target dates for their staged completion in all 
counties within two to three years. New guidance on the preparation 
of plans and on the all-hazards approach will also be issued to 
accompany the programme.665 
 
 
This change in focus to the more acceptable 'emergency planning' model of civil 
defence was a turning point in civil defence policy and a recognition that local 
authorities were far less likely to have ideological issues with planning for all kinds 
of civil emergencies.  
 
The Scientific Advisory Branch 
The Scientific Advisory Branch666 was responsible for advising all government 
departments on scientific and technical aspects of policy. In relation to civil 
defence, it researched the possible threat to the civil population posed by a future 
war using thermonuclear weapons for training exercise and protective measures, 
and the consideration of those measures that might be employed to mitigate the 
effects of enemy attack. It sponsored scientific research on issues related to civil 
defence for the Home Office and other departments involved in civil defence and 
liaised with the volunteer Civil Defence Regional Scientific Advisers and Training 
Officers. 
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As Smith notes,667 in the post-war age of the atom bomb, these advisers were 
mainly concerned with researching the same kinds of civilian defence methods 
employed during World War Two; developing shelter designs and how to mitigate 
the number of casualties from blast and fire. With the advent of the hydrogen bomb 
and the anticipated level of destruction realised in the Strath Report of 1955, the 
advisers’ options were considerably limited when faced with the reality of the 
hydrogen bomb and the severely restricted civil defence budget. Official 
government advice, in the form of 1957 publication The Hydrogen Bomb, still did 
not fully engage with the public over the level of the threat posed by the bomb, 
advising that “Radioactive dust on the body could be washed off with soap and 
water.”668 
 
This combination of overwhelming technological advance and economic 
constraints saw the advice provided by the Scientific Advisory Branch similarly 
constrained. Their focus shifted from developing means of government financed 
shelter to one of maximising chances of survival through personal protective 
measures. In the immediate post-Strath years, the branch carried out several 
experiments to measure the penetration levels of radiation and the effectiveness of 
simple protective measures that could be carried out my members of the public.669 
The results of this can be first seen in the government publication Advising the 
Householder on Protection Against Nuclear Attack (1963) which provides 
householders with practical information on building a makeshift shelter to protect 
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themselves against fallout in their own home. The recommendations were 
empirically based but heavily criticised; Duncan Campbell’s critique of the 
information as containing “various inanities and inadequacies”670 was typical of the 
general derision.  
 
The role of the scientific advisors in providing research continued into the post 
1972 period but the public advice it informed changed very little. This advice, 
which the Government would state “…at any given time is taken in the light of 
informed opinion,”671 remained defiantly similar nearly 20 years later in Protect 
and Survive (1980) and drew similar mockery and dismissal from the media and 
the public. In terms of what it could offer public protection that informed opinion 
was, as the Government fully knew, better than nothing but wholly less than 
adequate. Director of the Scientific Advisory Branch J. K. S. Clayton, in his 
introduction 'The Challenge - Why Home Defence?' in the Home Office 
1977 Training Manual for Scientific Advisers, stated that: “government Home 
Defence policy must … be aimed to increase the prospects of the survivors in their 
stricken environment.”672 This attitude is very much in evidence in the 
recommendations given in Protect and Survive, which only included: 
 
…those areas of civil defence which would be of direct relevance to 
the public including the action the public could take for protection 
against the effects of hostile attack and information on these effects 
and the complementary action that would be taken by local and 
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central Government.”673  
 
 
It can be argued that the secrecy surrounding civil defence was a contributing factor 
towards the derision that met these government publications from the general 
public. As Grant observes, “…the obsession with secrecy ensured that almost all 
the public information on nuclear attack was provided by the government’s 
opponents”674 as the public were unaware of the scientific basis for the advice they 
were offered, even if that advice was largely inadequate. The scientific 
recommendations put forward by the advisers was certainly influential; as Melissa 
Smith notes, the work of the scientific advisors was felt in both the civil defence 
advice issued by the Government and in shaping policymakers’ understanding of 
the civil defence issue, “helping to construct the ‘official’ version of nuclear war – 
a version, aimed largely at reassuring the public, which contrasted sharply with the 
devastating assessments of nuclear war contained in secret government reports.”675 
However, in terms of policy creation in the post-1972 era itself their influence was 
less surely seen. As Robin Woolven asserts: 
 
I would have placed the role of the Scientific Advisers way down the 
list of influences on civil defence policy making. Obviously the high 
level scientific input to the Home Office and MoD was influential 
but surely the local or regional volunteer scientific advisers were an 
economic (i.e. cheap) way of inserting professional advice on such 
matters as fall out dispersion etc.676 
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The role of the Scientific Advisory Branch as an external influence in policy 
making was ultimately hobbled by economic and ideological forces. The move 
towards a defence policy that relied upon a strategy of deterrence combined with 
the need to maintain public support for expenditure on nuclear weapons led to the 
publication of official public information which, while empirical in nature, owed 
their creation more to shifting political priorities than evidence based research. 
 
Peace Groups and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
As Cortright notes, attempting to evaluate the impact of the peace movement on 
policy is difficult and presents certain methodological challenges.677 The methods 
by which the campaigns of peace groups are measured for success are often 
imprecise and subject to bias, relying on subjective analysis by the groups 
themselves or the impressions given by government officials who are often 
extremely reluctant to admit any influence. Additionally, it can be difficult to 
ascertain whether the peace groups themselves were ever a catalyst for change or 
whether more influence can be ascribed to a shift in public attitudes which granted 
the movement its strength.  
 
Against the backdrop of increasing public anxiety surrounding the British 
ownership and potential use of nuclear weapons following three British nuclear 
tests in 1957, a group emerged to coordinate the anti-nuclear movement in Britain. 
The National Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT) 
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initially focussed on putting pressure on the Government to ban weapons testing 
and by the end of its formation year, boasted 100 local chapters.678 Anti-nuclear 
sentiment had been rising for some time within the Labour Party and the various 
peace groups and activists united under the umbrella organisation of NCANWT 
had hoped that the party would repudiate the use of nuclear weapons at its 1957 
conference. But when Aneurin Bevan, who had previously led the anti-nuclear 
movement within the Labour party, declared his pro-nuclear stance, the well-known 
playwright J.B. Priestly penned a stinging article in The New Statesman, calling on 
people to refute the 'nuclear madness': 
 
As the game gets faster, the competition keener, the unthinkable will 
turn into the inevitable, the weapons will take command, and the 
deterrents will not deter. Our bargaining power is slight; the force of 
our example might be great. 679 
 
 
J. B. Priestley's article attracted great favourable response and, combined with the 
move towards greater nuclear deterrence announced in the 1957 White Paper on 
Defence this served as motivation for the establishment of the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in January 1958.680 As Smith notes, by offering the 
public an alternative politics which sought to challenge the official version of Cold 
War defence, CND presented itself as a threat to the process of policy making 
itself, one that would persist to this day. 681 
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CND sought to undermine the official narrative of nuclear weapons and civil 
defence policy, but the level to which it – and other peace movements active during 
the last two decades of the Cold War - contributed to the development and 
termination of such policy is a matter for debate. Certainly civil defence was on 
CND's agenda from the early years of its formation, as it attempted to expose what 
it considered a wilfully fraudulent narrative of public protection and draw attention 
to the inherent dishonesty in the policy itself. In 1961 CND's newsletter Sanity 
carried the group's anti-deterrence position on civil defence which would remain 
unchanged until the end of the Cold War: “Civil defence is expressly intended to 
deceive the public into believing that Britain could survive a nuclear war – a belief 
which provides a reason for maintaining a nuclear deterrent.”682 
 
In 1980, CND’s membership doubled to 9,000 national members and a further 
250,000 in local branches,683 including a specialist subsection Labour CND, open 
to parliamentarians and members of the Labour Party. While CND itself was not an 
organisation formally affiliated with the Labour Party, CND supporters were 
generally to the left of British politics and in the immediate years after its 
inception, roughly three-quarters of its supporters were Labour voters684 and many 
of the early executive committee were Labour Party members.685 During the 1980s, 
several Labour peers and MPs were sympathetic to CND’s views on unilateral 
disarmament and the fraudulence of civil defence, some expressing their support 
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for the organisation in open debate.686 Labour peer Hugh Jenkins, speaking in the 
House of Lords in 1982, argued that the popularity of anti-nuclear organisations 
such as CND lay with the policies of government itself: 
 
One reason for the great growth of CND has been the failure of the 
Government to sustain the pretence of survival in a sufficiently 
convincing way. I think that the nuclear warriors have been rather 
dull in failing to see that this pretence is a necessary part of the 
policy. The trouble is that the Government really do not believe it 
themselves, and if they want successfully to deceive the people, they 
must first deceive themselves.687 
 
 
As Bruce Kent, General Secretary of CND from 1979-1987, later commented: 
“Civil defence was the best thing the government did for CND. It made people 
realise that the suggestions it contained were absurd.”688  
 
CND's primary tool was using the arguments for civil defence as weapons against 
it, and they were skilled in turning Government advice and publicity surrounding 
civil defence to condemn it. The organisation produced a considerable volume of 
literature which directly challenged the information produced by government, often 
directly contrasting the official narrative of government with one that appealed to 
the 'common sense' of the public, invoking the horror of nuclear war in an attempt 
to expose the 'myth' of protection. A 1982 publication by CND supporter Philip 
Bolsover epitomised the emotional approach taken by CND: 
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Much of the Government's thinking is, as it frequently indicated, 
based on the idea that the 'winner' of a nuclear war will be the 
country that has the most people alive at the end – even if that 
country is a radioactive rubbish heap! So, if one day you crawl alive 
from under your table you may stand on the piles of dead and peer 
through the smoking ruins with joy in your heart – for we may have 
won. And perhaps, somewhere somebody on the 'enemy' side will be 
doing as you are doing; hoping that maybe his pile of poisoned, burnt 
and shattered bodies is smaller than yours – his sign of victory.689 
 
 
The publication of Protect and Survive gave particular ammunition to CND in 1980 
and it provided a focus for the public’s anxieties towards nuclear war. The 
organisation quickly produced emotive materials critiquing Protect and Survive690 
and by extension, the Government’s position on both civil defence and nuclear 
weapons. John Preston argued that “…Protect and Survive has always been used as 
a reference point both by government and critics for bad civil defence policy”691 
and this was confirmed by Bruce Kent who acknowledged that “…we certainly 
used Protect & Survive to our advantage.”692 
 
 
Thompson and Bolsover argued that civil defence was a step towards making the 
idea of ‘limited’ nuclear war acceptable, an attempt to convince the public of the 
possibility of survival. As Thompson argued “…the country…must now not only 
be made to bear…the expectation, as a definite and imminent possibility, of actual 
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nuclear devastation.”693 As Stafford points out, by offering the public a state-
approved script on how to respond to nuclear war, the Government opened up the 
possibility for critique and reinterpretations of a post-nuclear Britain.694 CND took 
full advantage of this opportunity, using the tools of ridicule and protest to advance 
the nuclear debate with the public. As Bruce Kent stated, “More than anything civil 
defence changed the way people thought about nuclear war.  CND played no 
official part in [policy development] but we always ridiculed civil defence and this 
undermined policy by making it so ridiculous.”695 
 
Nevertheless, it was the Government's policy to engage with disarmament groups 
where possible, and there does not appear to be evidence to suggest that the 
government was deliberately withholding information on civil defence plans and 
exercises from peace organisations and, subsequently, from the public. A meeting 
of the Police War Duties Committee in May 1982 noted that there had been 
enquiries from peace groups whether there were any special plans for the police in 
the event of war, whether these plans could be extended to the public and what 
extent of police participation could be expected in the forthcoming exercise Hard 
Rock. It was noted in the minutes that while no comment was offered for the last 
two points, “...in the Home Office view it is advisable to respond to such queries as 
openly and directly as possible”.696  
 
The Government’s civil defence planning exercises were certainly an opportunity 
                                               
693  Thompson, E. and Smith, D. (1980)  p.47 
694  Stafford, J. (2012) p. 401 
695  Interview with Bruce Kent, General Secretary of CND 1979-1987, 23 September 2013 
696  TNA: HO 322/1012 Minutes of the Police War Committee (Wednesday 5 and Thursday 6 May 1982) 
268 
 
for CND to use its tools to parody and in 1982, it sought to explore the potential for 
subverting the ‘Hard Rock’ exercise with its campaign ‘Hard Luck’. In 
collaboration with the sympathetic organisation Scientist Against Nuclear Arms, 
CND produced a pack which urged local groups to campaign and “…bridge the gap 
between the abstract/technical reality and the concrete reality of a nuclear war 
situation.”697  
 
The Government had devoted relatively little time to studying the effects of a co-
ordinated anti-nuclear campaign on the public perception of government policy and 
did not seem to regard CND or other anti-nuclear groups as a threat to policy until 
1980 when the government acknowledged that their review of civil defence 
“...coincided with the CND's revival and, although we have sought to distance civil 
defence from the nuclear issues, much damage has been done at local level.”698  
 
In July 1981 it was noted by the emergency planning division of the Home Office 
that “...we are still awaiting Ministerial decisions about the proposed campaign to 
present the Government's home defence policy to a public increasingly deluged by 
CND propaganda.”699 The effects of the co-ordinated anti-nuclear campaign by 
CND and related groups was a cause of anxiety for civil defence planning and 
policy making and frequently discussed in civil defence progress reports and 
departmental meetings, as was a concerted campaign of defence against the 
message of CND: 
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Our increasing anxiety over the CND and END [European Nuclear 
Disarmament] attacks on civil defence, which we have some 
evidence to believe are affecting the morale of professional and 
volunteer civil defence workers, is now shared by both the Ministry 
of Defence and the FCO which are, of course, more concerned with 
the wider CND campaign against national defence policy and the 
nuclear deterrence in particular. We are today meeting MOD and 
FCO to consider a strategy for presenting a coherent defence of 
government policy covering both military and home defence.700 
 
 
Despite this assertion, no concerted campaign of information to counter the anti-
nuclear message ever appeared. The extent of the Government's counter-
propaganda amounted to little more than the publication of the previously-
discussed and poorly-distributed pamphlet Civil Defence: why we need it  published 
in December 1981, in which, it was agreed, the link between civil defence and the 
nuclear deterrent would not be included.701 The link between civil defence and 
deterrence was a dangerous one for the Government in terms of support for civil 
defence: as CND knew:  
 
…it made people realise that despite what the government was 
saying, deterrence was not a foolproof arrangement.  It was very 
important to the government: the foreign office put out a statement 
saying that accidents can’t happen but of course they can happen, 
human error can happen.  The government said it was better to have 
civil defence, but if you are saying that you need to have civil 
defence you are saying that deterrence is not foolproof.702 
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The Government “fully recognised”703 the problems that CND were causing at a 
local level and in January 1982, a letter to the Home Office from the Home 
Defence College at Easingwold stated that more effort should be devoted to the 
potential threat from peace groups; “...our recent and continuing experience with 
the anti-nuclear campaign teaches the need to apply all the foresight we can muster 
to dealing with the much more virulent campaign that we might expect should we 
come close to war”.704  
 
In the face of growing unease amongst the public to the idea of nuclear war, fanned 
by the success of information-distributing campaigns by anti-nuclear groups, the 
Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Heseltine, in 1983 set up a Ministry of 
Defence subgroup, Secretariat 19, with the express purpose of explaining “... to the 
public the facts about the Government's policy on deterrence and multilateral 
disarmament."705 Speaking about this period, Bruce Kent acknowledges the 
difficulty of determining the effectiveness of CND’s campaigning, but was clear on 
the distinction between the influence of CND on policy determinism and the effect 
of the group on the Government itself:  “Very difficult to assess the impact of CND 
[on civil defence policy] but I think the Government overestimated the importance 
[of the organisation]. Heseltine would not debate us, he thought that CND could 
swing the outcome of the 1983 election but I don’t ever think CND was a major 
threat to the Government.”706 
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CND closely aligned itself with civil defence non-compliance such as in the case of 
exercise Hard Rock in 1982 which it saw as an opportunity to disrupt central 
government policy, stating “... Hard Rock offers CND groups throughout Britain 
the chance to mount a nationwide campaign of protest and resistance to the civil 
defence con trick”707 and gave their full support to any local authorities choosing 
not to comply with the exercise. The Government recognised that it was vital for 
the integrity of civil defence policy that CND be prevented where at all possible 
from claiming the cancellation of Hard Rock as a victory708 but as Grant argues, in 
using the “language of annihilation”,709 CND forced the Government into having to 
rethink the way it communicated with the public in order to defend its civil defence 
policy.  This, it can be argued, is the greatest success of CND and similar groups. 
 
 
Conclusion 
There is strong evidence to argue that civil defence policy post-1972, as it was pre-
1972, was influenced by external factors. By 1968, East-West relations were 
undergoing a period of détente and the perceived reduction in the risk of a nuclear 
or conventional exchange involving Britain was compelling enough that it was 
cited as one of the determining factors behind the decision to place civil defence on 
a 'care and maintenance' basis. Despite the revival of civil defence as a policy 
concern in 1972 and the acknowledgement that danger from accident or 
miscalculation could never be completely removed, the focus of home defence 
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during much of the 1970s was on more generalised emergency planning, reflecting 
this period of decreased international tension.  
 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 followed quickly by the election of 
Margaret Thatcher, and then Ronald Reagan, two world leaders of significant 
influence opposed to the concessions of détente, signalled the end of this period of 
relaxed relations between the superpowers and the re-emergence of civil defence. 
The result of this was the largest review of civil defence that had been seen since its 
reactivation in 1972 and that would be seen until the end of the Cold War. Upon 
announcing the outcome of the review it was stated that the resulting plans to 
substantially increase spending on civil defence were not linked to any perceived 
risk from an external threat and that civil defence was just an important adjunct to a 
balanced defence policy, in keeping with Conservative doctrine on developing and 
maintaining a strong defence capability.  
 
As the actions of the authorities and sympathetic peace groups such as CND cannot 
be analysed without reference to their motivating ideologies, the Conservative 
government’s battle against the nuclear-free local authorities cannot be seen in 
isolation. It combined an ideological distaste for the peace movement with hostility 
towards local government on the whole.710 It can be argued that by increasing 
control over local authority defence responsibilities, central government sought to 
curtail local authority independence during the period in question and as even until 
the late 1980s, central government was still seeking to curtail local government 
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influence in the creation of civil defence policy by claiming it as exclusively a  
“...concern of national government.”711 The nature of central government policy in 
itself was also a contributing factor in the refusal of many local authorities to co-
operate with civil defence plans.  
 
Many of the causes of local authority non-compliance were non-political and 
contained within the policy itself. The Government would not provide local 
authorities with accurate data for use in civil defence planning – for both reasons of 
security and over fears that this information would be obtained and used to the 
detriment of the Government by opponents of civil defence - thereby limiting the 
practical value of any resulting planning. In the face of the Government's dilemma, 
the nuclear-free zones and CND won the propaganda war as public confidence in 
civil defence waned and the Government was forced to re-evaluate the way it 
communicated its policy to the public. Despite this, it was the political support of 
the Labour Party that gave the local authorities their momentum and ultimately the 
succession of policy changes introduced to maintain Government policy in the face 
of the threat of policy termination.  
 
It can be argued that the nuclear-free authorities' campaign against civil defence 
was a mixture of success and failure in terms of policy influence. The refusal of 
local authorities to comply with central government planning certainly served to 
keep the nuclear debate in the public mind and individual council initiatives helped 
to bring the issue to the attention of many. The alternative information on civil 
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defence provided by the nuclear-free zones also highlighted the credibility gaps in 
the Government’s policy and exposed the faults in the factors that led to these 
policies. The major success of the campaign was the cancellation of the Hard Rock 
exercise and the reduction of local authority involvement in civil defence to an 
absolute minimum.  
 
The polarisation of county councils and central government in the early 1980s on 
the issue of civil defence policy represents one of the largest mass acts of political 
rebellion in Cold War British history. Nevertheless in this success lay the seeds of 
its own failure, in the shape of the Civil Defence (General Local Authority 
Functions) Regulations 1983 and the subsequent Planned Programme for 
Implementation which substantially increased minimum duties and forced local 
authorities to conform to central government requirements. As such it can be said 
that while the dissenting local authorities forced the Government to continually 
review its policy in order to keep implementation possible, these changes were to 
the detriment of the aims of the authorities. The local authorities also had little 
effect on civil defence policy itself; while it was certainly an aim of policy makers 
in shifting policy from the traditional hostile attack model of civil defence to the 
peacetime, civil contingencies model to ensure local authorities complied with civil 
defence planning, the nature of those plans were more significantly influenced by 
thawing East-West tensions than any actions of peace groups or nuclear free 
councils.  
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It can be argued that all possible interpretations regarding the nature of civil 
defence policy in the last two decades of the Cold War are functions of a much 
broader political perspective. Monocausal interpretations that focus exclusively on 
any one sphere of influence as a mutually exclusive or discreet entity are 
necessarily inadequate; as Buckley states: 
 
...it is possible to observe that in a democracy such as Britain's the 
means of representation and the process of representation are locked 
in a symbiotic relationship whereby each necessarily and inevitably 
influences the other.712  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that British civil defence was the product of a long 
and complex process of interaction and reaction between the contrasting, 
complementary and conflicting political forces and agencies at work during this 
time. At no point was civil defence ever a single, cohesive policy but rather a 
heterogeneous collection of policies with a muddy genesis, sprawling evolution, 
impenetrably intertwined influences and often contradictory character. At various 
times during the creation and implementation of the assortment of policies that 
comprised public protection against the threat of nuclear attack it is possible to 
identify significant influences upon those policies. But the relationship between 
economics, ideology and external factors is a close and synergistic one, from which 
it is impossible to extrapolate a lone thread of causality or single defining 
influence. 
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The rational model of public policy analysis is arguably the most widely held view 
of the way policy is made. It defines policy making as a problem solving process 
that operates with rational, balanced, objective and analytical properties and 
decisions are made within a sequential set of phases. The rational model assumes 
that the policy maker is firstly able to accurately identify the nature of the problem 
to be addressed, that the aims and objectives of policy creation are defined, that all 
alternative ways of addressing the issue are considered and compared with 
objective criteria and that the goal of the policy maker is to achieve the best 
possible solution to a problem.  If policies do not achieve their objectives, the fault 
is considered to lie with problems in the political or administrative implementation, 
not with the policy itself.  
 
The rational model of policy making often assumes a significant quantity of 
specialised, accurate knowledge, the clarity of goals and criteria, that rational 
measurable criteria are available and agreed upon and the time and resources exist 
to define and analyse all possible alternatives. However, real-world policy making 
often operates in the absence of one or more of these factors and this was certainly 
so in the case of civil defence which did not operate in a rational and reasonable 
sphere demanded by the rational model, dominated as it was by political, practical 
and socio-cultural forces. Such a linear model also ignores the role of people and 
organisations in the process and the gap between decision and implementation, 
both significant factors in the decision made about civil defence.  As such, for the 
purpose of understanding policy making in this sphere, this thesis has demonstrated 
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that using only the rational model, characterised by objective analysis of options 
and the separation of policy from implementation, is inadequate for the purpose. As 
Anderson notes, “we need to recognise that policy making involves both 
incremental and fundamental decisions.”713 Civil defence can be better understood 
by the use of a combination of models applied to various aspects of policy to 
illuminate aspects of the complex interaction of influence.  
 
As Hill states, “the rationalism/incrementalism debate is beside the point when it is 
party political commitment or ideology rather than either rational planning or 
‘partisan mutual adjustment’ that drives the policy debate”714 and it is important to 
see the policy making process in its institutional context which made both rational 
and incremental decision making difficult at times. March and Olsen argue that 
“insofar as political actors act by making choices, they act within definitions of 
alternatives, consequences, preferences (interests) and strategic options that are 
strongly affected by the constitutional context in which the actors find 
themselves”715  and it was in strongly partisan and ideologically-driven 
administrations that many of the policy decisions surrounding civil defence were 
made.  
 
In the last two decades of the Cold War, the civil defence programme came under 
attack from both the left and the right for its perceived inadequacies, but this 
criticism stemmed from widely differing ideological perspectives. Critics within 
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the Conservative party, broadly in favour of civil defence as a necessary adjunct to 
a strong military and a defence policy based on the theory of nuclear deterrence, 
viewed the practical inadequacies of a no shelter, no evacuation policy as 
something which undermined the effectiveness of the deterrent posture, a nod 
towards the idea that a nuclear war was unwinnable. The Conservative 
governments under Thatcher were unwilling to spend large amounts of money on 
civil defence since this might suggest that the British independent deterrent - the 
maintenance and upgrade of which did have large budgets attached to it - might 
fail. A strong military was a fundamental part of Conservative ideology and it was 
eager to avoid public debate around the question of the effectiveness and worth of 
the deterrent, especially as this might in turn have brought fresh calls for nuclear 
disarmament.  
 
It could be argued that the revival of civil defence in the early 1970s and the 
increase in civil defence spending under the Conservative governments from 1981 
might imply a shift in policy concerns away from the idea of mutually assured 
destruction towards concepts of survivable or even winnable wars.716 It could also 
be argued that the increase in spending seen in the Conservative administrations 
was simply a result of humanitarian concerns or conversely, as a means of 
introducing covert methods of control and surveillance under the guise of 
provisions for public protection. Objectors to civil defence from Labour and other 
left-wing organisations and peace groups, while often noting the potential 
protection of a deterrent capability, were grounded in the belief in the inherently 
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dishonest practice of leading the public to believe that a nuclear war was 
survivable. Simultaneously, the possible erosion of civil liberties and the 
introduction of means of social and political control introduced under the auspices 
of civil defence legislation were of concern to those of the left. Nuclear war was 
often seen as a pretext for the suppression of subversive elements of society in 
attempt to preserve political and economic power. 
 
The Garbage Can theory describes a model of policy analysis that stresses the 
anarchical nature of organisations as 'loose collections of ideas' as opposed to 
rational 'coherent structures'. Organisations discover preferences through action, 
rather than act out of preferences. Understanding is poor, trial and error learning 
operates, and membership is fluid.717 This ‘organised anarchy’ system of decision 
making is characterised by three general properties: problematic, inconsistent or ill-
defined preferences; unclear technology, procedures or processes; and the varying 
involvement of decision makers. The nature of the choice, the time it takes, and the 
problems it solves all depend on a complicated inter-meshing of a combination of 
four streams: the problems, choices available, possible solutions and outside 
influences on policy makers, or, as Cohen et al. state: “a collection of choices 
looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which 
they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, 
and decision makers looking for work”.718 
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In the Garbage Can model, issues or problems are disassociated from choices. This 
gives an image of a garbage can in which participants in the decision making 
process are rummaging around for either a solution to a new (or recurring) problem 
or for a previously rejected problem to which an existing or favoured solution can 
be applied.719 Problems are addressed on a solution basis but the process does not 
necessarily follow a rational method as the capacity of policy makers to make 
decisions can be limited by two potential problems. Firstly, they may have 
ambiguous or unclear preferences, with different ideas about what the goal of the 
decision should or shouldn’t be and secondly, they may have too little information 
about their options to make objectively rational decisions.  
 
The Garbage Can model posits that the manner in which governments make 
choices under this kind of goal ambiguity leads to policy being created in the 
absence of consensus, and March and Olsen argue that problems are linked to 
solutions primarily by their time of arrival in the garbage can, and therefore policy 
choices are made “…for the most part either before any problems are connected to 
them (oversight) or after the problems have abandoned one choice to associate 
themselves to another.”720 This sloppy and haphazard process can be most clearly 
be observed in successive governments’ attempts to disseminate civil defence 
policy information to the general public. 
 
As in the garbage can model, civil defence policy making was seen to have 
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satisfactory, rather than optimal, goals, and where the policy decisions met the 
necessary outcomes on an acceptable level there was no attempt to 
comprehensively evaluate alternatives. No government could afford to admit that 
there was no proper defence for the civilian population721 while at the same time 
privately acknowledging that there could be no widespread protection against 
nuclear attack. Thus, where civil defence information was made available to the 
public, it was instead an attempt to persuade the people that the results of a nuclear 
exchange would not, with a little citizen-led action and self-reliance, be 
catastrophic. An acceptable solution in the form of Protect and Survive was fished 
from the garbage can that reflected the only choices available.  
 
There is a tendency for the defence debate in Britain to revolve more around the 
question of economic costs than strategic objectives722 however, and this thesis has 
shown that the economic influences on civil defence policy were not necessarily of 
a party political persuasion. Since the revival of civil defence in 1972, civil defence 
expenditure did not consistently fall under Labour governments and rise under 
Conservatives ones. The Labour administration of the 1970s demonstrated a high 
level of policy continuation as shown by its agreement with previous Conservative 
government's reluctance to plan for shelter provision on the grounds of cost. While 
both parties displayed support for the policy of nuclear deterrence, their attitudes 
towards civil defence provision varied in their commitment, independent of their 
levels of expenditure. The economic playing field has not always been a level one 
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with the Labour administration of 1974-1979 facing severer external budgetary 
constraints than the Conservative government of the 1980s. In real terms however, 
the expenditure levels after the 1980-81 review still amounted to less than was 
spent during the previous Labour government. While this illustrates that it is 
impossible to take economic factors alone as a variable, independent of all others, it 
can be seen that economic influences played an important part in the development 
and later implementation of civil defence policy.  
 
The 1981 review of home preparedness was a significant moment in post 1968 civil 
defence policy making and the results of the review were often ambiguous and 
inconsistent. The Government assessment of the threat of war seemed to place it 
somewhere between not likely enough to justify a programme of mass shelter 
building and likely enough that civil defence measures ought to be of  whatever 
quality an additional £45 million a year by 1983-84 might provide. For a 
government committed to a reduction in expenditure this appears uncharacteristic, 
and it could be argued that with policy decisions such as choosing not to resurrect 
the Civil Defence Corps as not “cost-effective”723 but simultaneously calling for 
more volunteers to assist in local preparedness exercises, the Government was 
acknowledging the need for greater civil defence provision but was unable or 
unwilling to back this up with a firm policy commitment, with the resulting 
financial obligations this would create. Thus the Government was caught in a 
complicated dilemma from which the policy results are a strange, ambivalent 
hybrid of bombastic rhetoric and attempted public mollification, where it was 
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acknowledged in publicly available literature that there was cause for the public to 
be concerned, but not to a level of alarm that might generate demand for a public 
shelter building scheme.  
 
The general public was given many varied justifications both moral and political 
for the reluctance of the Government to provide a higher level of 'insurance' for 
what they considered a relatively small risk, but it was the economic reasons that 
were most often cited, specifically for the lack of a wide scale shelter building and 
evacuation scheme. The public was reminded of the balance between risk and 
economic justification in official public information on civil defence such as Civil 
Defence: why we need it. However such information often appeared deliberately 
simplistic and overly reassuring and offered no explanation for the public as to how 
it was to understand apparent contradictions such as the 1980 review of home 
defence's increase in expenditure in light of the only 'slight risk' of war.  Neither did 
official information comment upon the ambiguity of a civil defence policy that 
drew so heavily on the concept of deterrence, leaving many critics of Government 
policy suspicious of the Government's claims of the effects of economic restrictions 
on civil defence policy and arguing for a more comprehensive policy financed by a 
reduction in the imbalance between the billions spent on defence and the millions 
allocated to civil defence.  
 
Ultimately it was not measures for public protection that was most significantly 
shaped by economic considerations but the very nature of what was meant by 'civil 
defence'. Each government since 1972 made it clear that policies for public 
286 
 
protection would proceed not by what was needed but by what could be afforded, 
but in practice this translated not to additional measures for public protection but to 
redefinitions of the scope of civil defence to justify additional expenditure. In turn, 
the motivation behind the increases and decreases in expenditure bore more 
relation to ideological postures than it did to any administration’s economic 
policies or the economic situation of the time.  Although the economic climate was 
frequently cited by both ministers and subsequently by commentators as a 
consideration when developing civil defence policy, this thesis has shown that a 
direct link between expenditure and the state of the economy in real terms cannot 
be observed.  
 
Peace groups and disarmament campaigns such as CND also highlighted the 
impotence of civil defence measures against nuclear weapons, recognising the 
contradictions inherent in civil defence policy. They questioned the motivations of 
the champions of civil defence on the right, arguing that even if the Government 
wished to increase spending on civil defence it could not do so without calling into 
question the credibility of its deterrent and subsequently its entire defence policy. 
Civil defence was therefore seen by its critics on the left as a dishonest policy 
which attempted to legitimise by stealth those foreign, military and economic 
policies which were only likely to exacerbate the prospect of nuclear war. The 
perspectives of those on the political left and right also divided commentators at the 
time, as can be seen stated in Rogers (et al.) and Lee, respectively: 
 
If civil defence is part of our system of deterrence by virtue of 
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showing that we will use nuclear weapons if we have to, it is also 
part of our deterrence in the sense that it is integral to the process 
which may lead to the use of those weapons.724 
It may not be assumed that one country’s ability – or one power 
bloc’s ability – to protect its population is any indication of its 
willingness to join in a war, or even start it. Conversely, one side’s 
inability to protect its people should never be assumed to be a sign 
that it would be reluctant to go to war – or start it.725 
 
Group theory attempts to describe all political activity in terms of the group 
struggle, and policy makers are viewed as constantly responding to petitions, 
bargaining and negotiating amongst influential groups. Political parties can be 
made from coalitions of special interest groups, but it was CND that managed to 
best exploit the opportunities presented by the impositional policy approach of the 
Conservative government. CND represented a bridge between the public and 
government, one that, as group theory illustrated, had to be managed by the 
government to achieve policy equilibrium.  However, the large grass roots support 
enjoyed by CND in the 1980s did not translate to direct and measurable change in 
policy selection. As Stafford notes “…the evidence suggests that low levels of 
confidence in civil defence did not seriously undermine Thatcher, or lead to an 
increase in public support for Labour’s defence policies.”726  
 
This suggests that in group theory terms, neither CND nor any related peace groups 
as a consolidation of single-interest organisations exhibited sufficient power to 
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significantly disturb the policy equilibrium. Additionally, as Peter Dorey notes, the 
objectives of special interest groups such as CND in the 1980s were considered too 
extreme for the Government to countenance and were therefore afforded 'outsider' 
status, without access to elite-level policy makers.727 Denied access to the core 
executive, outside interest groups instead seek to influence policy through 
parliament or through extra-parliamentary activities such as raising public 
awareness, seeking to influence the systemic agenda instead.728 As such the major 
influence of CND lay not in the realm of policy development but instead within the 
public sphere and the way they compelled the Government to alter the way they 
presented information about civil defence to the public and the mobilisation of the 
public in an activism that was in direct contrast to the Government sanctioned 
passivity of their official public advice. As Bruce Kent asserts:  
 
 
CND certainly made people stop and think on the issue of nuclear 
weapons and civil defence was a major factor in changing many 
people’s minds.  Reagan said “we get our policies off your banners” 
and of course he was being sarcastic, but while you can never say 
how things would have been, there was certainly a sense that we had 
an effect on the Government.729  
 
 
The interests of organised groups have long been recognised as central to policy 
making in Britain and proponents of the group theory of political analysis stress the 
importance of these interests in policy making. To group theorists, policy making 
is, at any one time, the result of the balance reached in the struggle between interest 
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groups and policy will change direction towards those groups exhibiting more 
power and influence and away from those groups whose influence is waning. As 
Earl Latham describes: 
 
What may be called public policy is actually the equilibrium reached 
in the group struggle at any given moment, and it represents a 
balance which the contending factions or groups constantly strive to 
tip in their favour...The legislature referees the group struggle, 
ratifies the victories of the successful coalition, and records the terms 
of the surrenders, compromises, and conquests in the form of 
statutes.730 
 
The theory of incrementalism states that policy making is essentially evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary, and this incremental approach can be seen throughout 
Cold War civil defence policy making and notably in the revival of civil defence in 
1972. Developed by Charles Lindblom in his 1959 article The Science of Muddling 
Through731 and subsequent work, incrementalism is a conservative policy making 
approach in which policy changes are made in the margin of existing policies. 
Instead of developing new policies, existing policies are improved or amended and 
subsequently are often only incrementally different, using, as Lindblom describes 
it: “the method of successive limited comparisons”.732 Lindblom argued that a 
rational decision making process was “…not workable for complex policy 
questions”733 and that policy makers often instead “muddle through” by making 
incremental adjustments to policies rather than engaging in a comprehensive and 
                                               
730  Latham, E. (1956)  
731  Lindblom, C. (1959) The Science of Muddling Through in Public Administration Review vol.9 no.2 
pp.79-88 
732  Lindblom, C. (1959) p. 80 
733  Ibid. p.81 
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logical process as seen in the rational model. With an incrementalist approach, 
successive comparisons are made to already existing policies and policy makers 
seek to reach agreement through negotiation where they can. This ‘branch’ 
approach sees policies developed through continually building on current 
situations, in contrast with the ‘root’ approach of rationalism which starts from 
“…fundamentals anew each time, building on the past only as experience 
embodied in a theory, and always prepared to start from the ground up.”734 
 
Typically, an incrementalist policy is one which provides only a limited, short-term 
amelioration of the issue posed on the political agenda, created in an environment 
where only a limited number of alternatives and consequences have been 
considered and where the goal is not to maximise a solution but to produce one that 
is administratively satisfactory. Political agreement is emphasized as a strategy and 
the measure of a good outcome, rather than by clearly defining policy goals, policy 
instruments and criteria to measure success and subsequently, incrementalism is a 
result of several intertwining political issues.735  Therefore, an incremental 
approach to policy making is often considered easier than a rationalist one; 
resulting policy changes are often more politically expedient as they do not 
necessitate any redistribution of policy values and subsequently, incrementalism 
tries to improve the acceptability of public policy. 
 
As Hill notes, “From an empirical perspective, policy processes are in many 
respects continuous processes of evolution in which a realistic starting point may 
                                               
734  Ibid. 
735  Lindblom, C. and Woodhouse, E. (1993) 
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be far back in history.”736 Lindblom argued that the incremental approach 
represents the typical decision making process in pluralist societies such as the 
United Kingdom737, and this is certainly a process seen very clearly in the creation 
of civil defence policy in the last two decades of the Cold War which produced no 
original or innovative policy decisions but a series of choices based on existing 
policy, often originally created as far back as World War Two. This can be seen to 
have been influenced by economic considerations as incrementalism consumes far 
fewer resources than a more systemic, rational approach. Successive governments 
repeatedly rejected innovative, expensive policy choices, resorting instead to 
improving and adapting existing civil defence programmes. Remedial in nature, 
civil defence policy focussed on what policy makers considered to be politically 
and economically feasible, rather than what the best solution to the problem was 
and it is in this approach that the most obvious failings of public protection are to 
be found. 
 
 Lindblom identified a flaw in the rational model by noting how policies change as 
they move through levels of bureaucracy to the point at which they are 
implemented: “Implementation always makes or changes policy to some 
degree.”738  The failure of the Thatcher Government to secure a means of co-
operative implementation for its civil defence policies led to politically significant 
policy termination, highlighting the dangerous dichotomy between policy making 
and implementation in the incrementalist process.   
                                               
736  Hill, M. (2009) p. 143 
737  Anderson, J. (2010) p.13 
738  Lindblom, C. (1993)  
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A process of incrementalism was politically expedient in the civil defence policy 
arena as it often – though not always - enabled agreements to be reached between 
stakeholders on matters of policy dispute with only slight modifications to existing 
policy, rather than adopting the much more politically risky all or nothing 
approach. A more rational approach would have required a complete knowledge 
and anticipation of the consequences of policy decisions,739 but as the nature of 
civil defence necessitated working under conditions of untested uncertainty, this 
reduced the nature of the risk in adopting potentially unpopular policies. As a 
result, incrementalism yielded practical, affordable, but limited and compromised 
policies. From 1972, as Dye notes, policy makers generally accepted the legitimacy 
of existing policies and tacitly agreed to continue with existing decisions.740 The 
incrementalism model of decision making that, more than any other model, 
characterised civil defence policy throughout the later Cold War 
 
While certain actions of non-domestic actors occurred largely independently of 
British politics, it was often the ideological reaction of British policy makers that 
ascribed significance to these events and as such inflated the influence that these 
events had on policy creation. The anxiety that many Conservative politicians had 
after the Soviet actions of 1979 concerning the perceived ineffectualness of civil 
defence preparations for example, could often be ascribed more to a reaction based 
on a hard line foreign policy doctrine than the event itself.   
                                               
739  Jordan, A. (1987) p.12 
740  Dye, T. (2012) p.18 
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Whatever the actual influence of ideologically-filtered thinking about the potential 
risk from frosty East-West relations on policy making, it cannot be said that the 
events resulting from the collapse of détente were not important in both the timing 
and outcomes of policy decisions.  It was an external influence in the form of a 
temporary thawing of East-West relations at the end of the 1960s that was the 
primary determinant in the decision to place civil defence on a 'care and 
maintenance' basis in 1968. The general disinterest in civil defence by all but the 
most dedicated advocates until 1972 can be seen as a mixture of response to low-
risk threat assumptions and increasingly severe competition for ever more limited 
funds. During the final years of the Cold War, the Soviet Union's redirection of the 
country's resources from expensive military commitments to more productive areas 
in the civilian sector contributed towards accelerating détente between Moscow and 
the West and, amid renewed talks on economic issues and the scaling-back of the 
arms race, the threat of nuclear war receded.  
 
The winding down of civil defence as a response to this lessening danger and its 
eventual transformation into an 'all-hazards' model of emergency preparedness that 
began with the 1986 Civil Protection in Peacetime Act was the ultimate example of 
external influence on policy making. The traditional model of civil defence was 
abandoned at the end of the Cold War, the policy recognised as one created in 
response to an external situation that on longer existed and heralded the 
transformation of civil defence into the model of emergency preparedness seen 
today. 
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